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ABSTRACT

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESS AND TRADITIONAL
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION OF IRAN
This thesis is essentially a study of the development of the Iranian press, principally
in the latter 19th Century and early 20th Century, and its relationship with traditional
Communications systems during the broad period of the Constitutional Revolution, a
seminal event in contemporary Iranian history. Although the core period of the
Constitutional Revolution was 1906-11, the thesis also studies the role of both mass
and traditional Communications systems in the preparatory period from the early
1880s. Furthermore, it looks more briefly at the aftermath of the Constitutional period
until 1925 when the Pahlavi dynasty succeeded to the throne of Iran.
Thus, the thesis examines the press and its evolving role in Iranian society during a
crucial period of more than 50 years after establishing a context for the introduction of
printing and a press tradition in Iran. Overall, the Iranian press has had a turbulent
history of some 150 years complicated by the country's struggle for democracy and
national independence. The fortunes of the press have followed the politicai fortunes
of the country. F r o m the early 19th century until the Islamic revolution of 1979, the
print media has been strictly controlled by the politicai regimes.
The Constitutional Revolution was the first step toward the realisation of freedom of
press in Iran. However, the revolutionary forces were defeated by strong feudal
elements w h o were supported by British and Russian imperialists. Nevertheless, one
of the most remarkable features of the revolution was the rapid development of
publications and the creation of n e w forms of politicai journalism which deeply
influenced the m o d e m history of Iran. During the revolutionary period, the number of
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publications increased and journalism as a social instrument of change played a
significant role in enlightening the Iranian people. This thesis considers in particular
three types of publications: the Politicai papers, the H u m o r o u s or satire (Tanz) and
Nocturnal Letters (Shabnameh) or Underground Papers. Then, three functions of the
press during the mobilisation of 1906-12 are identified and analysed:
•

The leadersliip function of the politicai press;

•

T h e persuasion or stimulative function of the humorous or satire (Tanz)
papers; and

•

The information function of the nocturnal letters (Shabnameh) or underground
papers.

This thesis will also briefly discuss the Iranian exile publications and their functions

Analysis of politicai and satire (Tanz) papers in particular reveals the manner in which
the press played an active role in the social awakening of the Iranian people during the
constitutional revolutionary period. Iran's politicai press expanded dramatically
between 1900-1925, and some of those papers, notably the Sure-Israfil (The Angel of
Resurrection), the Habl al-Matin (Firm Cord), the Mosavat (Equality), and NasimeShomal

(Northern Breeze), played a serious role in popular enlightenment. Today,

w e cannot understand Iranian journalism without tracing its historical, politicai and
economic backgrounds. Hence, a part of this thesis is devoted to the socio-political
and economic development culminating in the Constitutional Revolution, so as to
establish a context for the analysis of print media, bazaar and mosque

systems of

communication.

In addition to the print media (Newspapers & Magazines), the traditional
communication channels, especially the bazaar and pulpit (Minbar) , also played a
central role as politicai channels during the Constitutional Revolution.From the early
19th century until the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the bazaar in Iran was
constantly in conflict with the various politicai regimes in power. Historically, the
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bazaar in Iran has also served as a centre of urban life and an effective communication
and politicai network largely independent of central government. During the
constitutional revolutionary period the bazaar and merchants were the main agents of
revolution, with the emergent press essentially complementing their decisive role. The
thesis compares and assesses the respective role and contribution of both the formal
mass Communications channels through the press and traditional Communications
system through bazaar and mosque. While it stresses the overriding importance of

these traditional channels in the Constitutional Revolutionary period, it also argues th
during this period the basis was established for an increasingly viable and influential
system of mass Communications in Iran.
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GLOSSARY
Adalat Khaneh: House of justice
Anjoman: Society
Aqayid: Ideas, ideology
Arbab: Master, Landowner, Landlord
Ashura: A religious day associated with the Battle of Karbala, tenth day of the month
of Moharram
Ayatollah: Highest religious rank and title
Azan: Call to prayer
Bast: Taking of sanctuary
Caliph: The politicai and Religious Leader of the Islamic empire, Ruler
Dong: One-sixth part of any piece of real estate
Dehgan: Peasant attached to a plough-land, landed proprietor
Enghelab-e-Mashrutiyat: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911
Faghih: Man learned in Islamic Jurisprudence.

Fatva: Religious proclamation or declaration, a religious opinion or edict by a Faghih,
Mujtahid or Ayatollah.
Ghasbi: Usurpation, dispossession
Hadith: A record of an action or saying of Prophet Mohammad.
Hijrat: Migration after the model of prophet Mohammad's migration from Mecca to
Medina
Ifratiyun: Radicais, Democrats
Ijma: Consensus of opinion
Ijtihad: Endeavour; exercise of independence legal judgement
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Imam: dPrayer-Leader, religious leader
Iqta: Land assignment
Itedaliyun: Conservatives, moderate
Jadalhum: Reasoned debate, argumentation
Jahad: Holy war
Jangalis: Younger group of the Mashruteh revolutionaries in Gillan Province
struggling against British and Reza Khan, member of Islamic Unity
(Etehad-e-Islam) party
Karbala: The place where Imam Hossein and his followers were massacred by the
army of Yazid
Kharaj: Land tax to the Arab overlords, government and ruler
Khatib: Preacher
Khrdeh Malik: Peasant proprietor, petty landowner
Khutbah: Sermon
Madrasa: Religious school, traditional school
Majlis: Lower House of Parliament
Malik: Landowner
Marja-e-Taghlid: Source of imitation
Mashruta: Constitutional
Masjid: Mosque
Matboa't: The Press
Mellat-e-Iran: Iranian people, Iranian nation
Minbar: Pulpit

X

Moharram: Religious month of the year. The traditional Islamic calender is lunar, and
dates from 15 July 622 A D , the day of the hijra (Migration) of Prophet
M o h a m m a d from Mecca to Medina.
Mujtahid: Member of the religious classes who has reached a degree of eminence
which permits him to issue opinions on matters of faith
Nasaq: Land-right, capacity of a village in plough lands
Naus. He became Minister or Trade and Industry under Muzaffaru'd-Din-Shah of
theQajar dynasty. Naus increased customs duties for the Iranian products
exported abroad and decreased custom duties on the Russian products
imported to Iran.
Owqaf: Plural of vaqf, religious endowments
Qadi: Muslim Judge, also Qazi
Qharbzadegi: Westernisation, super-imposition of the Western culture, plagued by
the west.
Raiyyat: Peasant, subjects of ruler
Ruhaniyat: Clergy
Ruznameh: Journal, Newspaper
Sadre-Azam: Prime Minister
Sayyed: Descendem of the prophet Mohammad through his daughter, Fatimeh
Tawhid: Unity of God
Ulama: Muslim theologians and scholars.
Urf: Customary law
Usul-e-Figh: The principie of jurisprudence
Vaqf: An endowment land
Vaúr: Minister
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
The Iranian press has had a long and distinguished history complicated by the country's
struggle for democracy and national independence in the 20th Century. The fortunes of
the press have followed the politicai fortunes of the country. F r o m the early 19th
century until the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the print media had been strictly controlled
by monarchical and politicai regimes.

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 was the first step to ward the realisation of
freedom of the press in Iran. However, the revolutionary forces were defeated
ultimately by the aristocratic and feudal landlords w h o were supported by the British
and Russian imperialists. Nevertheless, one of the most remarkable aspects of the
Constitutional Revolution was the rapid development of newspapers, and the creation
of a n e w form of journalism which has deeply influenced the contemporary history of
Iran. T h e number of papers and periodicals increased during the Constitutional
Revolutionary period together with the traditions of a free and independent press that
flourished briefly, providing both historical m e m o r y and effective models that
profoundly influenced the Islamic Revolution of 1979, hence contributing to the social
and politicai awakening of the Iranian people.

In contrast to the print media (newspapers, magazines, periodicals and a wide range of
informal formats), the traditional communication channels, particularly the bazaar,
played a central role as a politicai channel during both Iranian Revolutions. In fact, from
the early 19th century until the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the bazaar in Iran
was constantly in conflict with the various politicai regimes in power. The only period
in which the bazaar did not openly oppose the government w a s under the Prime
Ministership of M o h a m m e d Mosaddeq (1951-53), but even then it retained its hostility
to the Pahlavi regime. [Mozaffari 1991, 377]
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Historically, the bazaar in Iran has served as a centre of urban commercial life and an
effective communication and politicai network relatively independent of central
government. The country and the press since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11
have alternated between periods of politicai centralisation and politicai fragmentation
which m a y be identified as follows:
•

Parliamentary democracy and politicai fragmentation beginning with the
Constitutional Revolution (1906-25);

•

Monarchical dictatorship and politicai centralisation (1925-41);

•

Parliamentary democracy and politicaifragmentation(1941-53);

•

Monarchical dictatorship and politicaifragmentation(1953-79);

•

Parliamentary democracy and politicai centralisation during the Islamic
Revolution (February 1979 to the present).

Basically, the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in the last quarter of the 20th centur
was the second step toward the realisation of democracy and afreepress. Since 1979,
the number of newspapers and magazines, in terms of variety and circulation has
proliferated dramatically. The purpose of this thesis, however, is to review the press in
the first period (1906-1925), focussing particularly on the Constitutional Revolution
which began in 1906. Today, w e cannot understand Iranian journalism without tracing
the country's historical, politicai, and social developments. Thus, part ofthe thesis is
devoted to the socio-political and economic situation of Iran since early 19th century, so
as to establish a context for the analysis of print media, bazaar and mosqm

systems of

communication.

Therefore, this thesis is conceived as as comprehensive a study as is possible, given
limitation of sources, of the print and traditional Communications systems in Iran with
particular emphasis on their functions during the Constitutional Revolution. There is a
range of classic studies in the history of journalism in Iran written by Iranian and nonIranian writers in Persian and English. But the main portion of these works comprise
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lists and newspapers in alphabetical order and/or compilations of the names and dates of
publications (See Rabino 1911; Tarbiyat, B r o w n e 1914; Sadre-Hashemi 1953; and
Qasemi 1993). These works are very similar because the writers have followed the
same pattern and their methodology involved the standard framework of just listing
papers in alphabetical order without c o m m e n t or analysis. While this process has
historical merit, there is little substantive c o m m e n t and clearly it is not designed for
intensive analysis of communication systems. A n exception is H a m i d Mowlana's
comprehensive review of History and Interpretation of Journalism in Iran, printed in
1963. Regrettably, however, there is no comprehensive Iranian study reviewing the
print media's functions and effects on the social and politicai awakening ofthe Iranian
people in the early 20th century, especially during the Constitutional Revolution.
Therefore, this study includes specific analysis of several major publications and their
functions during the Constitutional Revolution.
1.1 Why the Constitutional Revolutionary Period?

There are several reasons why the Constitutional Revolutionary period has been
selected for the purposes of this study. First, the Constitutional Revolution was the
unfinished revolution that brought the most serious challenge to the politicai, economic,
and cultural autocracy of the ruling powers, and consequently created n e w forms of
literature and journalism.

Secondly, the Constitutional Revolutionary period clearly was of both national and
international significance. It was an important link in the chain of anti-colonial
revolutions and struggles ranging from the Indian revolt (1843-44), to the Egyptian
independence struggles (1831-41), to the Turkish Constitutional revolutions (1876 and
1909), to the Chinese revolution (1911). Furthermore, the writings and the thoughts of
the ideologues of the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionary period, particularly SayyedJamalled-Din-Assadabadi and Agha-Khan-Kermani, became influential in the
intellectual eircles of Turkey, índia, Afghanistan, Egypt and Rússia, providing
stimulus to other revolutionary movements.
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Thirdly, the national significance of the Constitutional Revolution lies in the fact that it
represented the most formidable challenge by the n e w politicai forces to traditionalism
in the modern history of Iran. S o m e have gone so far as to proclaim it the most
significant event in Iranian history and certainly the Constitutional Revolutionary period
w a s the first major confrontation of therisingIranian bourgeoisie against colonialism
and feudal autocracy. [Malekzadeh 1951, 34]
Fourthly, during the Constitutional Revolutionary period many papers were printed
which, subsequently, played a significant role in the social and politicai awakening of
the Iranian people. The Revolution of 1906-11 not only contributed n e w ideas to the
cultural and educational systems, but also created socio-economic reforms in Iranian
Society. A s a result, it spearheaded a systematic attempt to integrate the fragmented
society of Iran, at the tum of the century, into a modern state. T h e rising middle class
was not the only n e w force that had entered the politicai arena. The increasing ranks of
urbanites, (primarily workers) small shopkeepers, artisans, were henceforth to become
increasingly active in Iranian politics.
Fifthly, social democratic organisations also began their active role in Iranian politics
this period. T h e aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution meant the beginning of the
formation of n e w alliances that were to dominate the fabric of the Iranian society for
decades to come. T h e far reaching philosophical and literary implications of the
Constitutional Revolution period constitute another aspect of its significance.

1.2 Thesis Structure

Broadly, the thesis has two main objectives: Firstly, to describe the rise of the Iranian
press from the early 19th century through the Constitutional Revolutionary period ofthe
early 20th Century, and to analyse its distinctive formats and content, particularly
during the constitutional revolutionary period. Secondly, to analyse the functions of
traditional communication channels, especially the bazaar, merchants classes, the
mosque, and clergy during the constitutional revolutionary period.
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In terms of structural organisation, this chapter briefly discusses the Constitutional
Revolution of 1906 as the first step toward the realisation of an independent Iranian
press. It also considers a number of methodological and textual matters related to the
thesis. Chapter T w o combines a conventional literature review with a sustained attempt
to establish a communication model embodying both traditional systems of
communication and mass Communications systems as they function during
transforming social movements. A model is proposed which is then applied thematically
throughout the thesis. The literature review is designed to contribute to this process,
and also to illuminate more generally traditional and mass Communications systems in
Iran.
Chapter Three looks at Iran's socio-political and economic structures before the
Constitutional Revolution. It argues that structural obstacles were to become m u c h more
formidable in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries with the increase of the Soviet
and British colonial influence. Chapter Four contextualises the Constitutional
Revolution as an historical process, a culmination of trends discernible in the historical
evolution of Iran.
This study distinguishes two types of communication systems, (Traditional and dPress)
in which the sources, channels of delivery and formats were fundamentally different.
Chapters Four, Five and Six scrutinise the contributions of both traditional
Communications and the press as politicai channels in Iran. Chapter Five considers the
function of traditional communication channels {bazaar and mosque) and their alliances
in the Revolution. It attempts to establish whether during the Constitutional
Revolutionary period the bazaar or the merchants were the main force of the
Revolution. This part also includes a brief politicai history of the bazaar, the bazaarmosque, and ulama alliance as a politicai channel during the Revolution. The last part
of this chapter will attempt to demonstrate that it was Shi'i revolutionary discourse and
the religious leaders that shaped the action of the merchant class {bazaaris) in the
revolutionary direction.
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The development of the Iranian press from its origins in the early 19th century to the
end of the constitutional revolutionary period in 1911-12 is taken up in Chapters 5 and
6. The main focus of Chapter 7 is on the constitutional revolutionary period of 19061911, considering three genres of press publication: the politicai papers, the nocturnal
letters (Shabnameh)

and the humorous or satire (Tanz) papers. The functions of the

press discussed include provision of news and information, contribution to leadership
and social mobilisation, and whether processes of the press were persuasive or
stimulative.
Chapter 7 more briefly considers Iranian press publication from the end of the
Constitutional Revolution's period of direct action period in 1906-11 to 1925 w h e n the
last vestiges of revolutionary influence had disappeared, and a dictatorial monarchy had
been restored under the Pahlavi regime. The concluding chapter summarises the
findings of the study. A n extended bibliography and four appendices are included.

1.3 Methodology
Essentially, the methodology of this thesis mingles conventional Communications
theory and analysis, both imbued with traditional social sciences methodology, with a
standard historiographical approach. In short, it is predominantly orthodox in its
methodology. A number of alternative approaches were considered and discarded as
inappropriate for a study of Iranian traditional and press Communications systems. (A
full account of this process is to be found in chapter 2). A s noted above, the
methodology attempts to devise a model incorporating both traditional and mass
communication elements to be used to link and underpin the following analysis.
Because the historical material is limited, resort is also m a d e to content analysis in
sifting out the principal elements of the Iranian press during the revolutionary period.
S o m e consideration is also m a d e of Iranian literature, particularly poetry, in the context
of the Iranian press and journalism.
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Nevin has defined history as meaning the search for knowledge and the truth, a
searching to find out: 'History is any integrated narrative or description of the past
events or facts written in a spirit of criticai inquiry for the whole truth.' [Nevin 1938,
22] This sort of traditional approach has fallen out of favour in an era of post-modemist
influence. Documentary-based historical research, however, in the social sciences
tradition is indispensable for researching the Communications history of what was
essentially a semi-feudal state until the constitutional revolutionary period.
Furthermore, this was an era before mass Communications when, even in 1925, the
press was not highly developed in terms of technology, content and distribution. It was
also an era w h e n popular culture was essentially undiversified and powerfully
influenced by Islamic traditions. There were none of the mass communication artefacts
that were commonplace in W e s t e m mass Communications and mass culture by the
1920's. Unavoidably, this thesis has been conceived and developed on the basis of
conventional documentation. In any case, documents have always been used as a
source of information in social research, either as the only method or in conjunction
with other methods. They are employed in the context of m a n y diverse studies, such as
quantitative studies, qualitative methods, and case-study research. It is most unusual
that any research study is carried out without some form of documentary method, even
if it is only a basic library search.

Consequently, this thesis has involved a vigorous search to obtain ali materiais relevan
to both traditional and press communication systems in English and Iranian. A
substantial body of material in English has been collected from searches particularly in
Australian, English and United States libraries. This material is listed fully in the
bibliography and the bulk of it is held in photostat form by the author. Furthermore, a
considerable body of relevant material has been collected in the Iranian language, both
from the author's previous research into Iranian journalism, and extensive fieldwork in
Iranian collections conducted in 1994. Particular use is m a d e of edited collections of
documents in the Iranian language from the constitutional revolutionary period. The
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relevant elements of this material have been translated by the author, assisted by Iranian
colleagues at the University of Wollongong. Copies of both original and translated
material is held by the author.
In translating material, the objective has been to translate Iranian as closely to the
contemporary Library of Congress system as possible, without the use of diacritical
marks and employing spellings that have become c o m m o n usage for the names of
various newspapers. Inevitably, some disrepancies have arisen because of differences
in spelling and style in the wide range of publications consulted. Hopefully, these have
been kept to a tolerable m i n i m u m The westem calendar has been used throughout, with
dates from Iranian language material altered from the Islamic calendar. U s e of Iranianlanguage terminology has been kept to a minimum, although widely-used labels such as
bazaari, ulama, mosque, minbar and bast have been used consistently throughout.
Titles of newspapers have been presented in both Iranian and English. A s far as
possible, Iran and Iranian have been used as the national designations throughout.
Pérsia and Persian have been retained in quotes and where the meaning would not be
clear without use of the historie designations.
Although the specific events that sparked the Constitutional Revolution occurred in
December 1905, this thesis follows the accepted designation of the central period of the
Constitutional Revolution as 1906-11.

CHAPTER

TWO

MASS COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
2.1 Introduction
The erroneous assumption is often made that traditional systems of communication have
been absorbed effectively into mass Communications systems and therefore have Uttle
practical influence on contemporary media structures and practice. The reality is that
traditional media systems in m a n y countries have remained an important influence on
people's daily lives, beliefs and attitudes; that in m a n y ways their traditional power as
Communications systems has endured alongside press systems and even electronic
broadcasting systems. This has been the case particularly where a strong traditional
relationship remains between religion and state as in the workfs great Islamic nations.
Thus, Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 and its Islamic Revolution which
began in 1979 were dramatically successful 20th Century social movements rooted in
traditional Communications and information systems. In the Constitutional Revolution
small press systems worked closely with the traditional Communications systems to
generate social mobilisation. It is necessary therefore to analyse public forms of
traditional Communications and small media as effective generators of massive social
mobilisation, creating a revolutionary politics in a context of apparently strong state
hegemony over mass media evolution.

The main purpose of the following analysis is to present, in a summary form, the most
influential social scientific theories about mass communication structures and
institutions. Further, the analysis is designed to assess their relevance to the distinctive
Unkage between mass and traditional media in Iran since the introduction of print media
in the early 19th Century to the end ofthe constitutional revolutionary period in 1925.
The continuing role of traditional Communications is then considered leading to the
devising of a model designed to link together both traditional and mass media
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Communications systems. Although this model applies particularly to the circumstances
of Iran, it could readily be adapted to other societies where traditional Communications
systems remain strong relative to mass media.

In considering mass Communications media systems, this review chapter considers
briefly attempts to place traditional media systems in the context of mass media
development. The analysis goes on to consider five major approaches to categorising
perspectives on mass communication systems. These are: the Mass Society Approach;
the Marxist Approach; the Functionalist Approach; the Culturalist (or Social Cultural)
Approach; and the Criticai Politicai Economic Approach. Because the media used in the
Constitutional Revolution was necessarily the print press, the analysis goes on to assess
the relevance of conventional press theory. Six major press theories are analysed:
Authoritarian, Free press, Social responsibility, Soviet media, Development media, and
Democratic-participant.
2.2 Traditional Communications—the Absorption Approach
Historians of the mass media and journalism have largely ignored the interpretative
difficulties associated with the survival of significant elements of traditional
Communications in the contemporary world. The standard response is to gloss over
traditional systems as effectively absorbed into the mass Communications frameworks,
surviving at best in a folkloric sense as quaint anachronisms. Such interpretation is
totally at odds with the evidence of potent traditional systems continuing into the late
1990's. Iran is perhaps the outstanding example of the contemporary impact of
customary Communications systems, but it is by no means an isolated one.

A principal exponent of the absorption approach in recent mass Communications history
has been Mitchell Stephens, author of the influential study A History ofNews,
the Drum

From

to the Satellite. [1988] Stephens studies the development of traditional

systems of spoken and written news at length up until the development of printed news
from the late 15th Century. F r o m this point, there is only occasional reference to
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surviving, indeed flourishing, mechanisms of oral and written news. The history of
news and information news is predicated on an evolutionary continuum, with written
news displacing spoken news, printed news displacing written news, and electronic
news increasingly displacing printed news. Essentially, traditional news systems are

conceived as merging into a linear configuration; oral merging into written, written int

print, print into electronic and, projecting further, electronic into digital, multi-med
and on-line systems. A conceptual approach of this kind does little justice to the
survival of traditional systems of communication alongside newer, more innovatory
systems. It is perhaps understandable that Stephens' absorption model does not take
account of traditional systems of news.

Furthermore, in the expanding field of comparative journalism study, clear instances of
conjunction of traditional and contemporary Communications systems are either ignored
or noted without analysis. Hachten [1993] notes the use of audio-cassettes and photocopying in the Islamic Revolution starting in 1979, labelling it as 'the first cassette
revolution' and quoting Anthony Sampson's epitaph for the Shah's regime, 'he forgot
the cassette':
Thousands of cassette recordings of the Ayatollah's [Khomeini's]
speeches propagating his revolutionary ideas were played in the mosques,
which were not kept under surveillance by the Shah's secret police. These
small, portable instruments were able to reach millions while
circumventing the government-controlled press, radio and television. At
the same time, w h e n mysterious "night letters" and pamphlets arrived
mysteriously at offices in Tehran, sympathetic secretaries m a d e m a n y
photocopies, quickly and more secretly than possible with a printing
press. [33]
The emphasis here is wholly on the mass Communications technology, rather than on
the adaptation of this technology to the traditional Communications of the mosque.

Hachten also makes a point of stressing the night letters but, strangely enough, fails t
mention their crucial importance in traditional communication systems, notably the
bazaar. Such 'night letters' or shabnameh had been important communication elements
in the Constitutional Revolution. Stevenson [1994] includes a chapter on revolutionary
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media which largely accepts the absorption notion that developing technology has
largely eliminated any significant role for traditional Communications:
Written language ended the power monopoly of the elders who preserved
and passed on the oral sagas and poems that contained the accumulated
knowledge of preliterate tribes. Inexpensive printing with moveable type
chaUenged the authority of church and crown and allowed the flowering of
vernacular languages and, eventually, democracy. [262]
Thus, Stevenson gives a very strong impression by default that traditional
Communications systems are largely irrelevant in the contemporary context.
Stevenson's treatment of revolutionary journalism was very much dictated by audience

response in westem media cultures, particularly to 'global' television audiences. It w
very much influenced by the revolutionary 18th Century and American independence.

His account of the contemporary revolutionary context is largely confined to China an

the former Eastem bloc countries of Europe. Apart from a brief reference to the inabil

of the border police to intercept smuggled audio tapes, there is no consideration of t
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Again, the emphasis is on the technology and not the
traditional systems that exploited it. The pervasive impression is conveyed that

traditional Communications are irrelevant to revolutionary social movements in the 20
Century.
2.3 Approaches to Mass Communications Theory

Mass Communications is a hybrid discipline whose origins can be traced back to the
journalism schools of the United States in the early 1930's. Particularly influential
the emergence of mass Communications theory was Wilbur Schramm, whose
pioneering work still commands respect in contemporary Communications theory. Since
World War II, there has been a remarkable explosion in Communications theory, both

as an underpinning of media practice and as a focus in its own right for academic stud
Unquestionably, the teaching of mass Communications and the rapid grown of ancillary
research has been an influential factor in the internationalisation of both higher
education and media practice.
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There are s o m e signs, however, that the impact of mass Communications m a y have

peaked since the early 1990's . This is largely due to two reasons: the rapid spread and
pervasive influence of post-modemist doctrine and methodology; and the increasing
influence of a culturalist, or cultural studies perspective. Changes in the nature of
Communications theory are best exemplified in the three editions of a standard
conspectus of Communications theory, Dennis McQuail's Mass Communication Theory
[1983, 1987 and 1994]. In particular, there are significant changes in conceptuaUsation
between McQuail's 1987 edition and his most recent re-formulation in 1994. It is
proposed here to describe briefly the main elements of the principal approaches to mass
Communications theory in contemporary terms, drawing particularly on McQuail but
also taking account of other relevant texts.
2.3.1 Mass Society Approach
This approach is based on a dominant media model positing that the media is integrated

into the interdependent institutions that exercise social power. The result is large-sca

society with an atomised public and a highly-centralised media having Uttle interactivit
with a mass audience. In short, media is used to manipulate the dominance of powerful

social interests, offering littler criticai altemative definition of the world and rende
people dependent on the media for their cultural identify:
This vision of society is pessimistic and more a diagnosis of the sickness
of society than a social theory, mixing elements of criticai thought from the
politicai left with a nostalgia for a golden age of community and
democracy. A s a theory of the media, it strongly evokes images of control
and portrays the direction of influence as from above. M a s s society is
paradoxically, both 'atomised' and centrally controlled. [McQuail 1994,
94]
In recent years, the mass society approach has declined in influence, McQuail arguing
that it is now more important for historical reasons than any contemporary relevance it

might have. In some respects, it might be considered a useful tool for analysing aspects
of Iranian media development, particularly the dominant influence of the Shah and the

ruling classes on media content and practice. The picture of an atomised post-industrial
class, however, is not consistent with the semi-feudal, homogeneous character of the
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Iranian people and their attachment to Islamic religion in the decades before the
Constitutional Revolution.
2.3.2 Marxist Theory and Mass Communication
Early Marxist perspectives viewed the mass media as a powerful ideological weapon for
maintaining public submission to capitalism. The means of media production conform
to the general capitalist industrial format with factors of production and relations of
production:
[The media] are likely to be in the monopolistic ownership of a capitalist
class, nationality or internationally organised and to serve the interests of
that class. They do so by materially exploiting cultural workers . . . and
consumers. . . They work ideologically by disseminating the ideas and
world views of the ruling class, denying alternative ideas which might lead
to change or to a growing consciousness by the working class of interests
and by preventing the mobilisation of such consciousness into active and
organised politicai opposition. [McQuail 1987, 63]
Thus, the classic statement of the Marxist approach would include bourgeois ownership
of a mass media operating in their class interest, promoting a false working class
consciousness and denying access to politicai opposition. This classic tradition of
Marxism has waned sharply in influence in the 1990's and, as McQuail affirms, the
original Leninist formulation of a vanguard press leading the revolutionary class
struggle is no longer realistic. [1994,77] Marxism, however, has spawned a number of
variants which retain some influence, including the formulations of Althusser, Gramsci
and Marcuse. McQuail also suggest a continuing role for Marxism either in a criticai
role in disclosure of media propaganda and manipulation (Herman and Chomsky) or in
the nurturing of new alternative or grassroots media.

In terms of Iranian history, society and culture a classic Marxist perspective offers li

assistance, particularly in the period up until 1925 which is the broad period covered b
this thesis. The absence of either an industrial proletariat or a dominant, integrated
bourgeois class is a conspicuous element in Iranian socialist organisation. Indeed, the
merchants and bazaari (bazaar workers) who might be conceived as constituting an
embryonic bourgeois class largely supported the Constitutional Revolution and were
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responsible for m u c h of its success. Conversely, the contribution of the working
classes w a s subsidiary, although their support strengthened after the revolution started
and it might be argued that an embryonic politicai class consciousness had emerged
briefly. Furthermore, the dormant semi-feudalism of Iranian society in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, together with the dominance of the Islamic religious tradition, did
not provide fertile ground for the emergence of class struggle and overthrow of the
State in terms of Marxian analysis.

2.3.3 Functionalist Approach

In earlier formulations, this approach was categorised as the Structural Functionalist
approach. According to R. K. Merton, in his Social Theory and Social Structure
[1957], functionalism claims to explain social practices and institutions in terms of the
'needs' of society and of individuais. [Cited McQuail 1994, 77] In terms of
functionalist theory, McQuail has summarised the essential contribution of media to
society as providing integration; co-operation; order, control and stability; adaptation to
change; mobilisation; management of culture and values. It contributes directly to
society, information and entertainment and, less directly, to correlation of events and
information, continuity of culture, and mobilisation for achievement of social
objectives.

In short, by gratifying individual desires, the media also provides benefits, sometimes
unintended, to society as a whole. Thus, the needs and demands of participants in
society, whether as individuais or collectivities, are the primary generators of media's
contribution to society. B y responding to each separate demand in consistent ways, the
media achieve benefits for the society as a whole. Thus there are elements of demand
for information and individual gratification in functionalism which also justify
commodification, or the development of mass media as commodities for consumption.

The major problem with functionalist theory is its vagueness in practical application.
McQuail described it as beset with conceptual difficulties, partly over confusion about

16

what function means and also about w h o is likely to benefit apart from an abstract
society. It has also been criticised as contributing to the status quo by preservation of
what already exists and what endures; as McQuail puts it, 'at root, whatever persists is
assumed to be necessary.' Despite, these limitations, there is no doubting the
widespread influence of functionalist, or structural-functionalist, approaches to the
media in society. Indeed, it has been one of the most influential channels of
Communications discourse and analysis over m a n y years, offering virtually a pervasive
lingua franca for Communications:
It offers a language for discussing the relations between mass media and
society and a set of concepts which have proved hard to escape from or
replace. This terminology has the advantage of being to a large extent
shared by mass communicators themselves and by their audiences and
being widely understood. [McQuail 1994, 78]

Clearly, functionalist theory has some virtues in its application to both traditional an
mass Communications. Because it does not attempt to explain the durability of
traditional institutions such as mosque

and bazaar, it provides a framework for

analysing their effectiveness free of value judgments based on such criteria as class and
contemporaneity. Unquestionably, also, the terminology of functionalist
Communications theory is useful in describing even an embryonic media structure such
as that of Iran at the time of the Constitutional Revolution. T h e m u c h criticised
'circularity' of functionalist theory is less of a problem in analysing the continuity of
culture and values in traditional societies.
Furthermore, the emphasis on social mobilisation is clearly useful in analysing the
development of a major politicai and social revolution. While functionalism is a useful
tool in separate analyses of traditional and mass Communications systems, it is m u c h
less valuable in accounting for their evolution in parallel and the duality of their
involvement in social mobilisations. Care has to be taken in using even the terminology
of functionalist Communications when looking at a dual Communications model interlinking traditional and mass Communications systems. For example, this claim by
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Curran points up the inherent problems in applying a functionalist approach to a
Communications system inter-meshing traditional and mass Communications:
The mass media have now assumed the role of the Church, in a more
secular age, of interpreting and making sense of the world to the mass
public. Like their priestly predecessors, professional communicators
amplify systems of representation that legitimise the social system.. . the
n e w priesthood of the modern media has supplanted the old as the
principal ideological agent building consent for the social system. [1982,
227-28]
Such an interpretation is clearly inapplicable in a Communications system where the
'priestly predecessors' remain as powerful communicators and the professional
communicators fulfil a lesser role. In many ways, the enduring power and influence of
traditional communicators undercut the power attributed to mass media to change
fundamental values in societies such as Iran.

2.3.4 The Culturalist Approach
The culturalist approach, previously the social-cultural approach, has increased

phenomenally in influence since the late 1980's. The enhanced status of this approach i
reflected in differences between McQuail's brief summary of the social-cultural
approach in 1987 to the extended chapter included in the 1994 edition of his Mass
Communication Theory. Although still approaching Communications from the
standpoint of a social sciences/ Communications theoretical approach, McQuail

acknowledges both the impact and potential value of the culturalist approach, describin
its evolution in these terms:
Since the earlier days of mass Communications research, a distinctive
'culturalist' perspective on mass media has been developing, particularly
under the influence of the humanities (literature, linguistics, philosophy)
as distinct from the more social scientific emphasis of 'mainstream'
communication science. At some points, or on some issues, the two
traditions have merged, although there remains substantial differences of
thinking and method. [McQuaifs book and chapter] is written primarily
from a social scientific perspective, but it aims also to benefit from some
of the insights and ideas of the 'culturalists. [1994,94]

Clearly, the culturalist approach commands respect and its power in giving new insights
and conceptualisation has been widely recognised. Furthermore, its distinctive
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terminology has permeated other disciplines and discourses. Apart from the influences
mentioned by McQuail, the development of the culturalist approach has also been

shaped by earlier criticai traditions such as social literary criticism, and the critica
approach of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School. Criticai cultural theory was stimulated
largely by the 'Birmingham School' of the 1970's, embodied most cogently in the work
of Stuart Hall, who thus described the cultural studies approach:
It stands opposed to the residual and merely reflective role assigned to the
'cultural'. In its different ways it conceptualises culture as inter-woven
with aU social practices; and those practices, in rum, as a c o m m o n form of
h u m a n activity... It is opposed to the base-superstructure w a y of
formulating the relationship between ideal and material forces, especially
where the base is defined by the determination by the 'economic' in any
simple sense... It defines 'culture' as both the means and values which
arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their
given historical conditions and relationship, through which they 'handle'
and respond to the conditions of existence. [Quoted McQuail 1994, 100101]
The sweep and impact of the culturalist approach has been largely preoccupied with the
mass culture and mass media of advanced westem societies. While the approach could,
and undoubtedly will, be applied to traditional and developing societies, its current
utility in analysing an historical context lacking both conventional mass culture and
mass media on westem lines appears limited. Valuable studies using a culturalist

approach could certainly be made of aspects of the Constitutional Revolution period; for
example, the role of poetry in Iranian journalism. Predicating an analysis of the
historical development of a dual system of traditional communication and emergent
mass communication, on the basis of the culturalist approach at its present stage of
development would most likely prove to be an unproductive exercise, particularly in the
absence of adequate cultural historical materiais.
2.3.5 Criticai Politicai Economic Approach
Politicai economy, of course, is a venerable label pre-dating contemporary economies,
referring particularly to the development of economic theory within a broader poUtical
context. It is used in contemporary media theory to designate media structure and media
content determined essentially by market forces. The consequences of this economic
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determinism of media structure and content are a highly concentrated media structure,
increasing globalisation of media structures and control of content, commodification of
audience and content, decreasing diversity, marginalisation of opposition and alternative
media, and the supremacy of private interest over public interest. [McQuail 1994, 83]
Apart from economies, this approach draws heavily on politicai science and sociology
and w a s influenced in its origins by Marxist political-economic theory. A s McQuail
observes, the media institution has to be considered as part of the economic system with
close Unks to the politicai system. [ 82]

A political/economic approach is undeniably attractive in the climate of the
contemporary western countries where market forces are dominant and the public sector
is in decline. M a n y public sector media enterprises have already dissolved and
transferred to the private sector, and survivors are under increasing pressure. Media
concentration is clearly growing rapidly and the great global media agglomerations
appear certain to dominate n e w information and media industries based on technological
convergence. Whatever its theoretical deficiencies, the political-economic approach
aecurately reflects m u c h of the contemporary reality.

It must be questioned, however, whether such an approach has any significant
relevance to traditional societies and the developing world. Its application to
circumstances in contemporary Iran would be a highly dubious task, let alone to the
Iran of the early 19th Century. Furthermore, it would be an extremely difficult and
probably useless exercise to correlate Iranian media with Western media for the
equivalent period; for example, comparing Iranian media in the 1890's with U S or
Australian media in the 1890's. While the political-economic approach has value in a
descriptive sense, it is largely irrelevant as a comparative media tool outside the W e s t e m
media framework.
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2.3.6 Conventional Approaches—A Summary
Conventional approaches to media theory can provide insights into traditional
Communications systems but, in aggregate, their value in extended analysis of these
systems and their linkages with mass Communications systems are negligible. Because
the Iranian mass Communications system during the constitutional revolutionary period
was wholly a press system in the narrowest sense, the next logical step in the quest for
an acceptable theoretical basis is to move to consideration of standard press theories.

2.4 Six Major Press Theories

In defining models of the press, the inevitable starting point is the four theories of th
press defined in 1956 by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm in their influential monograph
Four Theories of the Press. Siebert and his colleagues had been influenced by the
formulation of social responsibility theory of the press by the 1947 US Commission of
the Freedom of the Press. Although they were at pains to point out that they applied
press in their context to ali media of mass communication, their analysis applied
essentially to the newspaper and periodical press, then the most influential agendasetting médium of mass communication. Although Siebert et ai espoused a comparative
approach, their foci of comparison were rather limited:
In simplest terms the question behind this book is, why is the press as it
is? W h y does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in different
forms in different countries? W h y , for example, is the press of the Soviet
Union so different from our o w n , and the press of Argentina so different
from that of Great Britain? [1956,1]

The authors' outline of their rationale does offer a basis for a valuable analysis of th
press system of a nation such as Iran, modernising by the mid-50's but still very much
in the grip of a dictatorial monarchy ruling a society retaining pronounced semi-feudal
elements:
The thesis of this volume is that the press always takes on the form and
coloration of the social and politicai structures within which it operates.
Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of
individuais and institutions are adjusted. W e beUeve that an understanding
of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the
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press. . .To see the social systems in their true relationship to the press,
one has to look at certain basic beliefs and assumptions which the society
holds: the nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of
m a n to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth. Thus, in the last
analysis the difference between press systems is one of philosophy, and
this book is about the philosophical and politicai rationales or theories
which lie behind the different kinds of press w e have in the world today.
[1-2]
Clearly, this rationale was highly relevant to effective analysis of the idiosyncratic press
system developed in Iran by the mid-1950's. Indeed, it remains so today. In an era
dominated by the increasing cold-war rivalries of Rússia and the United States, before
the emergence of interest in, and argument about, developmental journalism, Iranian
press systems were of scant interest to these theories. Although Four Theories of the
Press is largely concerned with historical issues, the peculiar circumstances of the
development of the Iranian press and its conjunction with traditional Communications
systems in the Constitutional Revolution was not a theme that caught the interest of the
authors.

Essentially, Siebert et ai adapted social responsibility theory as a primary normative
model, and added three other models to it: Authoritarian theory, Libertarian theory, and
Soviet theory. They conceded that this four-part classification might easily have been
reduced to two, as Soviet Communist theory was only a development of the much older
Authoritarian theory, and Social Responsibility theory was only a model of the
Libertarian theory. [2] Possibly, they may have gone too far with this concession,
because the two adaptations do add something to the overall typology, having merits of
differentiation from the primary models, as the authors also recognised:
. . .Because the Soviets have produced something so spectacularly
different from older authoritarianism, and something so important to the
world today, and because the social responsibility theory road is the
apparent direction of development which our o w n press is taking, w e have
thought it better to treat them as four separate theories, meanwhile trying to
point out their relationships. [2]
In the summation of Siebert et ai, these four categories largely determined what kind of
press the Westem world has had, with their theoretical approaches firmly grounded in
philosophical tradition and great revolutionary movements:
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The Authoritarian theory grounded in centuries of authoritarian politicai
thought from Plato to Machiavelli; the Libertarian grounded in Milton,
Locke, Mill and the Enlightenment; the Social Responsibility, grounded in
a communication revolution and in certain behaviouristic doubts about the
philosophy ofthe Enlightenment; and the Soviet Communist, grounded in
Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the
Soviet Union. [1956,6]
This four-part typology has served as the model for the great majority of press theory
typologies and conceptual models over the past 40 years. The most influential has been
the adaptation in successive formulations of McQuail [1983, 1987 and 1994] who used

the initial four-part structure as the basis for his consideration of normative theories
the press added two further normative categories: 'development' and 'democratic
participant' theories. This six-part typology remains the basis commonly adopted for
contemporary analysis of media structures, although with some modification by other
theorists. These six models are considered briefly below in the order applied by
McQuail. [1987,111-124]

2.4.1 Authoritarian theory

This model identifies press arrangements in societies when and where the press
originated. Mostly these were monarchies in which the press was subordinated to state
power and ruling class interests. It can also refer to contemporary press arrangements,
ranging from where the state automatically expects support or neutrality from the press
to where the press is directly used as an instrument of repressive state power. In both
cases, the exercise of true independence is denied to journalists, and they are
subordinated to state authority.

Authoritarian theory justifies censorship prior to publication (the so-called doctrine o
prior restraint), for deviation from externai guide-lines applicable to politicai and

ideological materiais. Prior restraint can be enforced through direct legislation; direc
control of news production by the state; enforceable codes of conduct; taxation and
other economic sanctions; controlled import of foreign media; government veto on
appointment of editorial staff; suspension of publication. [McQuail 1987, 110] The
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authoritarian model is readily identifiable in pre-democratic societies and in openly
dictatorial or repressive societies such as a military junta at the head of the state, martial
law or occupation by an externai power. In such circumstances it would be virtually
impossible for the press to operate in any w a y other than authoritarian. A s McQuail
observes, authoritarian tendencies can emerge in societies that are not generally or
openly totahtarian.
There are cases and occasions w h e n authoritarianism expresses the
popular will and, in ali societies, there are situations where media freedom
m a y conflict with some interests of the state or society in general, for
instance under conditions of terrorist insurgency or threat of war. It is also
the case that elements of authoritarianism linger on in relation to some
media rather than to others. [1987, 111]
The main principies of the theory can be briefly summarised. The press should not do
or print anything likely to erode established authority or cause popular disturbance, and
it should always (or ultimately) be subordinate to established authority. T h e press
should avoid offence to majority, or dominant, moral and politicai values. Censorship
can be justified to enforce these principies. Unacceptable attacks on authority,
deviations from official policy or offences against moral codes should be criminal
offences. Journalists or other media professionals have no independence within their
media organisations.

On the basis of these criteria, it cannot be denied that there is a large element of the
contemporary world press that is essentially authoritarian in its structure and practice.
Even in countries where liberal traditions of the press are firm tenets of faith, there is a
residue of the doctrine in the willingness of government to submit m a s s
Communications to varying degrees of oversight and regulation for reasons of public
and private interest. A s McQuail observes, the model still offers a justification for
submitting the media to those w h o hold power in society, whether legitimately or not.

2.4.2 Soviet Press Theory

The Russian press and other media were completely re-organised after the 1917
Revolution on the basis of theoretical writings by M a r x and Engels as interpreted and
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applied by Lenin. The theory so constituted and embodied in institutional structures
provided the main framework for news media practice, training and research in the
former Soviet Union until its disintegration from the late 1980's. Under Soviet media
theory, the working class by definition held power in a socialist society and kept it by
controlling the means of intellectual production. Thus, ali media were controlled by
agencies of the working classes, primarily the Communist Party. Because socialist
societies were, theoretically, classless societies reflecting class conflict, the press
should not be structured along conventional lines of factional conflict.
In socialist societies, the press had a positive role to play by way of socialisation,
informal social control and mobilisation towards planned social and economic goals.
Because Marxism posited objective laws of history and thus an objective reality that the
press should reflect, there was virtually no scope for personal interpretation and news
gathering initiatives such as investigative journalism. N e w s gathering w a s dictated by
government and party imperatives, completely different from the conventional
' newsworthiness ' tests of liberal press systems. Thus, Soviet press theory w a s based
on essentially total submission of the press to the control of the state, with a Soviet state
requiring the media to submit to ultimate control by organs of the state and to be
integrated, in varying degrees, with other politicai instruments of the state. [McQuail
1987, 13]

Within these daunting limits, there were expectations that the press should be largely
left alone to exercise its responsibilities under the Soviet state, to regulate itself in
awareness of the prevailing guidelines. In short, the government and the party
intervened mainly w h e n requirements were flaunted or their authority challenged.
Furthermore the elements of the press were expected to develop their o w n standards of
professional conduct and to show responsiveness, and be accountable, to their
audiences by some market research, by institutionalised means of audience involvement
such as printing and answering letters, and by attending in a limited w a y to public
demand.

25

The similarity, indeed overlap, between Authoritarian theory and Soviet theory have
often been noted in comparative analysis of media structures. There is some merit in the
notion that Soviet theory was essentially Authoritarian theory in a specific historical
context, as Sibert et ai suggested in their initial outline of the four theories. In particular,
both theoretical models impose a strong emphasis on support for the existing social
order.

There are also important differences. Under Soviet theory, the press are not subject to
arbitrary or unpredictable interference, but work within familiar Umits. Their censorship
is largely the censorship of self-imposition. They are adjured by the state to serve and
respond to public needs, to act positively in their news reporting and to restrict or
eliminate negative news, emphasising public compliance with desired norms of
behaviour and stressing desirable functions such as education, information, motivation
and mobilisation. Thus, events such as great natural disasters are often reported in
terms of a triumphant popular response in adversity rather than emphasising huge
numbers of casualties. They pay some attention to diversity of interest, not invariably
those of a monolithic state. Furthermore, they serve positive social functions by
stimulating compliance with desired norms of education, information, motivation, and
mobilisation.
2.4.3 Free Press (or Libertarian) Theory

This is essentially the traditional liberal or libertarian theory of the press that had it
origins in the long struggle of emerging liberal democracies to free the printing press
from state control. This struggle was conducted in varying ways and over differing time
spans in the struggle to assert liberal-democratic frameworks of government and public
administration. In the English-language tradition the struggle began virtually with the
foundation of the printing press in England in the late 15th Century and culminated in
the late 18th Century with the inclusion of press freedom in the United States Bill of
Rights [The First A m e n d m e n t Freedoms], Thus, it w a s possible for countries such as
Austrália, colonised from 1788 and establishing itsfirstnewspaper in 1803, to have a
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virtually free press, even under colonial sovereignty, from the early 1830's. A s
McQuail observes, freedom of the press is the main legitimating principie for news
media in Uberal democracies, largely because of its long history, great potency and high
symbolic value. [1987, 14]

Certainly free press theory dominates the literature of normative media theory. In its
most basic form free press theory prescribes a basic right of freedom to publish
equivalent to other basic rights such as freedom of expression, religion and assembly.
These complement the underlying principies and values identified with the liberal
democratic state: the supremacy ofthe individual; a firm belief in rationality, truth and
progress; the ultimate sovereignty of the people. Control and censorship of the press
can only lead ultimately to irrationality or repression, even if it m a y seem justifiable in
the short term. According to Pool:
N o nation will indefinitely tolerate a freedom of the press that serves to
divide the country and to open the floodgates of criticism against the freely
chosen government that leads it. [Cited McQuail 1987, 115]
In practical terms, the application of freedom of the press is generally directed to
freedom from prior restraint, the notion that a press should be unencumbered in what it
prints but should be subject to legal processes if it transgresses against individual rights
and legitimate social claims. Thus, freedom of the press in liberal democratic societies is
not an absoluteright;it m a y be qualified by factors such as security or dignity of the
state or protection of individual rights to reputation, property and privacy. M u c h
difficulty has arisen over the institutional forms in which press freedom have become
embodied. In m a n y contexts, press freedom has become identified with property rights,
meaning the right to buy, o w n , use and sell media as a commercial commodity without
restraint or interference from government.

Apart from the assumption that freedom generally means freedom from government
intervention, this commodification of the press has been justified through the transfer of
the analogy of the'freemarket of ideas' to the real free market of commodities. Press
freedom thus becomes identified with private ownership of the media and freedom from
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interference in the market. McQuail summaries the anomalies and inconsistencies
inherent in this most widely invoked theory of the media:
The puré theory of press freedom presupposes that some tangible benefits
of liberty will actually be delivered. Certain other problems and
inconsistencies can also be noted. First, it is very unclear to what extent
the theory can be held to apply to public broadcasting... It is also unclear
h o w far it applies to other important spheres of communication activity
where freedom m a y be equally important-as in education, culture and the
arts. Secondly, the theory seems designed to protect opinion and belief
and has m u c h less to say on 'information', especially in matters to do with
access, privacy and publication, where personal or property interests are
involved. Thirdly, the theory has been most frequently formulated to
protect the owners of media and cannot give equal expression to the
arguable rights of editors and journalists within the press, or the
audiences, or other possible beneficiaries, or victims, of free expression.
Fourthly, the theory proscribes compulsory control but provides no
obvious w a y of handling the m a n y pressures to which media are subject,
especially, but not only, arising from market circumstances. [1987, 114115]
2.4.4 Social Responsibility Theory

A s noted earlier, Social Responsibility theory is attributable to the American
Commission on the Freedom of the Press which reported in 1947. This theory emerged
from feelings of dissatisfaction with conventional free press media theory as having
failed to deliver press freedom and social benefit. The rise of the new and powerful
media of radio, film and television had generated the need for additional mechanisms of
public control and accountability. According to McQuail, social responsibility theory
emerged as a means of reconciling independence with obligation to society:
Its main foundations are: an assumption that the media do serve essential
functions in society, especially in relation to democratic politics; a view
that the media should accept an obligation to fulfil these functions-mainly
in the sphere of information, and the provision of a platform for diverse
views, but also in matters of culture; an emphasis on m a x i m u m
independence of media, consistent with their obligations to society; an
acceptance of the view that there are certain standards of performance in
media work that can be stated and should be followed. [McQuail, 116]
In short, the media professional is not only responsible to consumer and shareholder,

but also to society at large. As Siebert et ai expressed it, the press is conceived of a

partner in the search for truth. [1956, 3, original emphasis] Social responsibility theo
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then tries to reconcile three somewhat divergent principies: of individual freedom and
choice; of media freedom; and of media obligation to society.
The theory favours two main kinds of solution to these problems. Firstly, the
development of public, but independent, institutions for the management of radio and
television developed m u c h later than for traditional print media, and thus are able to
advance the politicai value and potency of the social responsibility concept. Essentially,
it was argued that because of its longevity, restrictive regulation could not be applied to
print media protected by the sacred doctrine of freedom of the press. Public policy
objectives and processes, however, could be applied to n e w media without the
historical sanction of freedom of the press. Further, the continued development of
media professionalism could achieve higher standards of performance, while allowing
the media to persist with significant degrees of self-regulation.
In short, the media should accept and fulfil certain obligations to society, met largely
setting high professional standards of informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity and
balance. In discharge of its obligations media should be self-regulating within
established legal and institutional frameworks. Social responsibility journalism implies
that the media should avoid material conducive to crime, violence, civil disorder or
offence to minority groups. If high standards of performance are not forthcoming then,
under social responsibility theory, intervention is justifiable in pursuit of public interest.
Furthermore, a pluralist media should reflect social diversity and give ready access to a
range of views, observe a right of reply and publish corrections. Also implicit in
socially responsible journalism is the notion that journalism should be accountable to
society as well as to media proprietors and the market.
2.4.5 Development Media Theory
Hachten considered the developmental concept of media as a derivation from a
revolutionary concept which by its nature was a short-term affair:
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. . .the successful subservience of mass communication to topple a
despised regime is self-limiting. Once goals are achieved, the gains must
be Consolidated, and then another concept takes over. [1992,34]
Thus, developmental media was effectively a variation on authoritarian media,
associated particularly with the politicai independence of impoverished third-world
countries in the decades following World War II:
The Developmental concept is an amorphous and curious mixture of ideas,
rhetoric, influences and grievances. A s yet the concept is not clearly
defined. There are aspects straight out of Lenin and the Communist
concept of the press. Perhaps of greater importance are the influence of
Western social scientists w h o have posited a major role for mass
communication in the process of nation building in newly independent
countries. [Ibid]
Thus, Communications theorists such as Schramm, Lerner and others may have
unintentionally provided a rationale for autocratic press controls by emphasising the
central role of the communication process in achieving national integration and
economic development. Developmental journalism has been closely linked to the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the doctrine
known as the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO),
essentially an attempt to redress the imbalance of media resources at the disposition
the world's 'have nots' relative to the lavish media resources of developed countries.
Hachten elaborated his concept of developmental media in a series of principies which
may be briefly summarised. Ali instruments of mass communication must be mobilised
by the central government to foster the great tasks of nation building. The media
therefore should support authority and not challenge it. Information (or truth) thus
becomes the property of the state. Implicit is the view that individual rights of
expression and civil liberties generally are irrelevant when confronted with
overwhelming problems of disease, poverty, illiteracy and ethnicity. The end result is
guided press with each nation having a sovereign right to control news flows and the
activities of foreign journalists. [1992, 35]
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Supporters of the W e s t e m tradition in media theory have often been harsh critics of
developmental journalism and its manifestations in the NWICO and UNESCO. Writing
in 1994, Stevenson described it as having established a record which was not
impressive:
In the 1970's, the goals of third-world "national development" often
changed from economic and social growth along W e s t e m lines to the
vagaries of cultural sovereignty and politicai identity. In practice, the
nation often c a m e to mean the regime in power—hardly a n e w idea—and
development news consisted of endless puffery of government leaders and
the nation's progress, even where there wasn't much. Several of the
alternative news organisations created both to implement the N W I C O and
to fill legitimate gaps in the global news system have operated for 10 to 15
years, most with little evidence of success. [13]
In his influential re-formulation of press theories, McQuail saw developmental media as
arising from some common circumstances of developing countries that limited the utility

of other theories or reduced their potential benefits. One was the absence of conditions
necessary for a developed mass communication system such as the communication
infrastructure, professional skills, production and cultural resources, an accessible
audience. A related factor was the dependence of Third World countries on the
developed world for deficiencies in technology, skills and cultural products.
In varying degrees, these societies were committed to economic, politicai and social
development as a primary national task, to which other institutions should submit.

Furthermore, it was increasingly the case that developing countries recognised a similar
identity and interests in international politics. [1987, 119] From these conditions
emerged a set of expectations and normative principies about mass media deviating
from those that seemed to apply in either the capitalist or communist world. McQuail,
like Hachten, recognised the derivation of developmental principies from authoritarian

and, less often, Soviet theories, but also saw discernible influences in libertarian and
less often, social responsibility theories:
The normative elements of emerging development theory are shaped by the
circumstances. . . have both negative and positive aspects. They are,
especially, opposed to dependency and foreign domination and to arbitrary
authoritarianism. They are for positive uses of the media in national
development, for the autonomy and cultural identity of the particular
national society. T o a certain extent they favour democratic, grass-roots
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involvement, thus participative communication models. This is partly an
extension of other principies of autonomy and opposition to
authoritarianism and partly a recognition of the need to achieve
development objectives by co-operative means. [1987,120]
2.4.6 Democratic-Participant Media Theory
Democratic-participant media theory was conceived by H.M. Enzenberger in an
influential article, Constituents ofa Theory ofthe media, published in 1970. The theory
was largely a response to calls from the 1960's onwards for alternative, grassroots
media responsive to the needs of citizens. It was incorporated by McQuail into his sixcategory typology of media theories and thus is a relatively late addition to the
normative theory of the media. Conceptualisation of this media theory has presented
difficulties because, as a latecomer, it lacks the legitimation of earlier theories, and
because elements of it are to be found in earlier theories of the press.

Furthermore, it has not adapted readily to incorporation into institutional media
structures. Its emergence is partly a reaction to perceived deficiencies in other media
theories, but also as a positive means of establishing n e w media institutions and
reforming existing structures in the direction of greater democratic involvement. The
influence of democratic-participant media theory is to be seen in the development of
pubUc and community journalism ventures in the United States in recent years. M u c h of
the impetus for these formats has c o m e directly from the grassroots, although there has
been some commitment by newspapers wanting to counter falis in circulation by greater
involvement of local communities and citizens.
McQuail, in his latest formulation of democratic participation media theory [1994] sees
it as supporting the right to relevant local information, the right to answer back and the
right to use the n e w means of communication for interaction and social action in smallscale settings of community interest group or culture. [131] This return to more modest
units of media production has been induced by technology change such as desktop
publishing and desktop video as well as changes in theoretical perception. In
combination, the n e w theoretical base and access to new, cheaper technology have
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challenged the hegemony of commercialised, centralised, professionalised or statecontrolled media. The theory represents both a challenge to traditional media and a
disillusionment with conventional party poUtics and the media institutions that sustain
The practical expressions of the theory are many and varied, including the
underground or alternative press, pirate radio, community cable television,
'samizdat' publication, micro media in rural settings, neighbourhood
media, wall posters and media for w o m e n and ethnic majorities. The
theory rejects the market as a suitable institutional form as well as ali 'topdown' professional provision and control. Participation and interaction are
key concepts. [McQuail 1994, 132]
Although the impact of democratic-participant media theory is largely concentrated on
societies exercising the western liberal traditions of media theory and structure, its
practice encompasses elements of development media theory, especially its emphases
on social involvement and organisation on a horizontal rather than an historical

structure. Its accessibility to small-scale technology, such as duplicated newsletters an
extensive re-copying of audio tapes, gives it a certain resonance in the context of both
the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 and Iran's Islamic Revolution
beginning in 1979.

2.4.7 Press Concepts

There is no denying the substantial influence of the press theory approach deriving very
largely from Siebert, Peterson and Schramnfs Four Theories of the Press. The initial
typology has been widely used in subsequent Communications theory, amended and
adapted but still discernibly the same in its fundamentais. In its amplification of the

original typology, the treatment here has largely followed McQuail's evolution of a sixpart typology, a formulation which seems most relevant to the contemporary
circumstances of mass Communications media theory and practice. Any attempt to
analyse the total incidence of this influential body of theory and its employment in
numerous other works by Communications scholars is beyond the resources of this
thesis. It is intended, however, to look briefly at the treatment of the press theory
approach in influential works by comparative Communications scholars.
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Hachten [1992, 14] devised a changing ideologies approach to media theory and
structuring, suggestingfivepress concepts which, although clearly based on Siebert et
ai, m a d e some significant additions and modifications. According to Hachten, differing
perceptions about the nature and role of journalism and mass Communications are
rooted in divergent politicai systems and historical traditions broadly reflected in five
poUtical concepts of the press found in the contemporary world: Authoritarian; Westem;
Communist; Revolutionary, and Developmental. [15]

Hachten's Authoritarian concept is essentially the same as the Authoritarian theory
expressed by Siebert et ai. H e suggests further that the Communist and Developmental
models are essentially 20th Century modifications of the Authoritarian concept. The
W e s t e m concept, described as the model under which the press in W e s t e m democracies
generally functions, represents a fundamental alternative to the Authoritarian concept. In
essence, the W e s t e m concept incorporates elements of both the libertarian and social
responsibility theories developed by Siebert et ai and articulated in McQuaiTs six-part
typology. Hachten's formulation of the Developmental concept is similar to that of
McQuail, describing it as an emerging pattern associated with the n e w nations of the
Third World, mostly lacking adequate media resources.

In some ways, Hachten's Five-Concepts approach is a more concise and accessible
framework than the six-theory model articulated by McQuail. It has the further asset of
extending the scope of the received approach by adding another category of a
revolutionary concept or theory, an important omission from the earlier constructs. The
revolutionary concept, says Hachten, has one thing in c o m m o n with the W e s t e m
concept; both try to operate outside of government controls. [15-16] It is not proposed
here to go through Hachten's typology in detail; m u c h of it recapitulates principies
established by the earlier models. It is intended, however, to look at h o w Hachten
conceptualises revolutionary and developmental theories of the press.

Hachten defines the revolutionary press as a concept of illegal and subversive
communication 'utilising the press and broadcasting to overthrow a government or
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wrest control from alien or otherwise rejected rulers.' [1992, 31] The revolutionary
concept includes material externai to the country involved, as in the production of
Pravda

outside of Rússia before the 1917 Revolution. The wide distribution of

smuggled copies within Rússia was cited by Hachten as a fine example of the
revolutionary concept.

Fundamental to Hachten's Revolutionary concept was the notion that a revolutionary
press was a press of people w h o believed strongly that the government they lived under
did not serve their interests and should be overthrown: 'They believe they o w e such a
government no loyalty whatsoever.' [31] A s a 'puré example' of his revolutionary
concept, Hachten cited the underground press in Nazi-occupied France during World
W a r 11. Another contemporary example of the Revolutionary concept was the Samizdat
publications, clandestine typed duplicated and photocopied copies of revolutionary
material passed from hand to hand during the extended dissident movement which
ultimately destroyed c o m m u n i s m in the Soviet Union. The Samizdat approach to
surreptitious publication and distribution had m u c h in c o m m o n with the publication of
Shabnameh, or nocturnal letters, during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 190611. (See Chapters Three and Six)
Much of Hachten's analysis is directed to the anti-colonial movements which
established n e w nations in the Third World, particularly in the former British Empire.
H e notes that dissidents in the former British colonies had first expressed revolutionary
and national aspirations through small newspapers, often hand-written. The editors of
these underground newspapers included aspiring national leaders w h o ultimately
emerged as founders of their nations: Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Kaunda. The revolutionary
input of such newspapers was often tolerated by British colonial powers because it was
not contradictory to the American-Anglo traditions deriving from libertarian/social
responsibility models:
H a d not Thomas Paine used politicai pamphlets to help run the British out
of the American colonies? H a d not T h o m a s Jefferson said. . .the people
have a right to revolution, including the right to subsequent revolutions if
that proved necessary? [32]
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Thus, the Anglo-American tradition of a revolutionary press dominates Hachten's
conceptualisation of a revolutionary movement as an impact on world journalism. In
contemporary terms, he has a preoccupation with radio, particularly its importance in

the various times of politicai crisis and coup d'etats in Black Africa. The partnership

traditional Communications and revolutionary print media, the essential format of Iran'
Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th Century, are beyond his limited horizons.
Even the Islamic Revolution of the late 20th Century which had a significant impact on

global alignments and distribution of politicai power is conceived only in terms of its
application of technology. The internai dynamics are totally ignored.

Hazchten's treatment of developmental journalism is much more satisfactory because it
clearly establishes linkages with Authoritarian and Communist press theories. Most
importantly, it acknowledges the contribution of libertarian and social responsibility
theories, factors largely avoided by McQuail. The influences of Western social
scientists, says Hachten, are perhaps more important for the Developmental Concept
than aspects straight out of Lenin and the Communist Concept. These Westem theorists
have posited a major role for mass Communications in the process of nation building in
newly independent countries:
American academics such as Wilbur Schramm, Daniel Lerner and othersall libertarians at heart-have argued that the communication process is
central to the achievement of national integration and economic
development. In so doing, they m a y have unintentionally provided a
rationale for automatic press controls. Other more radical academics,
mostly Europeans, have echoed Marxist views and added a strong touch
of anti-Americanism to the concept. For the concept is to some extent a
critique of and reaction against the West and its transitional media....Some
critics say that central to the Developmental concept is the rejection of the
W e s t e m view. [34-35]
The elements of Hachten's outline of the Developmental Concept are broadly similar to
McQuail's formulation. He observes that by 1992 the concept appeared to be losing
momentum in the Third World, suggesting that general trends favoured democratic
systems with an independent media anchored in the private sector. This had boosted the
Westem press concept while the Communist model had largely disappeared. His
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analysis, however, conspicuously avoided any attempt to c o m e to grips with the Islamic
Revolution and its distinctive blend of traditional and mass communication systems.
Stevenson [1994] reduced the number of press theories to four: Authoritarian Theory,
Libertarian Theory, Communist Theory and Social Responsibility Theory, essentially
the framework proposed by Siebert et ai. O n this limited basis, he closely followed
Hachten's Five Concept model, not distinguishing with any clarity between theory and
concept which clearly overlap in his analysis. H e did m a k e one modification by linking
Authoritarianism loosely with C o m m u n i s m which he described as mostly an 'artifact'
except for a few outposts such as Cuba and North Korea. [1994, 110] His chapters on
Development and Revolutionary Media ignore the Iranian experience and do not
consider the survival of traditional Communications systems as a potent revolutionary
force.
2.4.8 Press Theories, Concepts and Iran

Iran is an ancient civilisation and a potent force in history and geopolitics because it
traditional territory provides a historical land bridge between Europe and Ásia, between
Rússia and the southem oceans. For more than 200 years, its oil resources lured
colonial exploiters. In the 20th Century it has spawned two great social revolutions with
significant consequences for both national and global power alignments. It has fought
one of the major wars of the post World W a r II period, been a dominant force in the
continuing significance of Islamic religion and society, and preoccupied the conduct of
W e s t e m foreign policy, particularly the United States, for almost two decades. Yet, as
the preceding review shows, it has been very largely disregarded in the development of
Communications theory and global communication.

Unquestionably, the press theories and concepts considered above are applicable in
certain respects to Iran, and these will be considered in the chapters that follow. In
particular, the Authoritarian Theory of the press is relevant particularly to the extended
periods of monarchical mie in Iran. Iran, however, has lacked any tradition of Marxism
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and the communist variation of authoritarian theory has found no place in its
government or society. Except for one brief interlude in the 1870's, libertarian and
social responsibility theories of the press m a d e no lodgment in Iran, at least until the
end of the constitutional revolutionary period in 1925, the period covered by this thesis.
It might be argued that developmental theory has had s o m e place in Iranian
Communications since the end of World W a r II, but this consideration is also beyond
the scope of this thesis. The revolutionary concepts considered above are based on
selective historical experience and analogies completely alien to the Iranian experience.
In the absence of any appropriate theoretical model drawing on both traditional systems
and mass Communications systems, it is incumbent to propose one here. This is the
principal task addressed in the remaining sections of this chapter.

2.5 Public Communication in a Historical Process

The thesis turns now to consider important examples of non-mass mediated
communication in a context of public communication. Firstly, it looks at the extensive
nature of public communication in ancient empires whose media effects seems to have
been overlooked and underestimated. The second focus is the enduring and
contemporary power of traditional channels of communication in the developing world,
reflected in the role played by the political-religious leaders in social awakenings in
countries such as índia, China, and Iran. A third section presents a model of politicai
communication designed to assist in analysing both functions of the news media and
traditional communication channels.

As we move from an industrial to an information society, the media represent one of the
more dramatically changing sectors. Traditional media practice and organisation face
enormous challenges from n e w forms of competition and industry structure; altered
regulatory frameworks; major changes in technology, products, and actual distribution
methods. The 18th Century was the era for analysing society as a machine, the early
19th Century for analysing society as a organism, and the 20th Century for analysing
society as a Communications network. Harold Innis, Marshall Macluhan, and R a y m o n d
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Williams are among the prominent Communications and cultural scholars w h o have
taught us that the effort to interpret society and culture must include analysis of h o w
public discourses are communicated. W h a t has been neglected in m u c h of this
consideration has been the enduring role of traditional Communications systems.
The modem world has witnessed five major communication revolutions based on
technology, ali of which were initiated or incorporated primarily in the west. Each of
these revolutions grew out of a technological invention and stimulated a profound
transformation of socio-political organisation and practice. Table 2.1 reviews these
changes.
Table 2.1
Principal Communication Channels
Channels

Approximate A g e in Mid-1990s

Print

520 years

Film

100 years

Radio

70 years

Television

55 years

SateUite

30 years

Digital

20-25 years

*Source: Kia 1992, 25.
The print 'revolution' in the west was a long and slow process dating conventionally
from Gutenberg's invention of moveable type in the mid-15th century. Print preceded
by a half-century another important process in modern western history—the
development of maritime exploration, which initiated European colonisation of many
parts of the globe. The conjunction of the two processes is neatly encapsulated by the
printing of a pamphlet in Spain in 1492 incorporating a letter by Columbus about his
great discoveries in the Américas. [Stephens 1988, 83] Though the effects of print were
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genuinely revolutionary, its emergence as a social institution did not occur until 300
years after the technology was invented.
The social impact of print on the developing world did not occur until the mid-19th
Century. In considering the origins of media in the developing world, the most useful
model is that developed by Lerner, w h o conceptualised a two-fold model of historical
systems of public communication which he termed Oral and Media.

Table 2.2
Lerner's Model of Communications
Model

M e d i a System

Oral System

Channel

Broadcast (Mediated)

Personal (Face-to-Face)

Audience

Heterogeneous (Mass)

Primary (Group)

Source

dProfessional (Skills)

Hierarchical (Status)

Content

Descriptive (News)

Perspective (Rules)

Source: Lerner 1964, 55.

Lerner called these 'idealised sets of paired comparisons' and, although he added the
disclaimer that few societies would fit the model perfectly, he believed a secular trend of
global importance was embodied in the typology. In short, he argued that traditional
communication is necessarily and inevitably overtaken by mediated communication.
According to Lerners' hypothesis there was a correlation between urbanisation, literacy,
exposure to media and politicai participations. [Lerner 1958,42]

aPye argued that the most striking characteristic of traditional communication was that
w a s not organised as a distinct system sharply differentiated from other social
processes. [1963, 40-42] Traditional systems lacked professional communicators, with
people participating on the basis of their politicai or social position in the community or
according to personal ties of association. Information flowed along the lines of the
social hierarchy or according to the particularistic patterns of social relations in each
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community. Thus the process was not independent of either the ordering of social
relations or the content of the communication. Since the communication process was
generally so intimately related to the basic structure of traditional society, the acts of
evaluating, interpreting and responding to ali Communications were coloured by
considerations directly related to the status relations between communicator and
recipient.

Eisenstadt elaborated and extended concepts demonstrating the power of ancient
communication networks, focussing on the communication patterns of centralised
empires. H e suggested that within various imperial systems, such as Egyptian,
Chinese, R o m a n , Greek, and Persian, there developed sophisticated politicai, religious
and cultural centres with the development of imperial symbols, currency, language, and
the channels to transmit these to the far reaches of the Empire that these empires were
also the seat of the development of the great traditions meant competition between the
various imperial centres. [1980, 28]

The economic historian and Communications scholar Harold Innis [1950] was one of
the first and most persuasive advocates of drawing attention to the role of
communication in Unking together a nation. The work of Innis also estabUshes the role
of particular mixes of communication media and forms (oral/written; state/church) in
maintaining flexible and durable social orders, as in Ancient Greece and Byzantium.
[29] This work suggests that far more sophisticated networks of communication existed
at least in these ancient empires than the model of oral communication provides.
Furthermore, concern for the incorporation of peripheral groups and their identification
with the centre is not simply a phenomenon of contemporary history. Curran [1977]
has shown that a variety of signifying forms were used in pre-industrial societies which
often reached huge audiences. H e provided a detailed analysis of the centralised control
of symbolic content exercised by papal cúria in medieval Europe, showing h o w a
Communications network was established which transmitted the hierocratic themes of
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the papacy, translated into popular and comprehensible ideological forms, across
W e s t e m Europe. [30]
Thus the historical evidence suggests the centrality of Communications adaptations that
were extensive, highly organised and effective in the maintenance of empires and other
politicai units, well before the advent of mass media. Therefore, notions of face-to-face
communication and a focus on primary groups alone seem an inadequate typification of
past systems of communication where extensive public communication was achieved.
Evidence from the contemporary Third World emphasises the continuing importance of
traditional forms of Communications as credible, effective carriers of information and as
powerful channels of cultural identity.
This affirmation of the enduring strength of traditional Communications is extremely
relevant w h e n considering revolutionary mobilisation in Iran, reflected in the
embedding of traditional networks of communication in the heart of urban social life as
well as the enduring social status ofthe clergy as spiritual/political leaders. Fathi [1979]
has challenged the notion that there did not exist any distinct, organised system of
public Communications nor class of professional communicators in traditional societies.
H e argues that the function of the Islamic Minbar was, and still is, as a m é d i u m of
pubUc communication, not only for specifically religious messages but also for politicai
and social issues. [103]
Traditionally, oral communication has been a significant form of public communication
in Iran. The Iranian culture has been an oral culture, and most literature and traditions
are transmitted from generation to generation through reading in public and private
places. [Mohsenian R a d 1995, 75] Indeed, Iranians are predominantly Shi'i Muslim,
and the unique characteristics of the Iranian culture include its religious practices and the
role of public places, such as mosques and bazaars, and the influence they have on
public interaction and communication. Traditionally, it has been in the mosque that
m e m b e r s of the public engaged in both religious practice and social discourse. Indeed,
architecturally the mosques were designed for large numbers of people to participate in
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ceremonies. For example, in 1612, there was a mosque in Isfahan designed for
speakers to reach audiences of more than 1000 members. [Kamalipour and Mowlana
1994, 75]

Religious leaders used these forums to disseminate their religious, social and politica
messages. For that purpose, mosques stiU play a central role in social communication,
since they can easily accommodate large audiences at any time. [Mohsenian Rad 1995,
65] The mosque was not only the location of the weekly communal prayers but also the
centre of the community much as the Fórum was to R o m e or the Agora to Greece. Thus
throughout the history of Islam, the mosque has been the centre and scene of numerous
uprisings, revolts and social movements often led by popular preachers from the
minbar. [Fathi 1979, 104] Another important development in Islam was the early
appearance of another type of religious orator w h o was called Qauass or storyteller.
There were also distinctions between preachers, with the Khatib, or religious man,
delivering a more strictly religious sermon while the Qauass or storyteller, was often
more directly politicai and developed a considerable following and influence. Thus the
minbar has played a considerable poUtical role at various junctures of Iranian history.

2.6 The Press and Traditional Communication Channels

The 1970s re-affirmed the importance of the traditional forms of Communications and
small media in contemporary history, perhaps most notably in the Islamic Revolution of
1979. Schramm was among the first to propose a distinction between the two different
systems of mass media.
S o m e Big Media, of course, are considerably bigger than others, and
some of the little ones m u c h smaller than others. B y the Big Media, w e
m e a n complex, expensive media like television, sound films and
computer-assisted instruction. B y the Little Media, w e mean the simpler
ones, which stretch ali the w a y from slides, slide films and projected
transparencies to radio and programmed texts. [1972, 54]
The linkage between Schramnfs formulation here and the democratic participam media
theory discussed above is readily apparent. S o m e of this re-thinking still implied a
model of communication experts instructing a passively absorptive audience, with the
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content and process of development orchestrated from above and the people volunteered
for involvement. [Rogers 1976, 32] The rethinking of the 1970s, however, did lead

towards recognition of the need for a better cultural fit between the methods employed
for development and traditional patterns of communication and interaction. Thus
Schramm and Lerner illustrated the shifting perspective:
We have learned that most media, well used, can contribute to
development-not only television from the A T S - 6 satellite to índia or from
ground towers to El Salvador and the Ivory Coast, but also the humbler,
less costly, less complex media like slides and posters at village meetings,
traditional media like the dances and puppet shows of Southeast Ásia, and
above ali the m é d i u m of interpersonal face-to-face talk. Dollar for dollar,
the smaller, less expensive media m a y often be more efficient in a
development program than the larger, more expensive ones. A n d any
m é d i u m is likely to be more effective w h e n combined with two-way
communication of one kind or other. [34]
Obviously the process works best when communities and individuais take the initiative
in creating their own appropriate means of communication, as the UNESCO publication
Many Voices, One World pointed out:
These means cover a wide range of media from local and wall
newspapers, mimeographed leaflets, photos, posters and dazibao, local
radio and itinerant loudspeakers, to pamphlets, slides, tape recorders,
exhibitions, experimentations, local fairs, film and music festivais, puppet
shows, itinerant information vans, street theatre and an endless list of
similar devices and means. [1980, 54]
The benefits of using such channels are that they may accomplish tasks and purposes
for which the mass media are not suited, saving resources and promoting broader
horizontal communication. Thus, for different development purposes different
combinations of media can be used, and each nation and culture will most effectively
use those forms that are a part of its traditional culture. The variety and complexity
traditional communication is great: in Botswana the performing arts are crucial; in
China after folk songs, opera and serial pictures, the dazibao
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or wall newspaper is th

most important in faciUtating popular participation; in Bolivia the miners run local ra
stations; and in Mali there are rural newspapers. [UNESCO 1980, 58] In Egypt,

*. Newspaper pasted in walls for the public readership.

44

folkloric forms such as puppets coexist with religious channels like the mosque and the
socio-economic arenas ofthe bazaar and markets. [Sarnir 1980,7]
Some analysts focus on group media augmented by Communications technology, and
suggest it can both support and maintain traditional forms of communication as well as
allowing participation in the group process and in the active production of meaning.
Adult education practices based on the ideas of Paulo Freire, the role of the churches
based on Liberation theology, radio-schools, community video and community radio
are some of the channels and tools used within the developing world by minority forces
aiming at fundamental changes in society, and comprising a necessary counter-balance
to mass media.

There is increasing agreement that traditional and interpersonal/group forms of

i
i
l
]

*

;i

communication should be fostered both for their intrinsic value and because they act as
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correctives to limitmg communication to professionals, to emphasising information at
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the expense of discussion, and toward the introduction of technology simply because it
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is m o d e m and impressive without consideration of its social utility. [SerbernyM o h a m m a d i 1984, 31] Thus, small media c o m e to stand both for channels of cultural
authenticity but also as important forums of popular participation. It is therefore not
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surprising that they have played such an important role in politicai and social

'

mobilisation.

Pye notes that a modem communication system consists of 'a fusion of high technology
and special professionalised processes of communication with informal, society-based
and non-specialised processes of person-to-person communication'. [1963, 26] From
this the derives the real test of modernisation as being not simply the levei of advanced
technology in a society, but rather 'he extent to which there is effective feedback
between the mass media systems and the informal, face-to-face systems'. [27] In Iran
the last monarchy, the Pahlavi regime, actively severed whatever residual linkages it
had maintained with the traditional networks, and attempted to orchestrate ali
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participation within its constructed party format. Ali this achieved was to empower the
traditional networks as sites of politicai and cultural resistance to the state.

For Pye, the 'transitional' communication process between traditional communication
and contemporary mass communication can be characterised by its fragmented nature.
Thus, the two leveis are not closely integrated but each represents a more or less
autonomous communication system. [1963, 24] The linear assumption of this model
m a y be challenged by examination of the historie experience in Iran. A n integrated and
complex communication structure had existed in Iranian history, and during the
revolutionary period a public sphere of independent publishing and autonomous
politicai groups flourished. The extremely bifurcated communication structure existing
under the Pahlavi regime was a regression from the previous integrated models.
2.6.1 The Print Media

The brief outline here tries to indicate the role of the press in politicai communicati
during socio-political crises, particularly revolutions. Religious communication was
central in the English Civil W a r , or 'Puritan Revolution', when sermons and pamphlets
played a crucial role. Hill has written of the church monopoly over thought and opinion
in Britain during the 17th Century, so that 'in the absence of other media of
communication, sermons were for the majority of Englishmen their main source of
politicai information and politicai ideas'. [1964, 58] Control of the pulpit w a s a
question of politicai power and clergymen acted for both King and Parliament in
reading declarations from their pulpits. In a similar manner, traditional Communications
including bast (sanctuary) and minbar (pulpit) performed essential communication
functions during the revolutionary periods in 20th Century Iran.

According to Mayer the 'proper functions' of the press are classified into five categori
including information, instruction, entertainment, reflection of public opinions and
advocacy. [1985, 49] The print media has played a vital role as an agent of social
change and print has the longest history as a m é d i u m of radical expression. It has been
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estimated that between 1640-1660 in England, at the height of the Civil W a r , 22,000
speeches, pamphlets, sermons, and newspapers were printed [Stone 1972, 60]
Pamphleteers, among them Tom Paine, were important during the American
Revolution. The printing of the Encyclopedia in France was a massive undertaking
requiring great resources and its impact was elaborated through oral discussion and
reiteration, and a barrage of underground leaflets during the French Revolution of the
late 18th Century.

Indeed, such open social spaces as French salons and the English coffee-house were

themselves criticai carriers and elaborators of politicai ideas and intellectual trends.
development of this public space as a means of oral and written communication was a j
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crucial element in the development of bourgeois society and public opinion. Radical
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tracts, like those of William Cobbett, helped to mobilise Chartism and the British trade
<

union movement in the early 19th Century.
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Clearly in the West, as L e m e r pointed out, there was an important relationship between
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literacy and politicai participation. The problem with this model, and indeed a real
problem for many inhabitants of the contemporary Third World, was that the nexus has
been broken. In many states electronic media were introduced before mass literacy was
obtained, because the mass media provided regimes with the means of politicai
indoctrination and control, forces which literacy and small media have the potential to
undermine. Even the performing arts, puppeteers and other traditional cultural forms

have played their role in politicai mobilisation, acting to espouse protest, dissent and
reform. In índia, 'these native media of sung communication and enacted information
proved more than a match to the Government-controlled mass media during the many
politicai and social campaigns launched by Ghandhi'. [Ranganath 1985, 64] Clearly,
each historical context provides different possibilities. As Gurr has described in his
analysis of mass mobilisations:
If the articulators of revolutionary symbolism lack access to existing
media, or find them closed by censorship, they m a y establish n e w media
like newspapers and journals. If these are suppressed, they m a y resort to
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clandestine or foreign communication media, face-to-face agitation or the
generation of rumours. [1973, 224]

Gurr refers to the distribution of anarchist tracts among Spain's Andalusian peasants i
1919, the appearance of clandestine pamphlets against Peron in Argentina in 1955, and
propaganda broadcasts from Egypt into Jordan in the 1950s. Occasional, small
circulation and rudimentary materiais are, in a censored context, of direct politicai
significance. According to Downing:
Books, irregularly appearing periodicals, almost illegible press, retyped
lectures, public gatherings of 80 people squashed inside a single
apartment, public lectures attended by 120 people: these are potent
reconstructions of an oppositional public realm. [1984, 308]
In Czechoslovakia, film, literary magazines and the Writer's Union were key channels
of resistance leading up to the dramatic events of 1968, and during the brief 'Prague
Spring' when the mass media began to reflect current concerns and broadcast in
minority languages: 'people were buying six or seven newspapers a day, and some of
them were listening to the radio till three in the morning'. [Downing 1984, 314]
In the Polish experience with the growth of Solidarity, there are perhaps surprisingly

close similarities with the Iranian situation. These include the importance of the Churc

as an alternative public space and guarantor of Polish culture and values in a centrall

administered environment; the scepticism about the official media; the initiation of the
underground media network by KOR (Committee for Worker's Self-Defense) with
signed communiques which published the struggles of workers and intellectuals, and

which carried the exhortation that by 'disseminating this bulletin you are acting withi

your rights, and playing a part in their defense. Read it, copy it, and pass it on'. [19
326] Downing describes the production of worker-oriented mass-circulation
newspapers, literary journals and NOWA, the independent publishing house which
became the publishing wing of Solidarity. He argues:
In terms of message reproduction, the movement graduated from the
classic samizdat method of reproduction based on typewriter and carbon
copies to the recycling of antiquated duplicators, photocopiers and offset
Utho to create the technological tools of the underground network. Cassette
tapes of the Gdansk negotiations also circulated through factories. The
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politicai police spent a considerable part of its time trying to repress this
growing underground small media movement, and even a year after
martial law had been imposed, its squads had seized over a million
leaflets, silenced eleven radio transmitters, found 380 printing shops and
confiscated nearly 500 typewriters. [1984, 327]
Independent media work still continued, however. Within the Polish context, these selfmanaged media created new spaces for public argument and debate, independent of the

power structure, and proved to be important small first steps in the giant movement that
ensued. As Downing observes, 'no alternative communication channel should be
written off simply because it is small'. [345]
Clandestine communication developed under and against Franco's Spanish dictatorship
from typewritten letters to underground press agencies, from underground politicai
press to anonymous poetry, or simply the symbolic painting of letters on walls: "P for
protest, A for amnesty, L for liberty". [Bassets 1983, 72] While this particular
underground movement was not able to play a catalytic role in developing a powerful
social movement, as happened in Iran, and change occurred naturally with the death of
Franco, it is interesting to note the reduction of Spanish society and Communications
practices into two separate realms, similar to the dualism of mass and traditional
Communications in Iran.
2.6.2 Traditional Communications and Leadership

Communication in traditional societies has been described as an indistinct, unorganised,
non-professional system which is totally based on face-to-face communication. [Fathi

1979,103] However, in certain traditional societies, Fathi argues that there is a distin
organised system of public communication operated by a communication dynamic

carried on face-to face, but it is institutional, not inter personal in nature. [104] Suc
system can have a powerful impact on socio-political activity. This section briefly
reviews the role played by inspirational leaders in social and politicai awakenings in
countries such as índia, China, and Iran
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Exploitation of the traditional Communications systems proved a strong politicai
instrument during social mobilisations in Third World countries through the 20th
Century. Gandhi and Mao's multi-model style successfully reached a large group of
people despite poverty, illiteracy, and lack of access to mass communication facilities.
Gandhi's daily prayer meetings, Mao's discussion meetings and various mass
campaigns attended by hundreds of millions of people substituted for audio-visual or
scarce print media. During campaigns the walls were plastered with posters and hand
written slangs or popular poems, news sheets by illegal printing presses were produced
and distributed. Further, the materiais were written in language specifically aimed at
particular audience-political opponents, the intellectual elite, and the masses. The
language M a o and Gandhi used against their opponents was highly combative and their
arguments were carefully hinged on moral grounds to embarrass their enemies. [Singh
1979, 99]

When communicating with the intellectual elite, Gandhi and Mao sought to change
centuries-old colonial ways of thinking and acting, arousing in them a repugnance to
the national consequences of living so far removed from the lives of the masses. [Ibid,
99] In writing for the masses, both Gandhi and M a o stressed 'traditional' aspects of
their languages. Ghandhi, of course, was also a journalist. Although reliance on the
anglicised translations of Gandhi's and Mao's statements limits conclusions, reports of
eyewitnesses or journalists provide some clue to their styles. Observers have described
their respective styles as simple and earthy, their use of words having a traditional
quality which made it easier for them to communicate effectively. Mehta Ved, a Gandhi
follower, thus described his leader:
H e spoke in a low singsong. His tone was always conversational, even
when he was addressing millions of people. Whatever he said was to the
point, and he used mostly simple words to say simple things. H e never
resorted to histrionics, or any rhetorical device, although he was fond of
using parables and proverbs, and quotations from Bhagavad Gita and
other sacred books. [1976, 94]
Traditional communication was a strong politicai channel during the Islamic revolution
of 1979 in Iran. M o w l a n a argues that the revolution 'grew naturally from native soil,
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and revolutionaries and people in general relied on traditional channels of
communication, primarily public meetings or other meeting places at which to spread
their messages and organise their resistance'. [Mowlana 1979, 107]
The mosque apart, the most important meeting places in Iranian cities is the bazaar the
traditional place of commerce, which played an active role in the victory of the Islamic

Revolution of 1979. Islam is the heart of Iranian social life, the traditional public sph
of communal activities. When the two interlocking social institutions of mosque and
bazaar suffered the specific attacks of the politicai regimes, especially during the
Constitutional Revolutionary (1906-25) and the Pahlavi periods (1926-79), the
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extensive personal and traditional values associated with both great institutions became

!

the core of popular mobilisation. [Sreberny-Mohammadi 1990, 354] Islam as a i
religious imperative and as the basis of social community and individual identity i
C
remained the most potent cultural and ideological force in Iran. [357] Indeed, Islam
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was the language and essence of politicai discourse as Mottale affrrms:
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Over 6 0 % of the Iranian population were illiterate and directly exposed
through the mosque to whatever the clergy wishes to inculcate in their
minds. T h e mosque is thus the focal point in mass mobilisation and
socialisation, and the clergy essentially interprets the world at large for
lower orders. In a changing and often threatening world, the mosque
became a fixed point of reference. [Mottale 1982,21]
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One of the major features of Iranian politicai history is the active role played by the S

Ulama (Clergy), in the historically significant events of Iran's politicai evolution over
the past century: the Tobacco Protest Movement (1891-2), the Constitutional
Revolution (1906-11), the Oil Nationalisation Movement of the early 1950's, the
violent protest of 1963 against the Pahlavi regime, and finally, the Islamic Revolution
(1979). This analysis concludes with a brief examination of Imam Khomeini's
leadership and the traditional processes of communication he employed in the Islamic
Revolution of 1979.

Imam Khomeini played a crucial role in motivating the clergy and people to participate
more actively in politicai life. [Sreberny-Mohammadi, 362-64] From early 1970, he
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stressed the need for religious leadership to become involved in politics, arguing that

imperialism had promoted a remote and pedantic religion obsessed by specific points of
legal interpretation. He encouraged the Ulama to publicise and to preach, arguing the

need for promulgating the ordinances of God and teachings of Islam, but also stressing
the power in numbers and influence of the clergy as a social force, arguing thus:
There are more than 150,000 students and scholars of the religious
sciences in Iran. If ali these scholars, authorities, proofs of Islam, and
Ayatullahs were to break the seal of silence from the list of crimes
committed by the regime, would they not achieve their aim? W o u l d the
authorities arrest them ali, imprison and banish them, destroy them?
[1981, 95-98]
I m a m Khomeini utilised a simple language and politico-religious orientation familiar to

the Iranian masses. His rhetoric provided a simple binary division of social inequality
between the Mostakberin, the oppressors, and the Mostazafin, the dispossessed, the
latter term neatly encompassing the various social elements which made up the popular
movement against the regime. One of Imam Khomeini's most powerful communiques
appeared just before Moharram, the Holy Month of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein
(Third Imam). A quotation suggests its rhetorical power:
Moharram is like a divine sword in the hand of the soldiers of Islam...it is
the month when blood triumphed over the sword, the month in which
truth condemned falsehood for ali etemity and branded the mark of
disgrace upon the foreheads of ali oppressors and satanic government...
the month that proves the super-powers m a y be defeated by the world of
truth, the month in which the Muslim leader taught us h o w to struggle
against ali the tyrants of history, h o w the clenched first of those seek
freedom, desire independence, and proclaim the truth m a y triumph over
tanks, machine guns and the armies of Satan... it is the duty of the entire
nation that has n o w risen in revolt to pursue and broaden its struggle
against the Shah with ali its strength and to bring d o w n his harmful,
disastrous regime...it is the duty of everyone to oppose the usurpatory
military government...it is the duty of ali oil company officials and
workers to prevent the export of oil, our vital resource...there is no excuse
for any class of people in the nation to remain inactive today: silence and
apathy m e a n suicide or even aid to the tyrannical regime. [SrebernyM o h a m m a d i 1990, 36]
I m a m Khomeini concluded by offering his congratulations to the families of those
youths who gave their lives for the cause of Islam and freedom, making martyrdom
again a cause for celebration instead of mourning. Imam Khomeini offered Iranians
both other-world and early redemption from the injustices of death, tyranny and
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imperiaUsm. Salvation was offered to aU, with promises that even the educated middle
classes found tempting. His rhetoric was enticing, highly normative, based on a
traditional value system which ali Iranians understood. According to SrebernyMohammadi:
Thus not only did the traditional fora of social and religious life provide
space for spread of communication but also the rhetoric of [Imam]
Khomeini and the grand Ayatallah was a traditional form of coercive
persuasion that precipitated the rapid and massive politicai mobilisation.
[1985, 235]
Small media (cassette tapes and leaflets) were two significant politicai tools in the hand
of religious leaders during the Islamic revolution of 1979 as westem comparative
Communications scholars have noted:
Supposedly blank tapes were found to contain [Imam] Khomeini's
messages. Tapes were duplicated by thousands and distributed along with
other goods through the bazaar system inside Tehran and out to other cities
and towns...these tapes were [Imam] Khomeni's electronic pulpit, a
switched on Minbar, for a population with 6 5 % illiteracy, in a cultural
milieu where oral communication is still the preferred means of
communication for interactions as diverse as inter-personal compliment.
[Sreberny-Mohammad, 358]
Massive participation in the revolutionary m o v e m e n t grew because of the direct

demands made on Islamic identity by the coercive persuasion of the clergy, particularly,
the charismatic power of Imam Khomeini. Clerical leaders thus played on the popular

i

devotion to Islam. They utilised traditional communication channels as a strong politicai
instrument in the popular awakening.
2.7 Class and Revolutionary M o v e m e n t s

Several significant mass communication theories have been discussed in this chapter.
These approaches, however, are inadequate to explain the processes of mass
communication in a traditional society. As these approaches do not incorporate the
interaction between modes of communication (mass and traditional), and culture (value

system, belief, and religion), they cannot analyse this process appropriately (See Figur
2.1).
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Early Marxist perspectives viewed the mass media as a powerful ideological weapon for
maintaining public submission to capitalism. The theories of communication based on a
conflict model of society derived initially from Marx's historical analysis of the
emergence of early capitalism stressing the unequal distribution of economic and
politicai powers in the world economy. The mass media, along with education and the
church, are considered an essential part of the ideological state apparatus. M a s s media
are said to play crucial roles in the distribution of power and the process of legitimation
in society.

Mass media are also viewed as powerful economic institutions concerned with profitmaking as m u c h as with ideological control, and with increasing tendency to
monopolisation, eroding any possibility of consumer sovereignty. Yet others see the
power of the media in taking over the cultivation of ideas, images and consciousness in
contemporary industrial society. Thus Gerbner argues that 'the truly revolutionary
significance of modern mass communication is...the ability to transform historically
n e w bases for collective thought and action quickly, continuously and pervasively
across the previous boundaries of time, space and status', and thus create n e w public
identities. [1976, 76] Hall considers the media to have 'progressively colonised the
cultural and ideological sphere' and to 'have established a decisive and fundamental
leadership in the cultural sphere'. [Hall 1982, 55] Politically, the media play a central
legitimating function and confer status.

Thus for many, the mass media have taken on the role of a contemporary priesthood.
But if the mass media were and are credited with outstanding ideological, politicai,
cultural and economic power in the W e s t e m industrialised setting, they were also
endowed with great powers within a Third World context. In the orthodox diffusions
perspective, mass media technologies and institutions were expected to create a climate
of change in developing societies by introducing n e w values, attitudes and modes of
behaviour favourable to modernisation. [Lerner 1964, 34]
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The mass media were expected to teach n e w skills 'from literacy to agriculture to
hygiene to repairing a motor car' and to act as multipliers of resources and knowledge.
[Schramm 1964, 18] The media could raise leveis of aspiration, which acted as an
incentive for action, and thus could help m a k e people more prone to participate in
decision-making in society. [Lerner 1964, 56] Mass Media could also facilitate the
planning and implementation of development programs which corresponded to the
needs of the population. But perhaps most important of ali for developing nations, the
media were supposed to help to create a sense of national integration and national
identity. Even the criticai perspective, using the notions of 'media imperialism,'
'cultural dependency' or 'electronic colonialism,' centred on the power of exogenous
mass media contents in undermining indigenous culture and social values in the Third
World. [Boyd-Barrett 1982, 65]

In short, there is an immense range of media theory suitable for many types of analysis
but unsatisfactory for the major purposes of this thesis which is based on a dual
Communications system encompassing both mass media and traditional Communications
systems. It has been necessary, therefore, to assemble a model to illuminate both the
separate components of mass and traditional Communications systems, and to illustrate
the relationships between them.

The theoretical framework here is a cultural model of communication based on a
perspective defining culture as a social setting in which a certain framework has taken
concrete form or has been institutionalised and structures the interaction and
communication of people within that context. Therefore various cultures also manifest
different identities. [Servaes 1992, 36] According to this model there is a close
relationship between culture and modes of communication (See Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1
M o d e l of Cultural Approach and M o d e s of Communication
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This cultural approach focuses on modes of communication and characteristics of
individuais (opinion, will), and social groups, and classes. Based on this approach
political-religious leaders are able to play a basic role in revolutionary social
movements. These leaders utilise traditional channels of communication for their socioreligious activities during social movements. The role played by such politico/religious
leaders has been particularised in this model to incorporate the traditional
Communications dynamics of an Islamic tradition and society. It could also, of course,
be particularised to accommodate the national traditional systems of other countries; for
example, índia and China, Gandhi and Mao.

The relationship between religion, as a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate ma
to the ultimate condition of his existence, and politics, more particularly the relationship
between religion and politicai struggles, has attracted the attentions of m a n y scholars.
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For example, Lenski and contemporary sociologists of culture have suggested that
religious subcultures, even after controlling for class position, can continue to have an
important effect on the formation of politicai ideology. [1984,65] Far from being mere
reflections of economic relationships, politicai and ideological forms are instruments in
the class struggle which can be used in diverse w a y s by diverse classes and class
alliances. Marx, however, believed that ideology corresponded closely with the class
situation.

Gramsci argued that ideologies which develop as the organic expression of the life
situation and aspirations of one social class can be taken over by other social classes as
a means of extending their m i e over society as a whole. In m u c h the same vein he
distinguished between "organic intellectuals" arising directly from the life conditions of
a fundamental social class and articulating its aspirations, and "traditional intellectuals"
attached to institutions which had grown up under past social formations, and n o w
linked to a n e w mling class as subordinate elements in their systems of class rule. This
theory has been applied to classify engineers, managers, marketing and advertising
specialists as organic intellectuals while teachers and clergy are categorised as traditional
intellectuals. [Mansueto 1988, 261-277] N i m a has argued the crucial significance of
reUgion in Iranian social consciousness:
It is the most important ideological force for social control; one of the
fundamental bases of religion, and in particular Shi'i Islam, is the
submission to the authority and the acceptance of a goveming elite. Shi'i
c a m e into being as an ideology of protest, and from its birth it acted as a
politicai force. Shi'ism, therefore, proclaims the inseparability of politics
and religion. [1983, 230]
In the case of Iran, a revolution which would dispel foreign influences could naturally
rely upon a native ideology such as Shfism. Historically in Iran the politicai economy
of the goveming class did not conform with the ideology of the middle class. So, the
middle class criticised and eventually attacked social structures, culminating in the
Constitutional Revolution. The emergence and expansion of a middle class in Iran can
be demonstrated and analysed in the context of the Iranian industrialisation process
since 1800, as A d a m s demonstrated:
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The expansion of industry has resulted in the creation of substantial middle
class located primarily in Tehran. Composed of the children of bazaar
merchants and civil servants, these individuais obtained some m o d e m
education and then took up administrative positions in private or
government industries. In addition, large numbers of them became part of
tlie m o d e m commercial sector by establishing shops or wholesale houses
outside the traditional bazaars. The middle class has also expanded as a
consequence of the phenomenal growth of the civil bureaucracy. Finally,
an even larger growth of this middle class m a y be expected in the future as
vastly expanded system of higher education, including both universities
and technical institutes, begins to turn out graduates in substantial
numbers. [1971, 198]

The middle class played a major role in the Constitutional Revolution, displaying a high
levei of class consciousness by comparison with the lower classes. [Iman 1993, 13]

The populist alliance of merchants, ulama, artisans, and intelligentsia managed to force
a transition from a despotic state to a constitutional autocracy. They were supported
after 1906 by Iran's small working class, which organised its first unions among
printers, telegraphers, fishery workers, and other groups, and went on strike to secure
better pay and working conditions. [Foran 1991, 804]
Bahar found that in the beginning of the Constitutional era, there were two groups in
Iran: Mashrutikah and Mostabed (constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists). [1942,
76] He classified upper, lower and middle classes during the revolution and concluded
that the majority of the people and some of the major clergy supported the
Constitutional Revolution. Foran and Goodwin found that middle class intellectuals
occupied a leadership position in the Revolution. They describe the constitutional
supporters participating in the Constitutional Revolution as "... a broad coalition of
classes and groups in the course of the revolution, including clerics (the ulama) and
middle-class intellectuals in leadership positions, as well as a massive base of
merchants and artisans of the bazaar economy, students, office workers, professionals,
and urban lower-class women and men from the shantytowns of the major cities".
[1993, 213] Halliday also believes that the "Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1912
was an attempt by merchants and intellectuals to reform the monarchy and establish a
constitution and a National Assembly. [Halliday 1979,22]
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In short, the intellectual as a m e m b e r of professional class is someone w h o , using

education as his/her significant resource, engages in mental activity and thereby makes a

Uving. «An intellectual works in those professions that necessitate an active and informe
and trained approach to society's problems. Under this definition, therefore, only those
people are regarded as intellectuals who are directly involved in shaping society's way
of thinking, and whose lives as well as their professions make their involvement with
society's culture unavoidable. This definition of the intellectual in Iran embraces

students, teachers (from primary to higher education), writers, artists, part of the clerg
(the educated section), and university graduates who support themselves through their
own work. Intellectuals try to discuss and interpret the current social stmcture to the
members of professional (middle) class. So, they have a strong role in the heightening
of professional class consciousness and in the leadership of different social movements
in Iran.
The following chapters discuss the Iranian Constitutional Revolution as a example of a
social movement where the combined forces of the traditional networks of social
communication and the contemporary press played an important role in popular
mobiUsation and revolutionary victory.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
3.1 Introduction

Determining precisely the span of the constitutional revolutionary period is an exercis
of some complexity. There are differences among scholars even about the core period
of the revolution although most accounts agree broadly on 1906-11. In practical terms,
the initial events of the revolution occurred in December 1905, and Milani refers to it as
the 1905 revolution. [1976, 4] Persuasive argument can also be m a d e for nominating
1912 as the end of the principal part of the Revolution. Although there is no lack of
relevant incident after either date, there is a perceptible falling away after the defeat of
the constitutional forces in December 1911. S o there is an element of rounding off
about the selection of 1906 as the starting point or that of 1911 as the conclusion.

Some analysts also designate a much broader life for the broadly-defined Constitutional
Revolutionary period, such as Milani w h o at one point suggests from 1840 to 1912.
M o r e frequently, he nominates the period from 1880-1912 as the revolutionary epoch.
Browne in his Brief Chronology of the Persian Revolution, prescribes a preparatory
period of two parts before the revolution proper, one of intellectual preparation and
propaganda, and one of actual revolt against 'prevailing intolerable conditions'. [1914,
311] Concerning the first part of this preparatory period he nominates the intellectual
preparation as reliant on the work of two major figures, Sayyed Jamalled DinAssadabadi (1838-97) and Prince M a l k o m K h a n (1833-1908), together with their
disciples.
This would suggest a revolutionary period beginning in the early 1880s when both
seminal figures were entering the periods of their most cogent and enduring influence.
Concerning the 'actual revolt' itself, Browne suggests that the overturning of the
Tobacco Concession in 1891 was a momentous event in Iranian history and m a y be
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fairly regarded as the starting point of the revolution. H e also states, however, that the
'immediate prodomata' of the revolution began in 1905. [312] Browne's analysis of a
two-part preparatory period is a useful one which is taken up in the examination here. It
is also accepted, however, that the Constitutional Revolution proper (or core revolution)
occupied the years 1906-11.

The brief historical analysis which follows is directed essentially to setting contexts
relevant to the analysis of the contributions of Iran's traditional Communications and
press to the Constitutional Revolution. Thus, a number of issues and events alluded to
here are taken up in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. Important themes are the
beginnings and emergence of modernisation in Iran; the developing importance of the
merchant classes, the bazaar workers and the institution of the bazaar; the decisive role
of the clergy at several crucial points; the significant impact of foreign intervention and
semi-colonisation; and the administrative style and personal qualities of the Qajar
regime.
The account begins with a brief overview of Iran's historical context from the early
civilisations to the end of the Savafid dynasty in the 18th Century. It then takes up at
greater length the principal issues and events in the reign of the Qajar Shahs from the
late 18th Century until the expiry of the dynasty in 1925. The survey includes a brief
summary of the principal events of the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) itself.
3.2 Early Iranian Civilisations

Between 10,000 and 15,000 BC primitive communities were already living on the
Iranian plateau. In terms of antiquity, there are countries such as Egypt whose recorded
history extends back further than Iran. In terms of impact on the development of
civilisation, Iran cannot pretend to a record comparable to Greece. O n the basis of
uninterrupted importance on the world stage stretching back to the first glimmers of
civilisation, Iran's record stands comparable with countries such as China and Japan.
It has occupied a consistent place over m a n y centuries in what William Haas calls
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dramatis personae, as an important participam in the world drama. [Cited Mowlana
1963, 13]

Even after the eclipse of the ancient Persian Empire built by the Achamenid dynasty of
Cyrus and Darius the Great (521-486 B C ) , viable Persian empires endured, although
slowly decaying, until Achamenian power ended ignominiously with Alexander the
Great's occupation in 331 B C . This new Macedonian empire was short-lived, although
for a further 80 years the Seleucids exercised brief sovereignty over the Iranian Plateau.
They were succeeded by the Parthians, a northern Iranian tribe whose language and
writing were known as Pahlavi, a title chosen by the last reigning Iranian monarchs in
the 20th Century. [Mowlana 1963, 28]

The Parthian dynasty inflicted heavy defeats on Imperial Rome, surviving until 226 AD
when it gave w a y to the Sassanid Kings w h o strove to the revive the magnificence of
the Achamenids and Imperial Pérsia. A s soldiers, they were extremely successful in
repeUing the R o m a n and Byzantine Empires, and the Turks. Their successes, however,
were not Umited to the battlefield as Mowlana points out:
Their roads, bridges and irrigation works were of a very high order;
remains of the latter are still to be seen. They were fond of the nobler
sports. . . A b o v e ali, they encouraged literature. . .[In the early 1960's]
in the Iranian mind this Sassanian period is idealised as a time w h e n life
was happily ordered. In legend, noble warriors and c o m m o n soldiers play
polo together. Peasants talk to their Shahfreelyand fearlessly. [1963, 31]
Another vigorous Iranian tribal group, the Alans, nomadized in Caucasian regions and
eventuaUy penetrated far into Europe. [McEvedy 1961,14]

Ancient Pérsia also made a remarkable contribution to the world's spiritual history.
About 600 B C , Zoroaster, a prophetic figure from north west Iran, evolved the basic
tenets of Zoroastrianism, a faith based on the perpetuai struggle between darkness and
light, good and evil. Zoroaster claimed his divine message came from his God, Abura
M a z d a , the Wise Lord, and he worked ceaselessly to propagate his doctrines.
According to Mowlana, Zoroaster 'stirred ali Iran, and his n a m e rung through distant
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lands.' [24] His traditions and articles of faith were perpetuated in the Avesta, the
sacred book and national epic of the Persians, a work codified and interpreted by the
Asssanid kings. (Zoraster was also k n o w n as Zarathustra, the n a m e used in the
influential Thus Spake Zarathustra, a philosophical work by Friedrich Nietzsche).
In a number of ways, Zoroastrianism foreshadowed Christianity, particularly in its
conception of a dualism between G o d and the devil, with the individual challenged to
aUgn on the side of justice and righteousness in a continuing struggle. This doctrine also
had a powerful impact on Persian imperialism, challenging the rulers to extend reUgious
domination as well as temporal domination over the earth, bringing peace and justice to
aU peoples.
By the time of the Sassanids, the force and purity of Zoroastrianism had been -diluted,
although it retained significant influence. In particular, the cult of Mithraism, essentiaUy
a fertility cult, imbued Zoroastrianism with an element of mysticism but also
incorporated earlier primitive traditions of ritual sacrifice. A n even greater influence was
the doctrine of Manicheanism, originating in the third century A D . Like Zoroastrianism
and Christianity, the doctrines of Mani (215-276) sought to draw existing religions into
one global and united faith. Manicheanism's relationship to Zoroastrianism has been
likened to that between Christianity and Judaism. It preached an advanced personal
ethic similar to the Christian and spread rapidly in Iran, although it did not supplant
Zoroastrianism. It also briefly challenged Christianity's newly-won position in the
R o m a n Empire. Another religion flourishing briefly in the sixth century w a s
Mazdakaism which mingled elements of Zoroastrianism and primitive communism.
Successful military resistance to the R o m a n and Byzantine Empires prevented
encroachment from Christianity into Iran, although by the sixth century the Byzantine,
Turkish and Persian empires were enervated by centuries of remorseless war:
In the sixth century A D the Turks of Turkistan to the north-east of Iran
rose in strength, alternately enemies and allies of the Persians. Byzantine
R o m e , Pérsia and the Turks wore themselves out, and the Arabs wore
themselves out, and the Arabs swept across the land. T h e terrible
campaigns, waged almost incessantly, exhausted Pérsia and R o m e alike.
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Iran, ruled by weaklings, was ripe for falling and in the deserts of Arábia
the n e w power hadrisen.The Sassanian Empire fell under the onslaught
of the Arabs. Islam came into Iran and neither Islam or Iran was ever the
same again. [Mowlana 1963, 35-36]
3.3 Islamic Iran
By 650 AD the first flood of Islam was spent and Iran had been drawn within the
rapidly expanding orbit of the Arab Caliphate. Iran became Muslim but not dArabic.
Initially, this Caliphate was dominated by the aristocratic U m a y y a d family with the
successors of the prophet M o h a m m a d combining, as he had, the religious and politicai
leadership. The U m a y y a d ascendancy was interrupted briefly by the Caliph Ali, the
son-in-law of the great Prophet, but he was unable to break the hold of the Umayyads
by his death in 661. This dynastic struggle also had vital religious consequences, with
doctrinal differences incorporated into the schism between the contending factions.
This laid the foundations for the divide between Sunnite and Shi'i Islam which persists
to the present day. In 779, the dynastic control changed with the Abbasids displacing
the U m a y y a d s and supporting the orthodox (or Sunnite) doctrines, although the Shi'i,
including Iran, had strongly supported their accession. [McEvedy, 44] B y 888 A D , the
Abbasid caliphate had contracted, and the Iranian territories had emerged as Emirates of
the Caliph with significant autonomy. It was something of a national revival for Iran.
This relative independence was strengthened with the further decline of the Caliphate
and the emergence of the pro-Shi'i Emirates of the Buwayhid dynasty in Iran.

In the 400 years of the Caliphate and the succeeding emirates, the Iranians reUnquished
national autonomy while retaining some freedom of action. The Arabs brought them
into high administrative positions and economic activity was not discouraged. There
was the intellectual challenge of adjusting to Islamic religion and imbuing it with a
distinctive Iranian flavour. The Shfism in Islam gave the Iranians, w h o supported the
Caliph Ali, the opportunity to shape Shfism into a national religion. Under the
Abbasids, the capital of the Caliphate was moved from Damascus to Bagdad, part of the
former Persian empire and close to the former Sassanid capital. Sassanian court
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etiquette prevailed and the old Sassanian famiUes had equal status in rank and access to
office:
Iranians soon appropriated the expressive and flexible i\rab tongue and
used it with such perfection that a large part of the literary and scientific
works in the Arab language were written by authors of Persian origin. O n
the other hand, in the ninth century, w h e n Persian became a literary
language enriched by a high percentage of Arab words, the knowledge of
Persian and Persian literature became an indispensable element of
education and culture. [Mowlana 1963, 37]
3.4 The Feudal Ascendancy

A significant development in the last century of the Caliphate/Emirate systems was the
emergence in eastern Iran of the Ghazavid Emirate, founded by a Turkish general.
Mercenaries from Turkestan had long formed the basis of the Muslim armies in the
Near East. They defeated the existing dynasties in the eastern Emirates of the former
Persian Empire, establishing the Seljuk sultanate which transformed the Iranian feudal
system. The Seljuks introduced the iqta system which was essentially a military and
service fief. The conquering Seljuk generais were granted the right to collect the

revenue of different villages in return for their services. This system evolved into one
expanding private property, as Lambton points out:
Later, as the weakness of the central power grew, the population were
forced in order to preserve their property more and more to seek the
patronage of the influential. Since it increased the influence of the latter,
this reinforced the tendency to alienate to assignees not only therightto
collect the revenue but also the land itself. [1955, 55]
Consequently, the history of Iranian feudalism was characterised by the bloody struggle

of warring factions to extend their spheres of influence to include eventually the whole

of Iran. Yet, in spite of frequent and often violent changes in the administration of th
iqta system, the structure and absolutism of the feudal relations established under the
Sultanate remained essentially unchanged. In short, the basis of the peasant/landlord

relationship did not alter. The ultimate result was an extension of large private estate
and a worsening of peasant conditions. [Keddie 1957,5]
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B y the 13th Century the strength of the Seljuk sultanate had been significantly
weakened as its área of control contracted and it split between dynastic rivais. The
Turks, however, were swept peremptorily aside by the onslaught of rapacious and
destructive Mongol invaders. For Iran, the rise of Genghis Khan and the Golden
Horde spelled slaughter and destruction. Major centres of trade were totally destroyed
and an estimated million people killed.1 Mowlana described the Mongóis as following
the Turks down the historie invasion routes from the north:
Genghis Khan is still vividly recalled. Razed cities seeded to grass and an
abiding hatred were his monuments. Iranians even today speak of him
with horror and point out vestiges of his depredations with the suppressed
fervour and enmity of victims...The conquest of Iran w a s completed a
quarter of a century later by his grandson Hulagu, w h o centred his m i e
there. [1963, 39-40]
In terms of the feudal system, the burden of the strict taxing policies of the Mongol
Khanate fell, once again, upon the peasants. Contemporary documents indicate that up
to 30 different types of taxes were levied upon the peasantry. [Lambton 1953, 103] To
counter the consequent flight of peasants from their lands, laws were passed legally
tieing the peasantry to the land and establishing penalties for absconding. [Keddie, 8]

With the rapid disintegration of the Persian Khanate after the death of Genghis Khan in
1288, Iran dissolved into native provincial administrations. Another Turkish noble,
Timur (known in the Anglicised form as Tamburlane) sueceeded in reviving the
Khanate of Turkestan, placating the Mongol descendants of Genghis and embarking on

repeated destructive forays into Iran, eventually forcing it to submit after 20 years of
sacking and terror. The Timurid Emirate was continued by Timufs suecessors, milder
in disposition and encouraging the restoration of economic activity and, remarkably
enough, the arts, science and literature of Iran. According to Mowlana, it was the great

*. In the city of Nishapoor, one of the major urban centers of the time, one million people were
reported killed in the course of the Mongol invasion.
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outpouring of noble poetry during this period that spread the glory of Iran through the
Islamic world and thence throughout the civilised world:
It is due to [these poets] that the Persian language accompanied the Mogul
conquerors into índia and became the language of court, society newswriters and administration until it was replaced by English early in the
18th century. [1963,41]

(The spread of the Persian language tradition into índia was a factor in the developmen
of the Iranian press, a theme taken up in Chapter 5.)
By the late 15th Century, the great Emirate of Timur was in decline, as indeed was the
mighty Khanate of the Golden Horde north of the Caspian. The Timurid Emirate had
split into smaller territories, effectively marking the end of the historical medieval

for Iran. The transition deriving from the break-up of the control established by Timur
and his descendants sparked another great rejuvenation of the Iranian state with the
emergence of the Safavid dynasty in 1499.
3.5 The Safavid Period

ReUgion was closely associated with the rise to power of the Savafids who led the Shi'i
order in Azerbaijan. The dynasty's founder claimed direct descent from the house of
Ali, Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law. The Shi'i division of Islam had become

increasing influential in Iran, with its adherents rejecting the legitimacy of the Calip
The Safavids also sought to trace their lineage back to the Sassanian dynasty through
links by marriage between Ali's son, Hussein, and the daughter of the last Sassanian
Shah:
On Ali and his sons who had died the death of martyrs, and on their
spiritual successors called Imams, the Shi'i conferred a saintly and quasi(Uvine character.. It was to the seventh I m a m M u s a K a z e m w h o lived in
the second half of the eight century that the Safavids traced their origin. It
was during this period that the Shi'i branch of Islam was established as
the state religion and used as an instrument of nationalism. . .The first
Safavi to become shah, Ismail, was looked upon by Iranians as "both
Saint and Shah." [Mowlana 1963,42]
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The Safavids established an autocratic and arbitrary rule consistent with despotic
traditions of Iranian monarchs. In the hands of the Safavids dynasty, religion became a

particularly significant tool, using Shi'ism as a doctrine to control Iranian society. It
became the state religion of Iran and remained a potent force in the subsequent history
of the country. The essence of Shi'ism's significance can be seen in the period of
Safavids mie (1501 to 1722):
The position of the ruler was reinforced by the theory of divine right.
Significant is the difference in phraseology between documents granting
iqtas or appointing officials to various offices in Seljuk times and similar
documents in Safavidtimes.The ruler has become the central figure to the
exclusion of ali else. [Lambton 1953,105]
The Safavid period led to many socio-economic changes. The establishment of a
centralised government capable of ensuring a certain levei of security helped trade and

agriculture to flourish. Westem diplomais and traders had established themselves in Iran
even before the Safavid victory, and their presence increased after it. This stimulated
demand for Iranian merchandise to service trade with the West, particularly during the
mie of Abbas Shah, described by historians such as Keddie and Mowlana as the
greatest ruler of the period. Apart from his prowess as a soldier, Abbas was a superb
administrator who united Iran, reorganised the military as an agent of the Crown, and
embarked on extensive public works:
The great Safavid Shah Abbas (1587-1629) encouraged international trade
through building roads, caravaransarais, and workshops to produce the
luxury textiles and ceramics demanded in the West. Silk was the main
export. [Keddie 1981, 10]
A new capital was established at Istafan displaying the finest examples of Iranian
architecture. Under the Savafids substantial factories, some employing up to 1,000
people, sprouted over the country. The numbers of bazaars and market places
multiplied. The Shah also indirectly encouraged the establishment of Iran's printing
press by his patronage of Armenian families whom he established in the separate
suburb of Julf a and gave many privileges:
To these industrially and commercially-minded people the Shah gave
m a n y privileges, including liberty of worship, the right to construct their
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o w n churches and to elect their o w n mayor. It was in 1639 that the
Armenians of Julfa established the first printing press in Iran. [Mowlana
1963, 44]
(The Armenian contribution to the establishment of printing in Iran is taken up in
chapter 5) The urban centres witnessed rapid development and the emergence of a

merchant class, though part of the trade was carried on by the court and members of the
feudal class themselves. [Issawi 1971, 1] In spite ofthe growing merchant class, and
the economic significance of their urban trade, cities remained the stronghold of the
feudalists. [Keddie 1957, 54]

Iran had always been splendidly situated to exploit the great trade routes between
Europe and the Orient, both by land and sea. Land routes, however, remained very

much a factor of good relations with the Turks at a time when the acceptance of Shi'i a

Iran's nation religious had exacerbated strains with the Ottoman Turks. To counter this
antagonism with Turkey, Iran tumed to European powers also concerned about the
aggrandisement of the Ottomans. This fostered diplomatic and trading relations between
Iran and European powers such as England and Portugal. It also brought the first

stirrings of colonial ambitions on the part of European powers. The politicai emissarie
were followed quickly by merchants, many as agents of the East índia Company but
others trading on their own behalf. [Mowlana 1963, 44]

At the beginning of the dynastic rule of the Safavids in 1507, the Portuguese had
attacked the significant trade centre of Hormaz on the Persian Gulf. This marked the
start of European attempts to interfere in and dominate Iranian affairs for trade and
commercial benefits. Fierce competition ensued with European trading firms proving
very successful in arranging favourable trading and tariff agreements. The pressures

brought by foreign interests at this time helped to stifle any stimulus for an autonomo
capitalism emerging in Iran. This became a determining factor in deciding the patterns
of the future socio-economic history of the country. Rivalries between European
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powers over dominance of the Persian Gulf ended with the British achieving hegemony
at the expense of the Portuguese.
By the time of his death in 1629 Abbas had created a strong Iranian state within
traditional boundaries. H e had succeeded also in secularising the state despite the
theological basis that had brought his dynasty to power, effectively diverting politics
and religion into separate spheres while maintaining a fervent adherence to Shi'i as the
national religion. T h e stability that Abbas and the early Safavids brought through
externai trade and economic expansion proved relatively short-Uved. Disruptive military
tribes, weak agricultural production, and changing patterns of westem trade in the Far
East, particularly the displacement of overland routes by sea, contributed both to
economic and politicai decline. Frequent wars with the Ottomans enervated Savafid
administrations lacking the military skills of Abbas. Furthermore, his successors were
unable to avert the restoration of the religious leadership in politicai and administrative
matters.
The decline of the Safavids began from the mid-17th century, accelerating early in the
18th Century with an Afghani revolt in 1722 and the subsequent fali of the dynasty in
that year. Iran entered a long period of politicai and social chãos, with internai conflict
between khans and feudal lords. This internai confusion was accompanied by externai
wars in quest of more land, resources andrichescaused by internai decay in economic,
politicai and military administration.

In a military sense, there was a brief recrudescence of national glory under the rule of
Nadir Ali Shah, w h o defeated the Turks and Rússia, then invaded Northern índia
capturing Delhi and winning victories over the Moguls. Nadir Shah's great military
skills and his thirst for conquest and spoils, however, were not matched by abilities as
an administrator and politician. His assassination w a s followed by 50 years of turmoil,
although there were s o m e glimmers of feudalism's decline in the Afsharid period
beginning in 1760. [Lambton 1953, 56] The costly and devastating wars drained the
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economy and famines became a fact of annual life. The increased cost of the army
brought an increase in the already over-burdening taxation by the government. The
authority of the central government rarely extended beyond major cities, subjecting
transport and travei to constant threats of harassment and theft. [ Milani 1975, 82]
3.6 The Qajar Dynasty

Chãos lasted until 1779, when the Qajars, a Turkish tribe that migrated from Central
Ásia into the Middle East in the 14th Century, emerged as the new rulers of Iran. Aga
Mohammad Khan Qajar, head of the powerful clan, led its successful bid for the
Peacock throne, although his occupancy was short-lived:
Refusing the Crown on the grounds that he did not yet mie the whole of
Iran, A g a M o h a m m a d K h a n turned his attention to the north, moved the
capital to Tehran, an obscure town near the Qajar territories, and then
mustered a large expeditionary force to conquer the north eastern
provinces. While leading this army into Geórgia he was assassinated by
two of his household servants. [Abrahamian 1982, 37]
After a fierce struggle for the succession, the crown prince, Fath Ali Khan entered
Tehran victorious, remaining as Shah for 37 years. With his successors Muhammad
Shah (1834-48) and Nasseru'd-Din Shah (1848-94), Fath Ali Shah ensured a Qajar
dominance that did not begin to falter until the early 1890's. In total, the Qajar
ascendancy lasted for almost 150 years, stimulating both the modernisation of Iran and
the furtherance of a remorseless despotism.

With the Qajar dynasty Iran entered a new place in her history, that of European
infiltration as it fell increasingly under the shadow of the west. The basis of Westem
intervention was the tension between Czarist Russia's expansion into Central Ásia

which directly threatened Iran. In tum, this impinged on British interests, particularl

the ascendancy it had established in the Persian Gulf and its vital interests in the In
sub-continent:
Under the Qajar dynasty a great drama begins, in the course of which Iran
is drawn deeper and deeper into the net of the European powers—at first
as a potential instrument and active partner, later merely as a tool and
victim. Rússia nibbled the northern edges of Iran; France negotiated;
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G e r m a n y infiltrated; Great Britain manoeuvred diplomatically and
economically. T h e nineteenth century w a s a buyer's market for
commercial concessions as the Shahs discovered. The Shahs were no
longer creators of national power but mere retailers. Britain and Rússia
elbowed each other at the bargain counter, and their competition kept Iran
from falling under either one's complete dominance. [Mowlana 1963, 4647]
Fath-Ali Shah and his two successors tried to m o v e away from the tribal style of
personalised leadership associated with Muhammad Khan, returning to the ancient
traditions of imperial Shah-in-Shahs, the grandeur of the traditional Peacock Throne:
They tried to routinise their power by constructing a statewide
bureaucracy; stabilising their position by creating an effective standing
army; and legitimising their dynasty by imitating the court manners of a
previous dynasty. [Abrahamian 1982, 38]
The attempt to create a state-wide, centralised bureaucracy failed and local communities
preserved significant autonomy, with govemors often remaining powerless outside their
provincial capitais. The Qajars were equally incapable of developing an effective
standing army, and re-asserting the glory of the ancient Shahs, although they adopted

the trappings of the Peacock Throne. They were also unable to quell the aspirations for
temporal leadership of the higher echelons of the religious establishment who, as

Abrahamian observes, interpreted the early texts of Shi'ism to argue that 'the state wa

at worst inherently illegitimate and at best a necessary evil to prevent social anarchy
[40] Having no military security, no administrative stability and little ideological
legitimacy, it might be questioned how the Qajars lasted at the head of Iran for 130
years. The most plausible explanation has been summarised succinctly by Abrahaamian:
The Qajars remained in power by systematically pursuing two concurrent
policies; retreating whenever confronted by dangerous opposition; and
more important, by manipulating the m a n y c o m m u n a l conflicts within
their fragmented society. The Qajar dynasty ruled nineteenth century Iran
with neither the instruments of coercion nor the science of administration,
but with the practice of prudent retreats and the art of manipulating aU the
possible variations in the complex w e b of communalrivalries.[41]
According to one British observer, "The Qajars ensured their o w n safety by safely
balancing and systematically fomenting mutual jalousies". [Quoted Abrahmian, 42]
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This did not m e a n that the Qajars were conspicuously less despotic, tyrannous and cruel
than their predecessors. If opportunities occurred, the Qajars were as ruthless and
unprincipled as any regime in Iranian history. Because their power w a s finite their
opportunities were more limited, and they were more selective in their exploitation. This
selectivity, however, did not curb their avaricious demands on state revenues or their
willingness to plunder the national income for their o w n purposes. In achieving these
ends, they had ample opportunity at hand in the contendingrivalriesof European
powers to intervene, and even control, the internai economy and society of Iran. This
produced a significant element of semi-eolonialism which predominated through the
19th Century and ultimately was instrumental in sparking the Constitutional Revolution
early in the 20th Century. The origins of this semi-colonialism are traced briefly here.
3.6.1 Semi-Colonisation of Iran

While Iran restored and re-built its society under the Safavids dynasty, Westem Europe
had advanced rapidly towards industrial and capitalist maturity. Inevitably, Iran with its
rich endowment of natural resources and bounteous opportunities for development
across the economic spectrum, became increasingly attractive to European colonisers.
D u e to the degree of modernisation achieved, with ali its imperfections, Iran's military
capability, resolute opposition by ali elements of Iranian society, debilitating
competition between two of the principal colonisers, England and Rússia, Iranian
colonisation w a s only partly achieved. [Nakhaie 1986, 95] Consequently, the
ascendancy of the Qajars was also an era of extended semi-colonisation.

In the early 19th century, the rivalries between France and Rússia in Europe and
between France and England in the Indian Ocean, together with the search by ali three
major powers for cheap resources, sparked their increasing interest in Iran. T h e British
envoy, Sir John Malcolm, visited Iran in 1801 and secured a treaty with Fath Ali Shah,
giving British and Indian merchants therightto setúe any where in Iran and to leave at
will without paying any tax for their merchandise.
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Napoleon's emergence as a competitor against Rússia and England, together with his
territorial ambitions towards índia, prompted a French military mission to Iran in 1807
led by General G.A. Gardanne. Ostensibly, Gardanne sought to organise the Iranian
army against Rússia and to prepare the ground for a Napoleonic thrust towards índia.
In return, Iran expected to receive arms and military instruction so that it could resist
increasing pressure from expansionist Rússia which had annexed Geórgia in 1801. O n
January 17, 1807, Napoleon wrote to the Shah calling for an offensive against the
Russians in Geórgia. Napoleon had resolved to send the Shah 4,000 infantry,
commanded by experienced officers, 10,000 muskets and 50 cannon. Unquestionably,
Napoleon was influenced also by a desire to reduce English influence in Iran.
[Chandler 1993, 528] Napoleon's defeat of the Russian armies and the ensuing Treaty
of Tilsit between France and Rússia in 1807 effectively ended negotiations for a
miUtary treaty between France and Iran.
3.6.2 Early Modernisation—Fath Ali Shah

The first Russo-Iranian War broke out in 1813 with Russian attacks on the Caucasian
territory of Iran. The war ended in 1813 with the Treaty of Gulistan which confirmed
Rússia's possession of Geórgia. In 1814, England and Iran signed a treaty of defensive
alUance that remained in force until 1857, but proved of little value to Iran.

The first serious attempt at modernisation occurred early in the 19th Century during th
reign of Fath Ali Shah, It was driven by Prince Abbas Mirza, the C r o w n Prince, heir
apparent and govemor of the crucial province of Azarbaijan. His initial motive was
military, a response to deficiencies in the tribal cavalry evident in the First RussoIranian War. H e reorganised his forces on the model of the Ottoman empire, estabUshed
industries for producing armaments in Tabriz, and appointed military rnissions in Paris
and London. T o secure the future, he sent students abroad to study military science and
manufacture, together with relevant subjects such as engineering, armament design and
manufacture, typography, and m o d e m languages. These initiatives were financed by
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cuts in court salaries and expenses, and by imposing protective tariffs and import
restrictions. A s a hedge against religious revolt, he obtained clerical pronouncements in
favour of his n e w model army. Unfortunately for Abbas Mirza, his ambitious plans
were eroded by poUtical intrigues and growing opposition from interests afflicted by his
financial policies. His military strength also incurred the enmity of his numerous
family.

Most importantly, the model army was ineffectual in the second Russo-Iranian war of
the late 1820's. [Abrahamian 1982, 52] Iran's initial successes were followed by
serious defeats, culminating in the capture of Tabriz by Rússia. T h e Treaty of
Turkamanchi, signed in 1828, gave Rússia the large and prosperous states of Erivan
and Nakhichevan. Furthermore, it granted extra-territorial jurisdiction over Russian
subjects (capitulationrights),a 'most favoured' nation clause, and the monopoly of
shippingrightson the Caspian sea to the Russians.
The Treaty imposed severe war reparations upon the Iranian government with heavy
penalties for any delay in the payment, established complete freedom for Russian
citizens to conduct commercial business in Iran, reduced tariff rates to a m a x i m u m of
five percent, and eliminated Iranian taxing power over the profits and the properties of
Russian citizens. The immediate impact of the treaty was the worsening of economic
conditions in Iran resulting from the pressures to pay the reparation. T h e increased
interference of Rússia in the politicai and economic affairs of Iran w a s another
consequence. A s well as permission for interference in the socio-economic and politicai
affairs of Iran by the Russian authority, the Tsar obtained therightto interfere in the
Iranian Court under the pretext of protecting the crown prince and the reigning Shah.
[Milani 1975, 87]
In the modem history of Iran, the wars against Rússia, undertaken by the Qajar kings,
became a turning point. T h e Turkamanchi treaty signified the transformation of an
independent, though extremely corrupt, government to one increasingly dependem
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upon foreign powers. From the late 1820's until well into the 20th century, Iran was to
berivenbetween the conflicting interests of Rússia and England. Rússia had embarked
on a course of expansion in Ásia, with visions of a warm-water port on the Persian
Gulf. England strove to control the Persian Gulf and áreas adjacent to the Indian subcontinent, the jewel in her politicai crown.
3.6.3 Modernisation Renewed—Nasseru'd-Din Shah

The drive for modernisation was revived by Amir Kabir, the first Prime Minister under
Nasseru'd-Din Shah w h o succeeded M u h a m m a d Shah in 1848. Amir Kabir, referred to
by some later historians as the 'Bismarck of Iran', was a protege of Abbas Mirza,
serving as special secretary for the A r m y and conceiving an admiration for the model
army of his patron.. A s a special envoy to the Ottoman empire, he had observed the
process of reform in Turkey and, on return, had gradually gained the confidence of the
future Nasseru'd-Din Shah. Under the new monarch, he was appointed Prime Minister
and Lord of the Army. The new Shah encouraged his Chief Minister to initiate vigorous
reforms. Following the trail blazed by Abbas Mirza, he revived the standing army and
established factories to supply its needs, also cutting foreign imports in the process.
BeUeving that Iran's economy should rely on a strong local manufacturing base and that
it should not be a captive market for foreign commodities, he sought to transform handm a d e industry into a machine-intensive process. Cotton spinning, long cloth, silkweaving, samovar manufacture, casting of iron, sugar refining and lump sugar
production, carpentry, wheel making and carriages—these manufactures were
encouraged by him to build up the army and substitute for imports. Amir Kabir sent
craftsmen to M o s c o w and St. Petersburg to learn n e w techniques, producing a paper
factory in Isfahan, glassworks in Tehran, and textile and foundry factories in Sary.
[Nakhaie 1986, 96]
Amir Kabir was opposed to foreign commercial and economic expansion in Iran. He
encouraged mining and the construction of dams. T o foster the development of skills,
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he ordered the construction of a technical university (Dar-al-Funun

or A b o d e of

Science). Like his predecessor, he pruned court expenses and raised tariffs, applied a
moratorium on the sale of offices and imposed a new tax on fief holders no longer
contributing armed men for imperial defence. Amir Kabir's vigour and resourcefulness
frightened the British colonisers whose fears were soundly based. If Iran acquired a
high levei of economic development and politicai independence, the coloniser's poUcy
would be gravely impeded. For the English, the more backward the society, the easier
it was to penetrate and control. [Nakhaie, 96]
Apart from the colonisers, particularly the English, Amir Kabir's efforts to economise,
stamp out corruption and implement wide-ranging reforms alienated feudal landlords,
tribal chiefs, and courtiers including Mahd-Olia, the King's Mother. An untimely revolt
by an extreme religious faction also increased the pressures on him. In 1851 after Amir

Kabir had been just over three years in office, a coalition of hostile interests persuad
the Shah to remove him from office. He was banished to the provinces, then killed:
His plans for the future were east aside, and his industrial factories,
despite heavy investments were left to wither away. Thus ended the last
nineteenth-century attempt at rapid, defensive and state-wide
modernisation.. . .although Nasseru'd-Din Shah and his ministers
themselves brought about m a n y innovations over a long reign that lasted
until 1896. But these innovations, instead of driving for rapid change,
induced a slow drift towards change; instead of defending the state against
externai enemies, they were aimed at buttressing the court against internai
opponents; and instead of protecting the economy, they sought to tempt
Western interests further into the Iranian economy. [Abrahamian 1982,
53]
Several of these sporadic reforms derived from the Shah's extensive travelling in
Westem countries, notably a brief venture into establishing a free press. (See Chapter
5) Amir Kabir' s reforms were the last attempts in the 19th Century to generate rapid
development of Iranian indigenous industries. Five years after Amir's fali, the Paris

Treaty in 1856 gave the British the capitulation rights, with a five percent custom tari
added to the negation of any rights by the Iranian government over Harat Qhandehar

and Afghanistan. Effectively, the treaty gave the British similar rights to the Russians
for the plunder of Iran's national resources and right to invest in, and even dominate,
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Iran's socio-economic and politicai affairs. This sparked a fiercerivalry,with each
imperial power trying to secure as m a n y profitable concessions as possible at the
expense of the other.
3.6.4 Concession Hunting

With a poUcy of attracting foreign trade, it was only a question of time before European
imperialists sought to exploit the cupidity of Nassem'd-Din Shah's administration.
Britain and Rússia and, to a lesser degree, France and Belgium, were seeking overseas
ventures in which to invest capital. Fortuitously, the Shah w a s anxious to raise
revenue, particularly to finance his penchant for extended European travei. Thus began
an era in which extensive concessions were granted by the Shah's administration to
European entrepreneurs. These concessions aroused the wrath and increasingly the
effective resistance of both the religious leaders and the merchant class whose interests
were jeopardised by siphoning off Iranian industry, agriculture, and public works to
overseas investors, particularly the increasingly important joint stock companies.

This concessionaire era got under way in the early 1870's with the purchase by Baron
Julius de Reuter, a British citizen, of a concession encompassing the exclusive right to
finance a state bank, contract out the entire customs services, develop aU minerais save
for gold, silver and precious stones, exercise a 70-year monopoly over building
railways and tramways, and establish ali future canais, irrigation works, roads,
telegraph lines, and industrial factories. [Abrhamian, 55] T h e great British
plenipotentiary, Lord George Curzon, the future Viceroy of índia, described the deal as
an 'international bombshell':
T h e agreement contained the most complete surrender of the entire
resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of,
m u c h less accomplished in history. [Curzon 1892,480]

Not surprisingly, Rússia strenuously resisted the Reuter concession. Coupled with
effective resistance from within Iran, the Qajar regime executed a strategic withdrawal
and cancelled the concession. Instead of a portmanteau approach, lumping ali of the
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concessions into one bag, concessions were generally offered singly, building into a
substantial w a d of monopolies and similar arrangements over the next 20 years but
done with sufficient caution to deflect serious resistance. Concessions mounted from
virtually nothing in the 1850's to £12 million by the late 19th Century. Reuter retained
mining and banking interests, and numerous other concessions granted included
fishing, shipping, telecommunications, dredging and port development, paved roads,
and quarries. Abrahmiam has aptly described the process as opening Iran to European
capital as well as European trade. [56]
3.7 The Preparatory Period—Intellectual Enlightenment
The two great intellectual figures of the constitutional revolutionary period were
unquestionably Sayyed Jamalled-Din [1838-1897] and Prince M a l k o m K h a n [18331908]. Jamalled-Din was a questing, restless intellectual whose writings and ideas
permeated m u c h of the Islamic world and its drive towards independence, freedom and
unity in the late 19th Century. His family provided him with a traditional education but
he explored several unconventional interests before going to índia in search of m o d e m
science. Concerned that m o d e m technology, having mastered índia was a threat to the
Middle East he concluded that the westem onslaught could be avoided only by the
Middle East countries adopting m o d e m technology immediately. Despite his respect for
m o d e m i s m , he decided that the traditionalism of Islam was an effective creed for
mobilising the public against these westem colonisers. According to Abrahamian,
JamaUed-Din retained these fundamental beliefs throughout his long career, although he
often m a d e a pragmatic response to immediate situations. [1982, 63]

Jamalled-Din visited most of the Islamic countries and his influence was pervasive in
independence and reform movements, particularly in índia and Egypt, where he lived
for m a n y years. H e was, for a time, an adviser and counsellor to Nasseru'd-Din Shah
but, unfortunately, had no enduring influence on that erratic monarch. In particular, he
tried to persuade the Shah to lead a campaign against the British, then tried to mobilise
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popular opinion more broadly for a crusade against the heathen and imperialistic west.
His propogandising aroused the concem of the Shah and Jamalled-Din was forced to
take bast but was seized and deported in chains to the Ottoman Empire where he spent

the last years of his life. He retained an implacable animosity to his former patron, th
Shah of Iran:
His hostility to the Shah was now declared; he denounced him in speech
and writing, advocated his deposition and gathered around him a number
of disciples. Finally the Shah decided on deporting him from the country,
though it involved the serious step of violating the [sanctuary]. [Browne
1910, 11]

Apart from his stature in Islamic countries, Jamalled-Din visited a great many European
capitais and was well known to leading figures of both east and west. Browne gives a
vivid pen picture of this magnetic. multi-faceted personaUty:
. . .a man of enormous force of character, prodigious learning, untiring
activity, dauntless courage , extraordinary eloquence both in speech and
writing, and an appearance equally striking and majestic. H e was at once
philosopher, writer, orator and journalist, but above ali politician, and
was regarded by his admirers as a great patriot and by his antagonists as a
dangerous agitator. [1910, 4]
Jamalled-Din has been identified with a loosely-defined movement known as the Pan
Islam movement, identifying a resurgent Islamic nationalism extending from índia
through the Middle East to Egypt. He was regarded as a philosophical influence on the
Young Egypt movement and with the awakening of nationalist sentiment in Egypt.

During his years in Europe, Jamalled-Din started a weekly newspaper in Paris, AlUrvatul-Vosgha (The Indissoluble Link) published in Arabic, which was strongly
politicai and vehemently anti-English. He also publicised his views in the European
press and his politicai articles were largely quoted in the English press. During some
years in Rússia, he induced the Tsar to permit the publication of the Quran and other
religious books in Russian.
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According to Browne, Jamalled-Din over a period of at least 20 years probably
influenced the course of events in the 'Muhammadan East' more than any of his
contemporaries:
To write his history in full would be to write a history of the whole
Eastern Question in recent times, including in this survey Áfghanistan and
índia, and, in a m u c h greater degree, Turkey, Egypt and [Iran] in which
latter countries his influence is still in different ways, a living force. [1910
12]
Prince Malkom Khan was a less striking figure and the influence of his diplomacy and
journalism was largely felt in his native country of Iran. His philosophy and its
exposition lacked the Pan Islamic resonances of Jamalled-Din but his influence was
comparable within Iran both in the preparatory period and during the Constitutional
Revolution itself. The son of an Armenian prince, Malkom Khan studied engineering in
France where he also came under the influence of freemasonry and contemporary
philosophers such as Saint Simon's social engineering, and Compte's religion of
humanity. In Iran, Malkom Khan gained the support of the Shah, converted to Islam
then formed a secret society devoted to promulgating the Religion of Humanity,
claiming at one point to have 30,000 converts. [Browne, 38]

Malkom Khan drafted for the court a Book of Reform urging immediate changes of
laws to prevent Iran from being engulfed by westem colonisers. He designated these

news laws as qanun to differentiate them from the shafia of the Islamic canons and the

old state regulations. His systematic exposition of the new law was based on improving
pubUc welfare and procuring equality of ali citizens:
The book concluded with a list of specific recommendations: the
separation of the government into a legislative council and an executive
cabinet, both to be appointed by the Shah; the acceptance of public
opinion; the codification of the previous laws; the formation of a
professional army; the creation of an independent tax department; the
introduction of a comprehensive educational system; the building of new
highways between the main towns; and the establishment of a state bank
to finance economic development. [Abrahamian, 66]
Malkom Khan lost the Shah's support when the clergy denounced the Qanun as heresy.
His secret society was banned and he was exiled to the Ottoman Empire. He was
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brought back briefly as a special adviser to the Shah in 1871 but dismissed again after a
hostile reaction to a package of controversial policy changes which included the Reuter
Concession. H e was packed off to London with the Shah appointing him to the
comprehensive position of 'Ambassador General to ali the Courts of Europe.' After
losing his post for refusing to share the spoils of a non-existent concession he had been
forced to sell, M a l k o m Khan emerged as a radical journalist, establishing a small
printing house to publish primers, journals and, most notably, the newspaper Qanun
(Law) from 1890 on. (See Chapter 5) From an insider working for reforrn, he became
an outsider advocating revolution, ' from a mild liberal seeking the protection of the
Shah against the ulama into an outspoken radical allying with the ulama against the
Shah. . .'[Abrahamiam, 67] H e sought to embody contemporary philosophies into
forms acceptable to traditional Iran, blaming politicai despotism and cultural insularity
for Iran's backwardness.
dAlthough the influence of both Jamalled-Din and Malkom Khan on the growing Iranian
intelligentsia was incalculable, m u c h also was derived from westem ideas and values
that permeated the country through increased contact, travei, dissemination of
newspapers and books by exiled Iranians, and students studying in Europe. N e w and
more progressive schools had been established, and there was an increasing awareness
in Iran of the politicai and social currents in the west associated with liberal-democratic
ideas and values. Furthermore, there was increasing evidence that imperialism,
particularly that of England, was increasingly under strain, as evidenced by the
Egyptian revolt of the early 1880's and the spirited resistance, although ultimately
unavailing, ofthe Boers in the South African war of 1899-1901.
The Russo-Japanese war of 1904- 1905 had seen the humiliation of the Tsarist power,
which had encroached ceaselessly into Iran, by a increasingly influential Asian power.
Although the regime had prevailed in the Russian revolution of 1905, its obvious
discomfiture by a disparate revolutionary movement had provided a demonstrable
model for the spirit of revolution in Iran. A combination of philosophy, journalism,
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westem influences, and the discomfiture of colonial powers ali formed part of the
Iranian awakening and its ultimate expression in the Constitutional Revolution. This
account turns n o w to the direct action factor in the constitutional revolutionary period.
3.7.1 The Preparatory Period—The Tobacco Concession
The concessions awarded by the administration during the 1870's and 1890's were
eventually cumulative in their impact, an assembly of smaller concessions not
overwhelming individually but building into a formidable structure with a substantial
influence on Iranian economic and social development. This period of gradualism
terminated abruptly with the resurgence of the gigantic concession, its incidence
comparable in scale to the Reuter concession of 1872, although rather more
concentrated in overall dimensions. Furthermore, the infamous Tobacco Concession
was awarded at the same time as a handful of much smaller concessions, including an
extension of de Reuter's banking and mining arrangements, a lottery concession to an
English company, and railway concessions to Rússia. According to Browne, the
misfortunes of Iran, which overshadowed the last six years of the Shah's reign, and
ultimately its destruction, dated from the announcement of the Tobacco Concession to
the British on March 8, 1890. [1910, 32]
The Tobacco Concession was concocted during the Shah's visit to Europe in 1889.
According to Browne, these regular peregrinations had done no particular harm,
although they were costly and had not brought any benefits to his subjects: 'But this
was a year of evil. . .' [31] The concessionaire, M r G. F. Talbot, was granted full
control over the production, sale, and export of ali tobacco in Iran for 50 years, paying
in return for his monopoly an annual rent of £15,000, a quarter of the annual profits,
and a five percent dividend on capital. Even with the recoupment by the Iranian
Government, it was an extraordinarily lucrative deal with a flourishing export market
and captive domestic market in a nation of almost universal tobacco smoking,
irrespective of rank, class or gender.
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In m a n y respects, the deal was similar to an earUer arrangement for British handling of
Turkish tobacco through the Turkish Régie, established in 1884. However, the annual
rent paid to Turkey was more than 40 times the £15,000 paid to Iran, and the
arrangement was to last only 30 years and not 50 years. Not surprisingly, the British
entrepreneurs considered the Iranian arrangement to be m u c h more profitable, and
looked forward to huge profits. With regard to Iranian consumers it was argued that
they would benefit by the arrangement because it would cut out the middle m e n and a
number of internai duties.
The British entrepreneurs blamed the Iranian merchants for over-charging and also for
diluting the quality of the product. In particular, they pointed to lower charges for the
Iranian tambakou, a tobacco product designed to be smoked through water-cooled
earthenware pipes. Talbot argued that the population would be a true partisan of the
British Régie because they would buy cheaper, and without admixture. The growers,
however, would be most favoured because the merchants did them a grave disservice
by depreciating their goods, and colluding to place orders at lower prices and payable
over long terms. The Régie, however, would encourage the production of the better
qualities of tobacco by paying remunerative prices, and by making advances. Talbot
envisaged a Very brilliant future' for the venture, which would realise large profits
from the very beginning for everyone except the hapless merchants. Browne, w h o
discussed the concession with the British entrepreneurs, commented acidulously on the
proposal:
Thus everyone was to be happy and pleased, and to derive a profit from
the beneficent Corporation (which itself w a s to be rewarded by a
conscious sense of rectitude and a profit of anything over 50 percent on its
capital) except the wicked Persian tobacco vendors, who, "with the small
capital they possess," were apparently regarded as unworthy of serious
consideration. [Browne, 35]
In 1891, however, when the time came to implement the concession, it soon emerged
that the deal had outraged patriotic and religious sensibilities across Iran. In the absence
of an independent and public-spirited domestic press, it took time for popular
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awareness of the concession to percolate through the traditional channels. A s Browne
observes, as soon as it was realised, it was bitterly and violently resented throughout
the length and breadth of the land. Both the clergy and populace were profoundly
offended that the passage of their tobacco through the hands of Christian infidels w h o
profaned what they touched should even be contemplated. Through the year, there was
constant turmoil through the country expressed with a fervour that was virtually
revolutionary. Attempts were m a d e by the Government to procure assistance from the
Russians w h o refused to intervene, enjoying the discomfiture of the traditional rival and
working to overturn the concession.

The crucial step came in December 1891 when the sénior clergy applied afatwa
enjoining the people to complete abstinence from tobacco until the concession was
withdrawn. This was a master-stroke which rendered the concession worthless without
any need for popular rebellion. Tobacco merchants closed their shops, pipes were
abandoned, and the people stopped smoking. O n the eve of Christmas, placards were
pasted on walls threatening foreigners with death unless the concession was rescinded
within 48 hours. The Shah sought to quell popular feeling by bidding the principal
religious leader involved to either set an example by smoking or leave the country.
Troops fired on angry crowds around the Shah's palace and several people were killed.
O n January 26,1892 the public crier announced in the streets that the religious embargo
on smoking had been withdrawn, effectively heralding that the tobacco concession was
also at an end. The announcement was received with universal joy and the employees of
the unlamented Imperial Tobacco Corporation withdrew, the company receiving a
handsome compensation of £500,000 for its troubles. [Browne, 52-54]

The consequences of the Tobacco Concession fiasco were immeasurable. It gave
Rússia an inestimable tactical advantage in the distributional of concessions within Iran,
at least until the early years of the 20th Century. It asserted the primacy of the religious
leaders and the importance of traditional Communications systems. (See chapter 4). It
also, however, provided opportunities for an Iranian exile press. (See Chapter 5)
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Furthermore, it underpinned the growing importance of the merchant class w h o stood
to lose considerably, both in prestige and wealth from the introduction of a
concessionary scheme which significantly eroded their role in the domestic economy. It
was also a notable politicai victory for the people as a whole, not only the groups
already influential:
Only one great and good thing came out of this wretched business. The
[Iranian] people, led by their spiritual guides, and led, moreover, with
wonderful wisdom and self-restraint, had shown that there was a limit to
what they would endure, that they were not the spiritless creatures which
they had been supposed to be, and that henceforth they would have to be
reckoned with. F r o m that time especially, as I believe, dates the national
awakening of which w e are still watching the development. [Browne
1910, 57]
(Browne's history was published in 1910, when the Constitutional Revolution was
nearing its end.)

3.8 Decline of the Qajars

For Nasseru'd-Din Shah, and indeed for the Qajar dynasty, the overthrow of the
Tobacco Concession was a devastating blow. In April 1896, on the eve of the 50th
anniversary of his ascent of the throne, the ageing Shah was shot dead by an assassin
during a visit to a mosque outside Tehran. His assassin was apparently motivated by a
combination of religious motives and personal grievances arising from suffering and
persecution he had endured because of the regime. He also said he had been inspired by
the ideais and writings of Jamalled-Din about the unification of the Mohammadan
peoples and restoration of the ancient powers and glory of Islam. [Browne, 97]

Muzaffaru'd Din Shah who became Shah in June 1896 was of a milder temperament
than his father, but was lacking initiative and self-reliance. In Browne's view he
'suffered rather than caused the government of Pérsia to grow steadily worse, while

refusing, or at least omitting, to follow those methods of repression whereby his fathe

had to a considerable extent held in check overt manifestations of the discontent whic
was universally prevalent.' [1910, 101] His demands on the public purse were no less
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remorseless, and it seems that a principal cause m a y have been personal vices.
According to Milani, the Shah's private perversions, 'and they were many, preoccupied
him throughout his reign. [Milani 1975, 120]

It has been noted earlier that the chief beneficiary of the Tobacco Concession fiasco w
the Russians. Apart from the growth and influence of their concessions, the Russians
already exerted powerful leverage on the Shah and the Government through their cmcial
military role within Iran. In 1876, a Cossack Brigade had been established under
Russian officers, the only-modem, well-paid and well-equipped military unit within
Iran. This provided the necessary military power to support their concessions and
implement their expansionist policies. Furthermore, it gave them a potent tool to place
at the disposal of the Shah if simmering popular discontent boiled over into revolution.
In the period between the Tobacco M o v e m e n t (1890-91) and the start of the
Constitutional Revolution, increased colonial influences again surged through Iran, this
time favouring the Russians. [Milani, 120]
Russian influence solidified further after a 1903 agreement granted even more
favourable economic terms, provoking serious popular opposition, particularly among
the merchants. The newly increased tariffs levied upon Iranian commodities by the
Belgian comptrollers aggravated popular grievances. T h e m o o d of unrest w a s
intensified by Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah's recurrent expensive trips abroad, and talk of yet
another loan to pay for yet another trip was received with strong opposition in the cities
of Iran.

Despite the widespread popular ioathing of the Belgians Rússia had come to be
increasingly identified as the most serious obstacle to reforms in Iran. Aligning
themselves with the most reactionary elements of the Qajar bureaucracy, and backed by
the strength of the Cossack Brigade, the Russians succeeded in creating an image of
the Russian Empire as invincible and omnipotent. This predominant image had become
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an element of social control in that it implied the futility of any efforts to undermine
Russian influence.

With the British discredited after the Tobacco Concession, circumstances favoured the
Russians who negotiated a huge loan of £500,000 to Iran, virtually becoming its sole
creditor and further embarrassing the British. Furthermore, an arrangement was

negotiated handing over the administration of ali the customs houses to Belgian control,
the Belgians being the allies, in popular parlance the 'jackals', of the Russians. This
gave considerable power to the insidious M. Naus, a Belgian who held several
functions: Director of Customs, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, High Treasurer,
Head of the Passport Department, and Member of the Supreme Council of State.
dArbitrary and tyrannical, Naus was hated by the Iranians who were also affronted when
a photograph captured him dressed as an Iranian religious leader.
On the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, Iran's social, politicai and economic
systems had become meshed into the international capitalist system in a manner that
facilitated the semi-colonialisation of the country. According to Turner:
This process had a double effect on the process of development. It had a
peculiar impact on the economy, and to some extent dissolved the feudal
structure through the exchange relation. But also, it created unfavourable
conditions for the structural transformation necessary for capitalist
development. O n the one hand, the state apparatus1 dependency on Rússia
and Britain inhibited any autonomous act of the so-called centralised state
to perform economic changes in the Une of capitalist development. [1980,
85]
Despite their rivalries, England and Rússia exerted a common influence in keeping Iran
in politicai, economic and technological backwardness. Three factors saved Iran from

total colonialisation: public resistance; national and religious ideas; and rivalry betw
the super-powers. Etehadieh has clearly stated the impact of these factors:
"...the gambling and lottery concessions that were granted to the British
were cancelled due to opposition from the public and religious clerics.
Furthermore, Tobacco rebellions forced the government to disregard
another commercial contact with British businessmen. It cost the
government £500,000 pounds and a concession to the people indicates
that most of the participants in the rebellion were from the middle class,
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thus stressing the national bourgeois character of the opposition". [1961,
59]
3.9 Constitutional Revolution—The Early Period
The Constitutional Revolution began with a series of relatively small incidents early
December, 1905 which aggravated the m o o d of general discontent. Apart from the
Naus photograph, there was anger over oppressive mie in a number of centres,
including gunshots fired at a crowd of people, the bastinadoing of two ulama and,
most importantly, the bastinadoing of a group of merchants in Tehran for increasing the
price of sugar. The Tehran incident had been sanctioned by the Aynud Dowleh, the
Shah's Chief Minister The bazaars closed in protest and there was a further incident in
Tehran when m e n armed with sticks expelled a group of merchants from the Royal
Mosque where they had taken bast.
Following this incident, which had also been sanctioned by the Shah's minister, a
group of some 2,000 merchants, ulama, and students took bast at a shrine outside of
Tehran. This incident was known as the 'lesser exodus'. After lengthy negotiations
with the Shah and his court, the fugitives returned in mid-January 1906 after the Shah
gave a signed promise which, as signification, was read in the mosque on the following
day. Copies were also photographed and sent around the country. The rescript
promised the creation of a House of Justice to include representatives of clergy,
merchants and landed proprietors and presided over by the Shah, equality of ali citizens
before the law, the dismissal of the objectionable Chief Ministers, and other popular
demands as formulated by the ulama. There was no mention of either a constitution or
a national assembly. There was popular rejoicing, Tehran was illuminated and,
according to Browne, the popular cry, 'Long live the Persian Nation", was heard for
the first time. [1910,312]
By April 1906, however, there was no sign of the agreed reforms and the ulama of
Tehran petitioned the Shah to enforce them. (The petition was also published in the
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official Journal or Gazette.) Furthermore, the popular demands escalated with caUs for a
Constitution and a National Assembly (Majlis). Throughout subsequent Iranian history,
the Majlis has remained the symbol of constitutionalism. T h e petition and
representations were ignored and the streets of the capital deteriorated with curfews and
a strong presence of soldiers, including members of the Cossack Brigade.

The Shah was denounced in the minbar and in the bazaars, particularly by the bazaari,
the artisans and humbler workers of the market place. Secret societies or Anjomans
spreading revolutionary ideas multiplied, supplemented by a National Library dedicated
to educating the people in patriotism. In June a number of popular leaders were exiled.
Popular resistance prevented soldiers from removing one of them, although a student
leading the rescue was shot dead by an officer. There were further disturbances and
soldiers fired on the crowd, killing 15 persons. A large group led by ulama took bast in
a mosque, obtaining after four days the Shah's approval to withdraw to the holy city of
Q u m . A vast concourse of people participated in this 'Greater Exodus', one observer
describing the main road between Tehran and Q u m as resembling the street of a town.
[Browne 1910, 118] W h e n the chief minister, Aynud-Dowleh ordered bazaars and
shops to be re-opened by force, the British legation permitted merchants and their
supporters to take bast in its summer legation.

After three days, some 5,000 people had assembled at the Legation, increasing daily to
a peak of about 14,000. They demanded as the price of their retum the dismissal of the
brutal Aynud Dowleh, promulgation of a Code of Laws, and the recall of ecclesiastical
leaders. Faced with such massive resistance, the Shah gave way, bowing to the
national outpouring of feeling, signing a Royal Proclamation enacting the establishment
of a Majlis to 'carry out the requisite deliberations and investigations on ali necessary
subjects connected with important affairs of the State and Empire'. [Milani, 131] So
low in repute were the Shah and his administration that when the proclamation was first
forwarded to the protesters in the British Legation, they refused to sanction it. The
verification and assurances of the British charge d'affaires was necessary before they
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would accept the promises of the Royal Proclamation. Apart from the election of a
Majlis, other pledges include 'blood money' to relatives of those killed, the return of
the exiled religious leaders, and establishment of Courts of Justice.

3.9.1 The First Constitutional Period
The solemn official opening of the new House of Parliament in the presence of leading
formally inaugurated the First Constitutional period. A 'Committee of Notables' was
chosen to write the laws regulating the elections to the Majlis, and on September 9,
1906 the election codes were issued. These comprised 33 articles of which articles 1

and 2 were the most significant because they set out the mies for selecting the electors
Article 1. The electors of the nation in the well-protected realms of Pérsia
in the provinces and the Departments shall be of the following classes: (i)
Princes and the Qajar tribe: (ii) Doctors of Divinity and students: (iii)
Nobles and Notables: (iv) Merchants: (v) Landed proprietors and
peasants: (vi) trade-guilds.
Article 2. The elector shall possess the following qualifications: (i) their
age must not fali short of 25 years: (ii) they must be Persian subjects: (iii)
they must be k n o w n in the locality: (iv) the landed proprietors and
peasants amongst them must possess property of the value of at least one
thousand tumans: (v) the merchants amongst them must have a definite
office and business: (vi) the members of trade-guilds amongst them must
belong to a recognised guild, must be engaged in a definite craft or trade,
and must be in possession of a shop of which the rent corresponds with
the average rents of the locality. [The Electoral L a w of September 9,
1906, translated by Browne 1909, 35-56, Cited Milani, 132]
The franchise conveyed by the electoral laws was a limited one. Of abut 20 million
people in Iran at the time, only about 120,000 were eligible to vote. Although
equality" had been debated with approval in the various ideological discussions in the
preparatory period before the revolution broke out, it was applied only nominally in
practice. It was defined and applied to include relative equality only within specific
circles. Consequently, the class representation in the Majlis was also restrictive and
inequitable as Table 3.1 indicates. Furthermore, 60 of the 150 delegates came from
Tehran, a distortion of national representation.
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According to statistics (See Table 3.1) from the Plan and Budget Organisation, in the
first session of the Majlis, the politicai representation of various social classes is set out
in Table 3.1. [Parsa 1974, 279-280]
Table 3.1
Class Composition of the First Majlis
Classes

Percent

Landowners

23.3

Merchants and Guildsmen

30

Clergy

13.5

State officials

12.4

Non-State officials

7.4

Others

12.9

*Source: The Plan and Budget Organisation, Parsa 1974, 279-80

The Majlis met for the first time on October 7,1906. Its initial deliberations focusse
two important matters: enactment of a Fundamental L a w and the creation of a National
Bank. [Browne 1910, 18] The Bank question demonstrated the increasing politicai
importance and influence of therisingbourgeoisie class, to whose interests the proposal
was directed rather than to overall economic benefit. In a sense, the establishment of the
bank was also a slap in the face for therivalcolonial powers w h o had dominated
hitherto the finances of Iran. With the establishment of the bank dependent on the
subscription of a certain levei of capital, it was expected that the merchants and other
bourgeoisie elements would subsidise the bank's creation through the power base they
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had acquired through their enthusiastic participation in the struggle for the Constitution
and the Majlis:
A hundred persons subscribed 5,000 tumans each, while some gave yet
larger sums, up to 30,000 tumans. The poor also contributed: Students
sold their books and w o m e n their omaments to support the Bank. A
million tumans w a s subscribed in Tehran (sic) alone, while Tabriz
promised another million. [Browne 1910, 19]

The ulama urged ali Muslims to contribute as much as possible, distributing a leaflet t

that effect among the faithful. Despite the enthusiastic subscriptions, whether expedie
or patriotic, the total fell below the two million tumans loan sought by the Shah to
procure his approval of the Bank. The English and Russian bankers also worked to
block any new Bank of Iran by restricting credit and reducing the money supply. The
defeat of the proposed bank law ensured the continued dominance of the Iranian
economy by the two colonial banks.
The success of the Constitutional Revolution was also threatened by tensions between
the participants. The working men and women in the cities and the peasants had
conceived constitutionaUsm as a remedy to the injustices they had long endured: feudal

exploitation, barbárie feudal laws, security from government agents and tax collectors.
The Ulama perceived it as producing improved income provisions and a stricter
observance of Islamic precepts. [N. Kermanai, cited Milani, 134] Despite some popular
disillusionment, the revolutionary spirit remained strong and the power of the
constitutionalists was increasing. The Majlis opened on October 76, 1906 and one of
its early acts was the pointed rejection of a joint Anglo-Russian loan of £400,000:
This important decision at once made it clear that the new Parliament had
no intention of being a mere tool in the hands of the Shah and the Court
Party and that it was thoroughly alive to the danger of foreign
intervention, and the Absolute necessity of checking the foreign influences
which had grown with such appalling rapidity during the past 17 or 18
years (before 1906). [Browne 1910, 125]
On December 30 1906, the Shah ratified the fundamental laws and the form of the
Iranian Revolution was fixed and defined. He also signed a separate document

promising not to dissolve the existing Parliament for at least two years. It was the la
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significant act of Muzaffaru'd Din Shah w h o had been increasingly iU for some time and
died on January 8, 1907. It seems that stern reminders from the clergy that he was
about to meet his God may have induced the Shah to sign the Constitution.
His successor, Mohammad Ali Shah adopted an intransigent attitude to the Majlis from
the beginning, declining to invite its members to his coronation. According to Browne
the new Shah had looked forward to exercising the same autocratic and irresponsible
powers as his forbears and resented the limitations imposed by the Constitution which
the Majlis was determined to enforce. [1910 134] The accession of Mohammad Ali
Shah, however, gave new heart to the opponents of the Constitutional Revolution and
to the Russians, with whom the new Shah was closely linked. The Majlis had a notable
coup when it compelled the Shah to dismiss Naus as chief of the customs, and began
much other constructive work. An ominous sign, however, was the signing of an
agreement between Britain and Rússia effectively dividing Iran into spheres of
influence:
Their hitherto struggle for the extension of their hegemonic spheres was to
give place to their co-operation in consolidating their positions in their
respective spheres of influence. The de facto division of Iran into spheres
of influence was to receive the officiaUty of a treaty. More significantly the
implications of the treaty were the eventual defeat of the Constitutional
Revolution with the intervention of foreign troops. In M o h a m m a d Ali
Shah, w h o had c o m e to power shortly after the Constitutional
proclamation, they found a staunch anti-constitutionalist, w h o had long
since proved his [unquestioned loyalty] to the Russians. [Milani, 134-5]
The anti-constitutionalists were able to exploit the aggravated tensions within the
constitutional movement by equating constitutionalism with 'anti-Islamic' poUcies. The
constitutionalists retaliated by forming more secret societies(Anyomans) which
organised aimed resistance and aroused the peasantry.

3.9.2 The Role of the Anjomans

The role of the anjoman or secret societies in Iran has been touched on previously in t
context of the late 19th Century. They now assumed a crucial role at an important point
in the unfurling saga of the Constitutional Revolution. In the period following the
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assassination of Nasseru'd-Din Shah in 1896, the anjomans

had been primarily

intellectual societies, the standard-bearers of bourgeois ideology. Lambton observes
that the anjomans "... seem to have regarded their task as being merely to awaken the
people to the evils of the despotism and the benefits of freedom, and to convince them
that progress was to be achieved by means of n e w learning'. [1970, 50] Because of the
despotic nature of the regime, they could not emerge as genuine poUtical parties but had
to operate in an unobtrusive, often clandestine, manner. The anjomans of the first
constitutional period played a significant role in the Revolution primarily because they
were an organisational expression of the popular mass movement in the cities.
There were two kinds of anjomans: official anjomans, and unofficial anjomans. The
official anjomans, as Browne called them, were originally formed to supervise the
elections but then refused to disband and assumed substantial responsibilities in the
conduct of the public affairs of their cities. There could only be one such anjoman in
each city or town. The most famous among these anjomans was the Anjoman-e Melli
or (Anjomane-Ayalati) in Tabriz, which forms the basis of the following account of the
anjomans' participation.

After the completion of the elections in October 1906, Mohammad AU Mirza, then the
C r o w n Prince, requested the disbandment of the anjomans. Most members of the
Anjomans became apprehensive and were generally ready to obey the order. The radical
wing of the opposition in Tabriz, however, launched an effective public agitation which
brought the city to the verge of revolt and forced M o h a m m a d Ali Mirza to rescind his
order and also to grant the Anjoman-e Melli official status. Behind the offensive was
the newly formed Markaz-e Ghibi (Secret Centre) whose members were in contact with
the circles of Iranian Social Democrates in Baku and other Caucasian towns.
Throughout this period and in the subsequent armed resistance in Tabriz the Markaz-e
Ghibi played an important role in organising the bazaaris and merchants. (See
Chapter 4.)
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F r o m press accounts, it appears that the anjoman was trusted by the people w h o
brought to it ali sorts of complaints and expected it to resolve their problems. At the
beginning, a committee consisting of the anjoman secretary, three merchants and two
craftsmen was formed to attend to the people's complaints. In February 1907,
however, discussions were held in the anjoman
Justice); in effect, the Anjoman

for the formation of a Court of

taking over the judicial responsibilities of the

government.
That the people brought their complaints to the Anjoman and not to the Crown Prince
showed that the institution was trusted by the people. This, however, did not prevent
the people from vigorously objecting to what they considered the

anjoman's

shortcomings, and holding it responsible for the lack of tangible improvements. For
example, on November 25, 1906, there was a great commotion around the anjoman in
Tabriz with people objecting, among other things, to the insecurity in the countryside
resulting from tribal lawlessness, and demanding more vigorous action. The next day
the bazaars were completely closed and everyone assembled around the anjoman. It was
with great difficulty and after a lot of promises from the anjoman that the bazaar and
merchants reluctantly agreed to reopen their shops. [Afshari 1981,75]
The bazaaris and merchants were probably the only organised groups who consistently
pressured the anjoman for better organisation and action. (See Chapter 4) In fact, they
had their o w n Anjoman-e

Asnaf (Merchants Guild) which met separately and

established a working relationship with the official anjoman. At one point the Asnaf s
deputies demanded that the minutes of the Anjoman's discussions be 'published in the
Ruznameh-Meili (National Newspaper), so that people would become aware of every
deputy's views. The following incident indicates the politicai strength and active
involvement ofthe Asnaf (GxxiXàs) in the constitutional movement in Tabriz.
In late December 1906, the Asnaf s deputies met and, following a long discussion,
presented a note to the anjoman in which they tried to clarify their relationship with that
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body. They informed the anjoman that from then on anything that was not signed by aU
the Asnaf s deputies should not be considered as the opinion of the Asnaf, and asked
the anjoman to answer the Asnaf s correspondence only in writing. They went on to
demand that any m e m b e r of the anjoman accused of a treasonable act should not be
dismissed until his case was referred to the Asnaf s deputies w h o would take two days
to investigate the charges and announce their opinion. Increasingly, the Anjoman-eMelli in Tabriz became a government within the government, and its anti-feudal poUtical
Une left Uttle doubt as to whose government it was. [Afshari 1981, 77]

The second kind of anjomans that appeared in different cities after the granting of
constitutional mie were politicai associations of people with similar politicai views
and/or c o m m o n ethnic or cultural backgrounds. Browne called them "unofficial
Anjomans":
They played a great part in the history of this period, especially on the
occasions of the two coups detat and constituted the back-bone as it were
of the popular party. A n d again, after the disaster of June 23, 1908, it was
they, w h e n the [Majlis] was no more, w h o organised the national
resistance. [1910, 245]
With the advent of relative politicai freedom, people began grouping together in
anjomans. For examples, the Tehrani bazaaris and merchants organised themselves in a
political-professional anjoman, as did the inhabitants of different quarters of the city. In
a short period of time some 200 anjomans c a m e into existence in Tehran alone,
although only a few of them were large enough to have a significant politicai impact on
the course of the Revolution.

In general, in the commercial centres of the country where the bazaar and merchants
were relatively strong and n e w ideas had m a d e sufficient impact, the popular anjomans
exhibited characteristics which did not, on the whole, negate the principies of the
Constitutional Revolution. Here, the organisational bonds ofthe bazaaris and merchants
were strong enough to overcome, to a certain degree, the tribal-feudal relationships
which still existed in the society at large. Afshari argues:
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The great revolutionary potential that existed in the popular Anjomans
remained, for the most part, unrealised. The fact remains, however, that
for the first time the Iranians were trying, on a relatively large scale, to
overcome the long ingrained superstitious belief that the business of the
government w a s the hereditary domain of the tribal-feudal elements.
[1981, 224]
In the second half of 1907 and the first part of 1908, the British diplomatic
correspondence conveyed the belief that it was the anjomans w h o really raled the
country. It was stated that "...the moral authority of the old regime has been destroyed
by the local Anjoman". [Parliamentary Papers 1909, 100] O f course, M o h h a m a d AliShah's fears of the political-military activities of the anjomans

were real and he

repeatedly expressed his apprehension to the British in Tehran. Available evidence
suggests that M o h a m m a d Ali Shah was using a tactic which was aimed at destroying
the anjomans,

this being the first and necessary step towards making the Majlis

subservient to the Palace. H e professed to the British agents that '...he was himself the
only true constitutionalist in Pérsia,' and that his opposition was not directed against
constitutional rule but against 'irresponsible' anjomans. [British Parliamentary Papers,
101]

Considerable numbers of the Qajar princes and reactionary courtiers changed their
attitudes to the revolution following the assassination of the Amin'us -Soltan, for many
years a sénior minister, by a sarraf (a bazaari banker ). Overnight they became the
supporters of the Majlis and strongly warned the Shah against further anti-constitutional
activities. They had felt the danger involved in the intervention of the masses at the
politicai levei of the country, so ali their efforts were directed at the removal of that
danger. Under the existing conditions the only course available to them w a s to cooperate with the Majlis over w h o m they could at least have some measure of control.
According to Tafreshi:
The Mohammad-Ali-Shah immediately refused to pay ali those w h o were
in the Palace's service, blaming the Majlis for the cut in his budget. Then
a palace-induced politicai agitation was launched a m o n g those affected,
and the c o m m o n people whose names were struck out from the pension
list were encouraged to m a k e their complaints as noisy as possible.
[1973, 50]
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The Shah was also shaken by the assassination and the mass demonstrations. H e
sought conciliation with the Majlis, vowing to respect the Constitution and ratifying the
Supplementary Fundamental L a w s that he had sought to resist. The royalist position,
however, gradually improved as the constitutionalists lost support among the upper and
lower classes, and the Liberais pressed for additional reforms.
Abrahamian [1969,141] has shown that the influence ofthe conservative ulama and the
negligent attitude of the Majlis towards the urban poor tumed this most unfortunate
group in Tehran against the Revolution. People such as dyers, carpet-weavers, bricklayers, camel-drivers, muleteers, pedlars, bath-attendants, colliers, and labourers began
to participate in anti-constitutionalist demonstrations:
In the early stages of the revolution, the rebels had successfully attracted
the poor to their side by championing the demand for cheaper bread, and
persuasively arguing that the government was to blame for the high food
prices. [Tafreshi, 142]
Having found no tangible improvements in their living conditions, the urban paupers
became receptive to the reactionary agitation, especially w h e n by participating in
demonstrations, they received free meais and some money widely believed to have
originated from the palace. [Kermani 1965,2:99] Events were moving quickly towards
a confrontation as this unruly crowd occupied (under the protection of government
troops) the main square in Tehran and went wild, killing two passers-by suspected of
constitutional inclinations. Tents were erected in the square and clubs were supplied to
the crowd. [1965, 76-77]
Meanwhile, to protect the National Assembly, the members of anjomans armed
themselves and assembled in the square in front of the Majlis buildings near the
conservative crowd. For a few days neither side made any m o v e against the others, but
at the eleventh hour, the Mohammad-Ali-Shah lost his nerve and backed off from a
confrontation by ordering his ruffians to clear the Square. This was the 'Abortive Coup
detat' of December 1907. F r o m that m o m e n t until June 23,1908 (at which time the
Shah's second coup detat succeeded) tensions escalated between the Palace and the
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constitutional camp. The anjoman and the nationalist press intensified their struggle
against the Shah. Rumors which greatly alarmed the anjomans, were circulating about
the Shah's purchase ofriflesand his attempt at organising his retainers from Varamin, a
rural district near Tehran. [Kermani 1965, 109]

For the second coup detat, the Shah was more determined and better organised, mainly
because of the active involvement of the Russians in the planning and execution of the
attack on the Majlis and the Anjomans. Colonel Liakhoff, the commander of the Persian
Cossack Brigade, was given total authority in directing the operation. O n June 3, the
Shah, escorted by the Cossack Brigade, left his palace and resided in his garden just
outside Tehran, remaining there with his forces until the destruction of the Majlis was
completed. The Shah proclaimed martial law and demanded the expulsion of popular
leaders, control of the press, and disarmament of national volunteers.

On the constitutional side, the bazaar and merchants resorted to a general strike whic
lasted for the duration of the confrontation; the anjomans' members began arming
themselves and assembled around the Majlis building. It was reported that the anjomans
were very active and were 'drilling m e n and preparing arms'. The Majlis however, was
vacillating between rhetoric and a search for a compromise solution. O n June 12, the
Shah demanded the disarmament of the anjomans' members and the expulsion of eight
revolutionaries w h o were popular among the craftsmen and merchants. O n June 23,
Colonel Liakhoff and other Russian officers led afrontalattack on the Majlis building
which was defended by the Anjomans' armed volunteers. The Persian Cossacks'
artillery bombarded the Majlis building, and despite the heroic resistance of the
defenders, Liakhoff carried the day and, in the words of the Times' correspondent, a
Muscovite reign' was inaugurated in Tehran. The incident was k n o w n as the second
coup detat or reactionary triumph. Liakhoff was appointed Governor of Tehran and
bloody reprisals were exacted. Tafreshi argues that the relatively easy victory of the
Shah's forces can be explained by at least two reasons:
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O n e was the Majlis' vacillation and its inability to provide a resolute
leadership for the resistance. It, had also caused great vexation among the
armed volunteers w h e n the deputies tried to disarm them in compliance
with the Shah's request. H a d a unified military c o m m a n d existed, the
movement would not have collapsed that easily. The second reason was
that the defenders were supposed to fight the battle without shooting at the
commanders of their enemies". [1973,98]
The British Charge d'Affairs confirmed to his Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, that

the Russian officers who presented easy targets to the Majlis forces were not fired up
because the constitutionalists feared direct Russian intervention. [Tafreshi, 99]
3.9.3 Civil W a r

Although the Shah and his supporters had triumphed in Tehran, strong support for the
Constitution emerged in the provinces with ulama denouncing the Shah:
Armed volunteers arose in defence of the revolution, first in Tabriz, later
in Isfahan and Rasht, and eventually in most other cities, including
Tehran. In the past, the capital had determined the course of events in the
provinces. N o w the provinces determined the course of events in the
capital. [Abrahamian 1982,97]
With provinces in revolt and two rebel armies converging on Tehran, the Shah's
position became increasingly untenable. Foreign banks refused further support for
military forces, and there were strikes in the bazaars. The constitutionalists within
Tehran re-organised and opened the city gates for their invading armies from the
provinces. Liakhoff and the Cossack Brigade surrendered. The Shah took refuge in the
Russian Embassy, a Grand Assembly of 500 constitutional supporters was formed and
deposed the Shah who abdicated in favour of his 12-year-old son Ahmad. A new
electoral act was ratified and the way cleared for the calling of the Second Majlis.
According to Abrahamiam, the revolution had finally secured the constitution. [101]
Thus ended the period known as the "Lesser Tyranny" to be followed by the Second
Constitutional Period.
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3.9.4 T h e Second Constitutional Period

The events of the Second constitutional period, which began with the accession of
Sultan Ahmad Shah and ended with the closure of the Second Majlis are too complex to
summarise even baldly here. Browne's chronology for this period ranges over 18 pages
of tightly-packed detail. Essentially, the Majlis and the Constitutionalists attempted

further social and electoral reform, but grew progressively weaker in the face of inter
disruption and an increasingly aggressive Russian intervention. These processes
culminated in the forcible closure of the Majlis by the Government under threat of
Russian occupation in December 1911, and the brutal suppression of constitutionalist

forces by Rússia at Tabriz in the early months of 1912. Effectively, the Constitutional
Revolution ended with the dissolution of the Majlis under duress in December 1911.
3.10 Conclusion

According to Milani's summary, heroism in the face of barbarity abounded in the period
between 1905 and the final defeat ofthe constitutionalists in 1911-12:
While part of the middle-class leadership and part of the ulama had
compromised with colonial powers and the court—once they had been
insured their profits—the heroic struggles of the m a n y in the face of the
'reign of terror' unleashed by constitutionalists continued. . .the same
figures w h o had been the beneficiaries of the ancient regime became the
peers of the n e w "constitutional' government. It was their leadership that
led to the further pauperisation of the economy and a n e w stage of
increased colonial activities in Iran. [1975-137]
In a gloomy summary of Iranian society on the eve of World War I, Miroshnikov

concluded that the Revolution had not altered the feudal structure of the prevalent mod
of production. Politicai power remained in the hands of feudal landowners succeeding

one another in short-lived ministries. The state was headed by the last of the Qajars, t
juvenile weakling, Sultan Ahmad Shah. The khans of the nomadic tribes and feudal
lords backed by paramilitary forces ruled much of the country. Iran endured as a semicolony which was formally independent but was, in fact, entangled by the meshes of
financial and politicai dependence. [1964,24-25]
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T h e failure of the Constitutional Revolution provided the basis for the m o d e m
dictatorship of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), and its ultimate overthrow by the
Islamic Revolution in 1979. Politically, the failure of the Constitutional Revolution
loomed larger than its achievements, having a distinctive impact upon Iranian politicai
history. The Revolution left a legacy that has continued to inspire those who have
followed the path marked by the revolutionaries of 1906-11. Anyone familiar with the
contents and the forms of the politicai Revolution in Iran of 1978-79 can recognise the
strong influence of this legacy.

The fact that the Constitutional Revolution failed to achieve its aims is stamped indeli
in the historiography of the Revolution. The topic of failure is a major theme, marked
by indignation and bitterness in contemporary historical writings. Almost ali tend to
blame the conspiracy ofthe Qajar dynasty against constitutional mie, a conspiracy that
succeeded in destroying the Revolution from within. For example, Malekzadeh, a major
Iranian historian of the Revolution wrote:
"...during the forty years since the Revolution the same absolutist
notables w h o mled the people in the period of absolutism were in charge
of the country's affairs and monopolised ali important government posts.
Even the notorious absolutists...who were unwavering enemies of the
Constitutional rule and shed the blood of thousands of the
Constitutionalists, successively mled the people as the head of the
Constitutional government" [1951, 225]
Although the Constitutional Revolution was largely a failure in procuring enduringly

effective constitutional, politicai and social change in Iran, it was a remarkable landm
in Iranian history. That the Constitutional Revolution had brought a temporary halt to
Iran's long history of despotism and dependence was due to many factors, not least the
effectiveness of traditional communication systems and the growth of an increasingly
vigorous press. The contributions of both traditional and rudimentary mass
Communications systems are analysed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION—TRADITIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS
4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a historical analysis of the role of the bazaar as a politicai
channel during the revolution of 1906. S o m e significant components of the traditional
religious communication channels, such as mosque (masjid) and pulpit (minbar) are
also discussed. Because there was a strong alliance between the ulama and bazaaris
during the revolutionary period, the last part of this chapter will attempt to show that
the Shi'i revolutionary discourse and the ulama shaped the actions of the bazaaris in a
revolutionary direction.

From the early 19th century until the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the
institutional bazaar in Iran was constantly in conflict with the various politicai regimes
in power. The only period in which the bazaar did not openly oppose the government
was under the Prime Ministership of Mohammad-Mosaddeq, (1951-53). Even then,
as Mozaffari points out, it retained its hostility to the Shah. [1991, 377] The bazaar
has traditionally been a significant economic-political channel, a place of work and
commerce with differentiated structures, a distinctive socio-economic environment and
functional ethnic, cultural and professional systems. [Mozaffari 1991, 31]
The bazaar played an important role in many protests and revolutionary movements of
the 19th and 20th centuries. Traditionally the bazaar embraced the largest part of the
commercial sector, trade and financial networks. The scope of the term bazaaris has
been defined by Floor:
[It is] applied only to those socio-political classes such as guilds (Asnaf),
craftsmen (Pishehvaran), small shopkeepers {Kasabeh), wholesalers
(Bunakdaran), exchange agents (Sarrafan), brokers (Dallalan), and retail
merchants (Furushandehgan), as well as a certain number of large
businessmen (Tujjar) w h o remained a part of the traditional Bazaari
system". [Floor 1976, 126]
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O n e of the visible expressions and symbols of powerful group in ali Iranian towns is
the bazaar. The bazaar comprises what could be called the Iranian bourgeois of the
wealthy merchants, the shopkeepers, and craftsmen.The bazaar designates first
location and buildings, then what is housed there: the workshops where wares are
produced, the shops where local and imported merchandise is sold, the offices of big
merchants w h o dominate the local market, and the import and the export business.
There are also the bankers and money-lenders. T h e bazaar is a comprehensive
industrial centre, a world complete in itself, a vibrant focal point for the life of town
and region.

Apart from its importance as a commercial and social centre, the bazaar has also been
crucial to the press both as a market-place and as a source of news. It is where ali
newspapers are first circulated and where advertisers are active. Thus, it is a fulcmm
of both press and traditional social communication, steeped in the rich history and
culture of Iran. A s M o w l a n a observes, the great bazaars of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan,
Shiraz, and other cities still stand: 'They are stiU filled with life, and imagination m a y
not find it difficult to conjure up the past'. [1963, 127] The power of the bazaar was
not only indicative of the merchants' economic importance but also a reflection of the
awesome politicai power that it could c o m m a n d as an integrated institution:
The bazaar is well organised. But it did m o v e only w h e n its immediate
interests were at stake. A n d w h e n it did act, the situation so created could
not be trifled with. Cases are not rare w h e n even powerful kings had to
withdraw their decrees once the bazaar had decided to close its door in
protest and had threatened to stop the economic life of the country. Those
familiar with the recent history of Iran will remember the part the bazaar
played in the fight for the Constitution of 1906, and in the Nationalisation
of Iranian oil in 1951. [Mowlana 1963, 127]
The bazaar was also instrumental in the greatest of these upheavals, the Islamic
Revolution of 1979. Iran's geographic location and its well-developed system of petty
commodity production were conducive to the expansion of commerce in pre-capitalist
Iran. Around 1800, Iran's main trade partners were Afghanistan, the principalities of
Central Ásia, Turkey and índia. Trade with índia consisted mainly of native products
on both sides, the East índia company's export of British goods to Iran being very
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small. Trade with Afghanistan and Central Ásia included a large amount of European
goods re-exported from Iran, and with Turkey also it comprised mostly goods coming
through Istanbul or Baghdad. The consolidation of state power under the newly
established Qajar dynasty at the tum of the 19th century, also contributed to Iran's
commercial growth. In real terms, trade rose about three fold between 1800 and 1850
and quadrupled again by 1914, a totalriseof about twelve fold during the whole
period under review. In Issawi's view, the outstanding feature of this period was the
rapid growth in international trade. [1971,45]
With the merchants heavily involved in generating this great economic leap forward,
there was considerable potential for social conflict. Trade is not merely the material
basis of the bazaar, it is also the principal network of communication. Traditionally,
commerce in the bazaar was govemed by custom. The bazaar also obeyed an ethic
rooted in traditional values. Thus the ethics of the bazaar have provided both a refuge
and an anchoring point for national identity in periods of social crisis. In this sense the
bazaar is a source of folk m e m o r y for the people of Iran.

The physical and geographical environments of the traditional bazaar have been
significant because the geographic placement of the bazaar reinforces both its
functional specificity and its autonomy. It occupies the traditional and vital centre of
the capital, Tehran, and of the other large cities. The Grand M o s q u e is usually at the
centre of the bazaar and relations between mosque and bazaar are close, constant, and
organic. Never in competition, they co-operate and coordinate their c o m m o n actions.
The bazaar also enjoys an independence of communication by display of its o w n
traditional signs and symbols.

The Iranian politicai conflicts, especially the revolution of 1906 and the Islamic
revolution of 1979 cannot be understood without an analysis of the struggles of the
bazaaris, as noted earlier, a term that encompasses merchants, shopkeepers, and
artisans. Bazaaris were among the principal actors in the Constitutional Revolution of
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1906. [Parsa 1989, 80] They also played a significant role in the conflicts against
royalists and the British during the nationalisation of oil in the 1950's. [Parsa, 81]

There were significant reasons why the bazaaris played an effective role in politicai

conflicts in Iran. Fundamental is the distinctive structure of the central bazaar with it
pronounced capability for mobilisation and collective action in times of conflict. Parsa
argues:
In most major cities, the central bazaars are concentrated in a single
location, in narrow alleys under covered roofs. The concentration and
proximity of shops facilitate Communications. Ali bazaaris meaning both
merchants and shopkeepers w h o distribute goods and artisans w h o
produced goods on a small scale, deal in very specialised commodities.
They buy, sell, or produce a single line of goods only. Furthermore, ali
those w h o deal in that specific product work in the same street or alley.
[1989, 81]
Thus, the entire bazaar is closely inter-connected. Proximity and concentrated
dependence on selling single commodities can generate intense competition for
customers. At the same time, however, proximity and dependence on similar
commodities for livelihood can also create a common fate with respect to market
conditions, changes in technology, rise of new competitors, and externai factors such
as the intervention or non-intervention of the state in business. These conditions can
generate strong solidarity during periods of crisis and conflicts, especially when
various segments of the bazaaris are faced with a common enemy. [Parsa, 91]

Another significant factor enabling bazaaris to play an important role in politicai
conflicts has been their resources. By the time of the Constitutional Revolution,
Tehran's central bazaar, the heart of the nation's trade, numbered close to 40,000
shops and workshops, one-half of which were located within the covered bazaar.
Shopkeepers outside of the covered bazaar foUowed bazaari politics, even though their
shops were not part of the bazaar proper. Finally, bazaaris sold goods to shopkeepers
throughout the country on the basis of extended credit. This practice created a
dependent relationship in which bazaaris exerted additional influence over the
commercial sector outside the bazaar. [Parsa, 92]

107

In summary, the ability of the bazaar to close its doors in protest and disrupt or
effectively suspend economic and social activity are potent weapons against
government. This is particularly so if the press and other avenues of communication

are unavailable or restricted due to repression and censorship. Consequently, resolute
action by the bazaar against government can create opportunities for other adversely

affected classes and groups to act collectively in conjunction with it. Mobilisation o
the bazaaris has been cmcial to the success of concerted action by the people against
the Government, as in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11.
4.2 The Islamic Sermon as a Politicai Channel
Islamic history has provided the precedents for the sermon serving as a channel of
politicai communication. The sermon has been a means whereby the ruling elite has
informed the public of its policies, programs and ideas. The politicai content of the
sermon has varied, but at least in theory it has always been considered a channel of
communication for the Iranian state. There are two types of Islamic sermons: the
homily (Wa'z) given any time during the week when an ulama can gather around him
a group of listeners on the floor of the mosque, and the Friday sermon (Khatbat-alJum'ah) delivered from the pulpit during the Friday noon worship service which ali
adult Muslim males are obligated by the Islamic law (Shariah) to attend. [Borthwick
1967, 300]

Before World War II, the Friday sermon was stylised and pedantic. Often the
preachers simply memorised and recited sermons which were hundreds of years old.
But in the post-war period several members of the ulama advocated reform of the
sermon. They have urged preachers to speak about the problems Muslims face in
modem life and about the nations in which Muslims live. The reform in the education
of the ulama and the reform of the sermon structure and content have enabled the
preachers to become mediators between the traditional and modem cultures. As a
result, the sermon in some Arab states is now an amalgamation of traditional Islamic

concepts together with the policies of the contemporary ruling elites. In short, it is
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channel of communication for the state as well as a traditional religious
communication. [Borthwick 1967, 300]

During the lifetime of prophet Muhammad and for approximately one hundred years
after his death in 632 AD, politicai content of the sermon was quite high. Then this
secular content disappeared from the sermon almost entirely until the 20th century:
[Excellency] Muhammad was a "prophet and statesman" and the
community he left behind was both politicai and religious. This fusion of
reUgion and state and the fact that the sermon and related institutions have
performed social and politicai functions in the past have m a d e it easier for
contemporary politicai leaders in the Arab world to give an Islamic
colouring to themselves, their programs to modemise the society and the
economy, and their policies of nationalism. [Borthwick 1965, 300-301]
From the beginning of Islam the responsibilities of the preachers have been religious

and politicai. At least in theory, and often in practice, they have been representatives
ofthe state charged with exhorting the 'believers' to uphold Islam and with informing
them of the policies of the government. Today, the preachers continue to carry out
these dual functions.
Prophet Muhammad was the first preacher, and when he preached, he acted in two
capacities: the leader and spokesman of the Islamic community, and the Prophet, or
Messenger, bringing the revelations of God to man. Sometimes one role
predominated, sometimes the other. Prophet Muhammad's successors, the Caliphs,
inherited these secular and religious roles, as symbolised by two of the appellations
given to them: Amiru' Mu-Minin, "the commander in chief of the believers," and
Imam, "the leader of prayer." Not only did this unity of politicai and religious office
exist at the very top, but also down through the hierarchy of the Islamic empire.
[1967, 301]

The sermon is as old as Islam. Prophet Muhammad created it, and he was the first to
use it to communicate politicai messages. This use of the sermon remained a tradition,
if not always a practice, in Islamic society. The sermon is preached in the midst of
traditional Islamic rituais and in the setting of the mosque whose architecture evokes
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memories of the great Islamic past. The sole sources which the Shariah permits the
preachers to use to justify their arguments are the Quran and Hadith books which the
traditional people memorised to some extent.
The preachers are members of a traditional social and occupational group, the ulama,

and are generaUy of humble birth. They have usually been educated in part at a Islami

school, where only the Quran is taught. They mostly wear the traditional dress, have a

modest standard of living, and live close to the traditional people. The legitimacy of
the sermon makes the traditional people more willing to listen to it and also comply
with the modern messages not being communicated in the sermon. [1967, 302]

The Islamic sermon is a channel of communication which is well suited to the needs of
contemporary Middle Eastemers. It is an old Islamic institution with a high degree of
legitimacy among the traditional people. Thus the sermon is one way by which the
ruling elites can communicate across the communication gap to the traditional people.
According to Borthwick:
The twentieth century reformers of the sermon took the first step in
making the sermon a bridge across the Communications gap. Prior to their
reforms the sermon was only a channel of communication a m o n g the
ulama. Ancient sermons, which only the ulama could understand, were
usually recited. The reformers of the sermon established communication
between the ulama and the Muslim masses by writing their o w n sermons,
by simplifying their language, and by preaching on topics which
concerned their listeners. These reforms connected the traditional Muslims
to the output end of the sermon. [1967,312]
In the next part, some significant components of traditional communication channels
are introduced.

4.2.1 The Islamic Pulpit (Minbar)
In two 20th-century politicai struggles in the Middle East, the constitutional
Revolution of 1906 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Minbar has served as a
public fórum and legitimising force for revolutionary groups. Communication
processes in modem societies have often been used as the basis for assessing those
same processes in traditional societies. Thus, modem communication (primarily mass
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media) has been characterised as a distinct and highly organised system operated by
professional communicators. Communication in traditional societies, however, has
been described as an indistinct, unorganised, non-professional system which is totally
reUant on face-to-face communication. [Fathi 1979,103]
In certain traditional societies, however, there is a distinct, organised system of public
communication operated by a class of professional communicators who do not rely on
modem technology. Communication is carried on face-to-face, but it is institutional,
not personal, in nature. Such a system can have a powerful impact on socio-political
development. One such system is demonstrated by the function of the Islamic minbar
in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11.

Gradually the minbar became a kind of throne to be used on official occasions by the
Caliph and for proclaiming important decisions and announcements. As a médium of
public communication, it was also used for defending certain policies, stirring public
emotion, or spreading propaganda.
The mosque was not only a place for the weekly communal prayer but
also the centre of the Muslim community. However, due to the expansion
of Islam and the appearance of the imperial caliphate, among other factors,
a learned religious m a n or chatty gradually came to deliver the oration or
khutba during the prayer of the assembly on Friday instead of the caliph
or his governors, and the politicai nature of the khutba also was
transformed into a religious sermon. These purely religious aspect of the
mosque increased and the minbar became a semi-sacred pulpit. The
politicai character of the mosque, though diminished, never disappeared.
A n d in a major crisis or community dissatisfaction, the people flocked to
the mosque to discuss the problem and to seek remedy or redress.
[Borthwick 1967, 314]
Thus, throughout the history of Islam, the mosque has been the centre and the scene
of numerous uprisings, revolts and social movements often led by popular preachers
from the minbar. As an example, in the next part, the role of the minbar as a channel
of politicai communication using the mobilisation of 1906 is reviewed
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4.2.2 Minbar,

Politicai Communication and the 1906 Revolution

Islam has served m a n y countries as both religion and politicai state, as in the Ottoman
Empire (1453-1919) in which the Sultan was considered both the clergy and the state,
a role legitimised through religion, but denied to the Iranian monarchs. Thus, the
tension between the religious leaders and the civil government turned the former into
natural opposition party. When the government was powerful the religious leaders did
not enjoy much influence; whenever there was a weak ruler, or general discontent,
religious leaders tried to reassert their influence. [Fathi 1979, 104]

The conflict between the clergy and the state was an important factor in the
development of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. On August 5, 1906, this
struggle was temporarily terminated by the granting of the Constitution by
Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah. But his son, Mohammad Ali Shah, began his mie on January
19, 1907, by ignoring the Majlis set up by the Constitution and on June 23, 1908, he

dissolved it. It was at this point that the effective use of the minbar helped the sur
of the seemingly obliterated Constitutional movement. According to Fathi:
In Tabriz in the north-west there was still active resistance to the Shah
under the leadership of twelve Constitutionalists w h o were in close
collaboration with the preachers in Tabriz. Between them it was arranged
that on Fridays in three mosques, well-known preachers would conduct
sermons and discuss issues related to the Constitutional movement.
During the 10-month siege of Tabriz by 30,000 Royalist troops, the
preachers not only encouraged the people to take up arms, but also served
as the distribution centre for information about the movemenfs activities.
The preachers informed the public about activities in the capital, in other
parts of the country and abroad, interpreted the events, and restrained the
people w h e n the situation required calmness and patience. The resistance
of Tabriz encouraged the Constitutionalists in other parts of Iran to rally in
a coordinated effort, one group from the north and another from the
southem region capturing the capital and forcing M o h a m m a d Ali Shah to
abdicate on July 13,1909. [1979, 106]
The importance and effectiveness ofthe minbar as a médium of public communication
were also recognised by the Royalists. Disgruntled clerics were encouraged to attend
the minbar and denounce the Constitutionalists. Mohammad Ali Shah was perfectly
aware of the preachers' influence on the public. For example, in one of his many

112

negotiations with the Majlis to settle their differences, he asked for the exile of eight
Constitutionalists, three of w h o m were preachers. Later, after the destruction of the
first Majlis in June 1908, he put to death two very eloquent Constitutional clerics.
[1979, 107]
Thus, during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, the minbar was extensively
utiUsed by both sides as a médium of public communication for the promotion of their
politicai positions. Furthermore, in acute circumstances, such as during the siege of
Tabriz, the minbar was used primarily as a focus and a channel for communication,
with religious ceremony cut to the bare minimum. Politically speaking, constitutional
leaders legitimised the Constitutional Revolution through their use of the pulpit.
Further, with respect to the diffusion of an ideology and propaganda in a social
movement which could have been done by a mass médium such as the newspaper in a
literate society, it is significant that a centuries-old system of public communication
was effective in these circumstances.
4.3 The Functions of the Bazaar and Mosque in the 1906 Revolution
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-12 sprang naturally from native soil. The
shock of the Revolution has been traced to m a n y factors, such as the weakness of
politicai and economic conditions, and intervention in the internai affairs of the
country by Rússia and England. (See Chapter 3) Essentially, the mobilisation of 1906
was a rational response to the despotic Qajar Shahs.
The print media, particularly newspapers and magazines, were controlled by the Shah
during the Qajar dynasty which lasted from the late 17th century to 1925. (See
Chapter 5). The revolutionaries and people generally used the traditional channels of
communication, primarily public meetings or the mosques and bazaars to spread
messages and organise resistance. These traditional communication channels, in
frequent conjunction with the press, played an active role during the Revolution. In
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this part, the main components of traditional communication (bazaar and mosque) and
their roles will be analysed further.

4.3.1 Definition of the Bazaar
The word merchant is the translation of the Iranian term 'Tajer' referring to the
wholesale merchant. The merchants were engaged in long-distance and relatively
large-scale domestic and international trade. In each city a few merchants dictated
economic life. The merchants also played an important part in financing the activities
of the government through the payment of revenue quotas or dues to provincial
govemors. Their economic status, however, was not the sole factor in the constitution
of the merchants as a class.

Shi'i Islam and Iran's traditional culture were also important elements in defining the
merchant's class identity. In traditional Iran, the merchants occupied a high position in
the distribution of social honour. Their prestige was rooted in the Islamic culture.
Pristine Islam was favourably disposed towards commerce and commercial activities.
Besides the Quran, m a n y eulogistic formulations about commercial activities can be
found in the dieta attributed to the Prophet M u h a m m a d and in other religious texts.
(See below)

In Ught of Islam's pro-merchant tendeney, it is hardly surprising that the 19th century
Iranians considered the merchants to be more respectable than any other social class.
[Floor 1976, 102] The merchants were also a m o n g the better educated segment of the
population. For instance, in northem Iran more than half, sometimes even 90 percent,
of the merchants could read and write. [Issawi 1971, 76] Therefore, it is little wonder
that they were considered notables of the city in which they lived.

The bazaars were organised by the merchants, craftsmen, and retailers who had been
the commercial focus of the city and its hinterland. The bazaar was not merely a
market-place for economic transactions in the m o d e m sense of the term. It was also a
type of community centre. The bazaar área included one, or several mosques, public
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baths, religious school, and m a n y tea houses. Religion was the basic c o m m o n
denominator in the bazaar, creating ties and bonds among bazaaris of different guilds
and professions:
The bazaar constituted the major source of support for the ulama and
religious institutions. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the bazaar has
been the major source and centre of support for oppositional politics.
Underpinning the bazaar's politicai dynamism was the coalition between
the merchants and the petty bourgeoisie, which m a d e the bazaar a
powerful force in the opposition movement. [Moaddel 1993, 106]
Politically, the bazaar has been one of the most important communication channels in
Iranian social and politicai events. Moaddel [1992, 527] argues that from the mid1820's, the Iranian merchants and the handicraft producers were constantly harassed
by European companies. Consequently, financially strong European concems were
gradually able to take over much Iranian commerce:
The Iranian merchants were no match for these foreign interests. They
lacked the organisational and administrative capabilities as well as the
capital necessary to finance and run their affairs on the same scale as the
Europeans. The situation was exacerbated by the very different manner in
which European governments and the Iranian government treated their
domestic interests. The European companies were receiving strong
backing from their governments; while the Qajar state not only left Iranian
merchants unprotected, but also constrained by a financial crisis, was
granting concessions to the foreign monopolies. The consequence was
increasing hostility of the merchants and the craftsmen toward the state.
[Moaddel, 527]
Thus, while in Western Europe the domestic middle class was able to gradually
control their domestic market and direct the state policies in a manner consistent with
their interests, a different trend emerged in Iran. The merchants and traditional petty
bourgeoisie were politically and economically marginalised, with important
consequences for the alignment of class forces in Iran. As Moaddel notes, the
merchants began making common cause with the traditional petty middle class against
the state and foreign interests. [ 529]

4.3.2 T h e Politicai History of the Bazaar

Therisein 19th century Iran of the merchant class with sufficient resources to be able

to resist the state was greatly facilitated by a host of economic, politicai, and cultura
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factors. The merchants played an important part in financing the activities of the
government, and the payments of the revenue quota due from a provincial govemor
designate prescribed for his government. [Lambton 1980, 54] The merchants had

considerable social prestige and were considered to be more respectable than any other
social class. The merchanfs prestige was also embedded in Islamic culture, which
tended to view commerce and commercial activities favourably.
Torrey [1892, 2] observed that the Quran manifested every where a lively interest in
trade and commerce. The ideology of the Quran was expressed in words elsewhere
used to express familiar commercial ideas, but transferred to the relations between
God and man. Thus, commercial terms such as "reckoning," "weights," "measures,"
"payments," "loss," "gain," "fraud," "buying," "selling," "profits," "wages,"
"loans," "and" security," occurred about 370 times in the holy Quran, giving a
commercial flavour to the whole. Numerous expressions of esteem for merchants are

also to be found in the sayings of the Prophet and other religious texts. According to
Moaddel, the prophet is reported to have said:
"The merchant who is sincere and trastworthy will (at the Judgement Day)
be a m o n g the prophets, the just and the martyrs. The trustworthy
merchant will sit in the shade of God's throne at the D a y of Judgment,
and merchants are the messengers of this world and God's faithful
trustees on Earth". [1992, 455]
According to Islamic holy tradition, trade is a superior way of earning one's
livelihood. Other classes closely allied with the merchants were craftsmen and retail
traders, organised into guild by type of occupation. Mecca, the birthplace of Islam,
was a major centre of local, regional and some international trade. The city was, 'at

the time of the rise of Islam, dominated by the merchant patricians'. [Tabari 1973,2829] According to Goitein:
Friday congregational prayer, one of the most important Islamic
institutions articulating the religious community and the state, coincided
with the day on which the business activities of the weekly bazaar
heightened because the people of the town and surrounding áreas gathered
in the marketplace for business transactions. [1966,111]
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T h e prophet M u h a m m a d , whose first wife and m a n y members of his clan were
prosperous merchants, engaged in trade on behalf of his wife. [Tabari 1973, 829-33]
ReUgious reform thus includes the reform of the bazaar, the main social centre outside
the family as weU as a focal point for believers. Both religious and commercial images
were projected onto the whole spectrum of Islamic thought and society, even to the
character of God:
The mutual relations between God and man are of a strictly commercial
nature. G o d (Allah) is the ideal merchant. H e includes ali the universe in
his reckoning. Ali is counted, every thing measured. [Torrey 1892, 51]
Islamic law specifically recognised the bazaar as a social meeting-place. Business
transactions in the bazaar went way beyond commodity transactions, to the expression
of religious norms and cultural values. [Udovitch 1987, 163] The bazaar was,
therefore, basicaUy a religious and commercial entity.
The urge to be active and influential in civic, religious, and politicai affairs of the
community as well as commerce was a hallmark of the typical merchant, a rational and
calculating character but also religious. According to Ashraf:
The social hierarchy of the bazaar had the big merchants (Tujjar) at the top
of the pyramid, the headmen and the masters of artisans and shopkeepers
of well over 100 guild-like associations at the middle levei, and the
masses of apprentices and footboys at the bottom, with some marginal
elements such as poor peddlers, dervishes, and beggars at the lowest
levei. [1988, 55-24]
These economic and status distinctions had broader civic and politicai significance.
During the election of the first Majlis in 1906, merchants and guild masters, with the
ulama , were granted the franchise, but most bazaaris were denied it.The bazaaris
politicai leadership was indebted to the merchants and guild leaders occupying

seniority in the bazaar status hierarchy. In an early session of the first Majlis, a lea
constitutionalist addressing a merchant during a bitter debate among the bazaari
deputies said:
This assembly is called the Majlis, where ali members are equal, not the
bazaar where you, as a merchant, are allowed to humiliate and c o m m a n d a
petty trader. [Majlis-e Shora-ye-Melli 1946, 12]
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The point was m a d e firmly that the powerful bazaari used to getting his o w n w a y in
the bazaar could not transfer this power to the National Assembly. B y the early 20th
Century, the bazaar provided the state with revenue from taxes, custom dues, road
tolls, credit charges and forced labour for sénior civil and military authorities.
Reciprocally, the Government protected the bazaaris in their workplace and shielded
them in s o m e degree from the law. While the state supervised the routine
administration of the bazaar, such as fair pricing and accuracy of weights and
measures, the overaU interests of the bazaaris were dealt with collectively through the
leadership of the merchants and the guild masters. The leading bazaaris were also
closely involved with civic administration by serving as town mayors, exercising a
dual role as trustees of bazaar and municipal property, but also serving as appointees
ofthe state. [Floor 1975, 65]
The mosque was the other major channel of traditional communication during the great
Iranian social mobilisations. The next part considers the mosque

as a politicai

communication channel with emphasis on the alliance of the bazaar, mosque and
ulama.
4.4 The Mosque (Masjid) as Politicai Communication

The mosque is where aU important national and religious questions of Islam have been
discussed. This status was embedded in the mosque at the time of its creation, and it
has remained ever since. A s w e have already seen the mixture of worship and politicai
activity characteristic of the contemporary mosque is not at odds with the historical
context. This has been reflected historically in a widespread resort to the mosque as
the traditional and informal communication system in Iran. Denied the outlets of free
press, free speech, politicai parties, labour unions, and student organisations,
opponents of the Qajar regime moved inexorably towards the only accessible fórum:
the 100,000 or so mosques and holy shrines supervised by some 200,000 clergy.
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The mosque and Islamic sermon have been important, sometimes decisive, channels
of politicai and social communication in Iran. In contemporary history, theological
disagreements have been used to foster revolution or to force unpopular governments
out of power. A combination of religious sermons and mass media also has been used
to propagate modem ideas and social change in the context of Islamic and Shi'i
philosophy and theology. The mosque is a place of general public assembly and the
minbar has historically been used in Iran-as in many other parts of the Middle Eastfor poUtical sermons which have prompted politicai action.
The clergy possess a language accessible to the masses, a rhetoric refined and
polished through immediate and continuai public contact. They are figures of

traditional social authority, possess rare knowledge, interpret traditions for the peop
and wear distinctive garb. They are virtually professional communicators linked
closely to the traditions of the mosque, the fundamental workplace. Borthwick has
described the origins of the mosque traditions:
The mosque came into existence as a place where members of the Muslim
community could congregate. It is said that the Prophet M u h a m m a d
needed a place where he could gather his followers together for instruction
and discussion and, therefore built the first mosque next to his house in
Medina in A.D. 622. A s the Muslim community grew larger, it became
necessary to designate a time when ali the members could get together in
the mosque regularly, and the Friday prayer of the assembly came into
being as a "day of congregation "Every mature Muslim male is required to
attend the prayer of the assembly in the mosque, bringing together the
members of different social strata in the Muslim community. Associated
with the prayer of the assembly in the mosque on Friday is Khutba or an
oration. This oration is delivered from the minbar which is an elevated
seat. It is said that the Prophet M u h a m m a d frequently used an elevated
place to address the Muslims. The mosque in the time of prophet
M u h a m m a d and his early successors was not only the spiritual centre of
the Muslims, but also their politicai, educational and social centre. [1965,
11]
If the community was forced to take up arms in self-defense, the planning and
preparation was done in the mosque. If there was an important announcement to be
made, the community was called to the mosque to hear it. Diplomatic delegations from
other tribes were received in the mosque and were lodged in tents erected in the
courtyard. In the mosque, the prophet was defended against the abuse of his enemies,
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and judicial disputes were settled. T h e mosque

w a s used in this informal and

comprehensive manner under prophet M u h a m m a d . A s a result, the mosque in Islam is
not just a shrine or exclusively a holy house of worship. It is rather a communal centre
that serves religious and politicai functions.
4.5 The Bazaar—Mosque and Ulama Alliance During the Constitutional
Revolution

An examination of the historical roots of the bazaar-mosque alliance will help us to
understand their functions in Iranian society. Analyses of protest movements in
contemporary Iran have emphasised the central role played either by the ulama or the
bazaaris. T h e Tobacco Rebellion of 1890-91 was the first successful protest
movement originating in the bazaarí-ulama alliance. The tobacco concession granted to
a British subject effectively turned Iranian tobacco dealers into salesmen working on
commission for an English firm, seriously undermining the economic status of
thousands of tobacco merchants. In the major cities protests andriotswere sparked in
the bazaars in opposition to the concessions given the British. (See Chapter 3)
The bazaaris prevented the agents from entering the tobacco fields, burnt the tobacco
stock, wrote petitions and sent delegations to the Shah, took bast in a shrine and
disseminated a Fatwa, issued apparently by Mirza Hasan Shirazi (the highest religious
authority), forbidding the public to smoke. Under the pressures that mounted from the
bazaari-ulama alliance, the Shah cancelled the tobacco concession. It was a remarkable
example of a successful politicai campaign essentially based on the resolute
combination of commercial, religious and social mobilisation. This successful action
gave merchants courage and served as a prelude to the constitutional movement of
1906. [Dowlatabadi 1947,105-111]

The alliance of the ulama and the bazaaris in Iran gained strength in several ways and
for a variety of reasons. The bazaaris were allied traditionally with the independent
Shi'i ulama (those w h o had no official appointments) in their mutually-held belief that
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the patrimonial domination, though often recognised as legitimate on a de facto basis,
had only quasi-legitimacy. This approach had politicai weaknesses which necessitated
the need of bazaaris and ulama to work together. The physical proximity and the
interdependence of the mosque and the bazaar in the structure of the Islamic town
reinforced them as a closely-knit community. The bazaafs enclosed physical space
increased their awareness of each other's public activities. According to Mottahedeh:
The religious sentiment and traditional orientation of the bazaaris were
reinforced by their ties with the ulama, by the physical setting of the
bazaar, and by its c o m m u n a l character. Paying one's religious taxes,
contributing to charitable funds, and maintaining a generally good
relationship with the ulama were ali signs of piety and, as such, helpful to
maintaining one's respect and honour in the bazaar community. [1985,
346]
The major social instruments for sustaining cohesion among bazaaris as well as
maintaining their networks for protest mobilisation were hey'ats (primary religious
groups), sermons of preachers, and the noon and the late-afternoon/early-evening
congregational prayers. Prominent merchants and guild leaders were expected to
gather in the major mosque of the bazaar, using this occasion to discuss matters of
mutual interest in business and, occasionally, politics.

The religious groups are multi-faceted and inter-penetrate many leveis of civic life
through informal face-to-face groups which serve as occupational, neighbourhood,
religious, inter-personal, friendship, co-operative, self-help, or politicai networks in
various sections of the bazaars and neighbourhoods of different communities. Many
of the functions formerly fulfilled by the guilds were assumed by the hey'ats, such as
helping the poor, organising co-operative relief efforts helping bankrupt merchants
and collecting funds for building schools, contributing to hospitais, and similar
charitable and community activities. [Thaiss 1971,202]

Through their incessant activity the hey'at seemed to be everywhere and to know
everyone, from whom they asked nothing but religious loyalty. Thus, through the
periodic meetings of the religious groups (weekly, bi-monthly or monthly),
communication networks were developed throughout the city.
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It is through these interpersonal networks and the participation of the same
individuais in several different gatherings during the w e e k that bazaar
information, ideas, and rumours are passed on. Participants in these
religious gatherings are not only merchants but also smaller businessmen
local religious leaders workers and porters and s o m e government
bureaucrats as well. [Thaiss 1971, 202]
Such established social networks and groupings could be activated when necessary by
the bazaari. They could readily mobilise processions of moumers, feed large groups,
and arrange congregational prayers. Beyond these essentially routine functions, they
could organise mass mobilisation, diverting mass action where and when it most
suited their interests. In pre-modern Iran, the bazaaris 'politicai orientation was
influenced mainly by their relationship with the ulama, on the one hand, and
goveming authorities on the other. The traditional alliance between the bazaaris and
the ulama was further bolstered through the 19th century by the strains and
antagonisms between their interests and the state. Rooted deeply in the history of the

conflicts between the Shi'i clerical establishment, the state and the bazaar, the confli
between the state and the bazaari-ulama alliance intensified notably from the mid1880's.
An early protest by the bazaaris against the state occurred in 1884, when the big
merchants of Tehran demanded the dismissal of the Minister of Commerce and the
establishment of an Assembly of Merchant Deputies. They issued a proclamation that
demanded the convening of an Assembly of Merchants' Deputies composed of ten
representatives selected from the merchants of Tehran and other major cities. The
essential tenet of the proclamation was that the merchants' collective interests could
only be protected by Umiting domestic oppression and externai colonialist exploitation.
They proposed protecting private property, preventing state functionaries from taking
advantage of merchants, empowering merchants to settle their own affairs in an
assembly of their peers, and liberation from the traditional judicial system, ali
measures designed to reduce oppression from within. Protecting local merchants from
their European competitors, both in and beyond Iran, developing modem industries to
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replace the decUning handicrafts, creating a national banking system that would reduce
British and Russian control of the money markets, and reducing the control exercised
by foreign powers and the entrepreneurs over customs houses were the measures
directed against the semi-colonial control over the country's economy. [Ashraf 1988,
542]

Although the efforts of these merchants to increase their politicai power were
unsuccessful, their grievances and their opposition to the regime continued until it was
given, in alliance with the ulama, a powerful and successful expression. This
pervasive aUiance was a instrumental force in ali of the subsequent great politicai and
social mobilisations of Iran from the early 1890's to the present:
In alUance with the ulama, the bazaaris served as the driving force or as a
significant component of ali the major politicai movements in m o d e m
Iranian history. Starting with the Tobacco Rebellion of 1891-92 and
continuing with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, the antirepublican movement of 1924, the Oil Nationalisation Movement of 195053, the urban uprising of 1963, and finally, the Islamic Revolution of
1979, this alliance held firm and was reinforced over time. [Ashraf 1988,
543-44].
With the beginnings of the accelerated growth of foreign trade and increasing contact
with the West in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the bazaars in the major cities
grew and prospered. The balance of economic power within them shifted gradually
from the traditional patrimonial agents to the emerging big merchants. In addition a
group of successful and relatively enlightened merchants emerged in the principal
urban centres and began to articulate new economic and politicai demands based on
the merchant's proclamation of 1884. [Ashraf and Hekmat 1980, 725-50; Gilbar
1977, 275-303]
Thus, the bazaar and the mosque, as inseparable twins, have served, for many
centuries, as the primary arena of public life in urban Iran. In combination, they
formed the context in which city dwellers organised their communal life and, often as
a direct consequence, their politicai alliances. According to Ashraf:
In the Islamic city the bazaar has long been: (1) a central marketplace and
production centre for handicrafts, located in old quarters of the town; (11)
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the primary arena (together with the mosque) of extra-familial sociability;
and (111) the embodiment of traditional urban lifestyles. [1988, 538]
Each element of the alliance, however, had been facing long-term structural decline.
For the bazaar functions of credit were being absorbed by modern banking,
production and distribution of goods were shifting to transnational companies, and
retailing in the narrow alleyways of the bazaar in Tehran was threatened by department
stores and modem merchandising. Even so, the bazaars showed remarkable resilience
and capacity for regeneration. For the clergies, their influence narrowed as much of
the traditional religious control over justice and education was replaced by separate
secular institutional structures.
These threats strengthened the closely-interconnected and mutually supportive nature
of the alliance. A further source of strength were the extensive family ties connecting
the two institutional frameworks. Historically, the two institutions acted together to
oppose autocratic Shahs, the bazaars shutting their doors in protest as the mosques
opened theirs. Culturally, they shared traditional religious outlooks and practices. The
bazaar provides much economic support for religious activities, such as the haji
(pilgrimage) to Mecca. Thus the mosque and bazaar were the two major traditional
social pillars of Iranian society and, together, projecting a formidable communication
network throughout Iran, particularly in the capital, Tehran.

4.6 Bazaar, Merchants and Ulama in the Constitutional Revolution
The Constitutional Revolution was primarily a revolution by the bazaar, merchant
class and the ulama. This is not to deny the active participation of other groups and
classes but to assert that the bazaari and ulama provided the core around which other
activities crystallised. In the second half of the 19th century the ulama's politicai
power had increased considerably, and the intellectuals, especially the reformist
bureaucrats, were insiders in the game of Iranian politics. The bazaar, however, had
been totally excluded from politicai power and the merchants partly-excluded. For the
first time in Iranian history, the Constitutional Revolution gave the bazaar and
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merchants the opportunity to place their representatives in a Majlis with substantial
politicai power, and whose authority over the Shah's government was guaranteed by a

constitution. The brief account of the Constitutional Revolution that follows is directed
primarily to the involvement of the UlamalBazaari alliance and its subsequent
dissolution.

In 1905, politicai agitations began over the Belgian administration of the customs and
the new tariffs. In late April, the merchants closed their shops and gathered at the
Shrine of Shah Abdol'azim outside Tehran; the cloth merchants were the most active.
The Habl al-Matin's (Firm Cord) correspondent reported the consequent paralysis in
the capital:
Today is the fifth consecutive day that aU the commercial and the shops of
cloth merchants, moneylenders and others are completely closed and a
state of prolonged stillness is felt in the bazaars. [ Vol. 19, issue 36,
1905; cited Afshari 1981, 188]
In an early example of interaction between press and traditional communication, this
correspondent interviewed the merchants' spokesman, Haj Mohammad Ismaile
Maghazeh, who described the familiar sequence leading to the taking of bast at the
shrine. They had been trying for three months to bring their grievances to the attention
of the government officials, a meeting was held during which the merchants proved
their charges against the Belgians by showing customs documents and the merchants1
account. No actions, however, were taken to rectify the injustices. The spokesman
linked specific grievances to the general ones, arguing that the new tariffs and the
Belgians' handling of the customs were detrimental to the development of Iranian
manufactures and commerce. According to Kermani [1965]:
At the same time, other serious acts of protest against the Belgians'
administration of the customs occurred in Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan,
Shiraz, K e r m a n and Yazd, ali of which greatly alarmed the ruling class
elements and indicated the profundity of social restlessness. The Shah,
w h o was departing for Europe and wanted a quick end to the agitations,
gave in, at least partially, to the basic demands of the striking merchants;
he ordered M . Naus to be placed under the authority of the Majlis-e
Tejjarat (Association of C o m m e r c e ) consisting of leading Tehrani
merchants and headed by the S'ad od-Dowleh, the liberal Minister of
Commerce. Like ali such promises, the order was only intended to end the
crisis temporarily and not to be seriously carried out. [294]
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O n e event at thistimeindicated the advancement of the movement to a relatively high
levei of militancy even before the advent of the Constitutional Revolution. It also
showed the boldness of the ulama in directly challenging the state authorities. The
Russian Bank was expanding its building in Tehran on an old burial ground which

provided a pretext for anti-Russian agitations. In the nearby mosque and at the climax

of an anti-imperiaUst sermon, an ulamac invited his aroused audience to go to the site

and utter a.fateha (prayer for the dead) for the last time. He then descended from the
pulpit and led the crowd, some of whom were already prepared to destroy the
building. By the time they returned to the mosque, there was nothing left on the site
for the Russian Bank. Unrest in Kerman and maltreatment of ulama by govemors in
Qazvin and Sabzevar provided further fuel for the ulamaZs agitations. Nazem al-lslam
described the popular mood in Tehran:
. . .The people were just waiting for an excuse or permission from the
ulama to close their shops; not only that, there was a m o n g c o m m o n
people a talk about Jahad (Holy War); although it was apparent that it had
no basis, the talk caused disturbances and people were contemplating
great upheavals. [1965, 45]
O n December 11, 1905, the govemor of Tehran submitted a number of sugar
merchants to the humiliating discipline of the bastinado. This action, which
graphically demonstrated the contemptuous attitudes of the tribal-feudal elements
towards merchants, kindled a series of continuous acts of protest which came to be
collectively known as the Constitutional Revolution. Among the merchants was an
elderly man, with a considerable reputation as a pious person, who had paid for the
construction of three mosques in the city:
The merchants were still at the governofs when the news quickly spread
throughout the bazaars, leaving behind a trail of shock and anger. At
sundown, upon the closure of their shops, the people of the bazaars
gathered in the mosque (Masjed-e Shah) for a demonstration. The next
day the Revolution was on in earnest. The closure of the bazaars and the
gathering in the mosque were done after consultation with the two leading
ulama in Tehran, Sayyed-Mohammad-Tabataba'i and Sayyed-AbdollahBehbahani (the "two Sayyeds"). The former was not motivated by
personal gains in opposing the government and was very close to the
people; the latter was believed to have been largely motivated by personal
considerations, working for the dismissal of the 'Ain od-Dowleh, the
Premier. [Malekzadeh 1946,22]
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There were two other leading ulama in Tehran. Thefirst,Shaikh-Fazlollah-Nuri, w h o
considered himself superior in knowledge to the two Sayyeds, stayed away from the
confrontation as long as the Ain od-Dowleh was the Premier. H e later supported the
Revolution following the establishment of the first Majlis. The second, the Imam
Jome'h, was a staunch royalist throughout. Sayyed Behbahani was not alone in his
endeavour to have the Ain od-Dowleh dismissed as Premier:
There was another influential caique headed by the A m i n os-Soltan, the
ex-premier, w h o hoped to regain the post he had occupied for a long time.
[Kermani 1965, 339]
At the same time, Mohammad Ali Mirza, the Crown Prince, and subsequently Shah,
wanted the Premier dismissed. [Browne 1910, 113] It was against this background of
intra-ruling-classrivalrythat the first major protest movement, merchants, started on
December 12, 1905. The following day the bazaaris and merchants did not open the
bazaars and again assembled at the mosque. At sundown, they sent after the ulama
w h o were dragged to the mosque. Tabataba'i and Behbahani assumed leadership and
formulated demands for the next day's demonstration: the dismissal of the govemor of
Tehran and the establishment of a Majlis to attend to the people's grievances. That
night, however, the gathering was dispersed by the followers of the Imam-Jome'h
w h o used a premeditated disturbance tactic. This was considered a victory for the
Ainod-Dowleh, since the Imam-Jome'h was acting in league with the Premier. At that
stage of the struggle, the use of such tactics could only intensify the opposition.
[Ashraf 1988, 545].
The following day the two Sayyeds, Tabataba'i and Behbahani, along with other
friendly ulama, left the city .and took sanctuary in the Shrine of Shah Abdofazim. The
Ain od-Dowleh moved quickly to prevent another day of general strike in the bazaars
by sending his m e n there with the order to plunder those shops which remained
closed. They ravaged some shops to intimidate other bazaari. According to Kermani
[1965, 361-62]:
The number of those w h o took bast swelled, in the next few days, to
about two thousand, and these mostly from the ranks of theology
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students. Their daily provisions, for the duration of the bast, were paid
for by money collected from the merchants. From the beginning, until the
time w h e n the Shah was forced to accept the newly formulated demands
of the bast any attempt by the Premier to have the ulama brought back to
Tehran was met by further disturbances and closures of the bazaars, both
in Shah Abdol'azim and Tehran. A spirit of rebellion prevailed over the
city, with the bazaars closed most of the time and people constantly going
back and forth in excitement between Tehran and the Shrine; one day the
Shah's carriage was mobbed by Tehrani w o m e n w h o demanded the retum
of the ulama after giving satisfaction to their demands.
The new demands went beyond the previous ones in asking, among other things, for
the acceptance of the 'House of Justice' and the dismissal of the Govemor of Tehran
In the Iranian tradition, this accorded with the concept of just mie which the bazaar
and merchants had cherished for centuries. They were most likely to benefit from such
an establishment, because it would give some security to the merchants' properties.
The Shah was forced to comply with the demands of the ulama who had, by then,
ended their month-long bast. On the day of their return to Tehran, the bazaars were
closed and people thronged the path of their arrival. The magnificent retum of the
ulama on the royal carriage and the exuberant welcome that people accorded them
were symbolically more significant than the Shah's formal acceptance of the 'House
of Justice' and the dismissal of the governor. The people made the day a grandiose
display of the Palace's isolation. Nazem ol-lslam noted that 'it was on this day that
the first time the cry "Long Live the Iranian Nation" was heard, which was offensive
to the members of the ruling class present to escort the ulama"1. [Kermani 1965,364]

The Shah's health was progressively deteriorating and the Amin od-Dowleh resorted

to procrastination in delaying the "House of Justice," while intimidating the oppositi
by selective punishment of the most outspoken. In Tehran, a secret association of
leading merchants was formed to conduct politicai agitation among the people.
[Malekzadeh 1946, 1: 237] At this time, social unrest exploded in two other cities,
Shiraz and Mashhad. The causes of the unrest in both cities were traditional and the
current protest movements showed characteristics similar to the old limited-objective
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protest movements. Nevertheless, both movements in December 1905 became part of
the Constitutional Revolution.
In Tehran, an attempt to arrest one outspoken ulama sparked an incident which ended
the five months interlude in the popular protest movement. The ulama had been
arrested on the street, but a group of theology students in the nearby

mosque

intervened and in the ensuring melee a young theology student was killed by the
soldiers. The people managed to rescue the body from the soldiers. The body was
taken to the Friday Mosque, and as the news spread through the city, ali the bazaars
and caravanserais were closed
The demand was still for the establishment of the 'House of Justice.' The Ain odDowleh decided to meet the popular challenge with a show of military strength.
Throughout the night the government's criers announced: "Anyone w h o does not
open his shop....tomorrow, his merchandise will be plundered and himself will be
punished". [Kermani 1965, 483] In the morning soldiers were posted on every main
crossroads, especially in the bazaars. Because there had been a number of clashes
between w o m e n and soldiers the day before, the soldiers were ordered to prevent
w o m e n from coming out of their homes.

Despite the threat to plunder, the bazaars remained closed and the number of people in
and around the mosque increased. The stand-off lasted for two days, until protesters
organised a procession on the bazaars and streets. The day before, a new regiment of
the Shaqaqi tribesmen had been posted around the mosque. The tribesmen stopped the
people as soon as they emerged from the mosque and dispersed them by gunfire,
causing an unknown number of dead. In a horrified retreat, the crowd could only
rescue two corpses.

The ulama made the next move, and in July 1906, in a highly effective and symbolic
act of protest, left Tehran for the announced destination of the holy cities of Iraq but
stopped at the Holy City of Q u m . It appeared as if the decisive military and police
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actions of the 'Ain od-Dowleh had w o n the upper hand in the continuous struggle,
and the ulama's exodus seemed a desperate move, with no other action possible
without a blood-bath. Kermani described the mood at the time:
Some bazaars are closed, some are open; people are confounded,
bewildered and do not k n o w what to do; theology students and merchants
are in a state of dread and fear; nobody dares to walk on the streets or the
bazaars. [1965, 500]
This was, however, a temporary relapse. The ulama's departure provided the
movement with a further emotional cause since in the people's mind the government
was responsible for the state of the city:
The reUgious status of the ulama protected them, to a considerable extent,
from governmental retaliation in its most brutal forms; they were also able
to extend, under certain circumstances, that protection to the bazaar and
merchants. Feeling very insecure by the threatening actions of the 'Ain
od-Dowleh and the ulama's absence from Tehran, the bazaar and
merchants resorted, on July 19, 1906, to a m o v e which brought the
movement to its climax. They took bast in the large garden of the British
Legation in Tehran and within a few days their number had increased to
15,000 almost ali of them Bazaaris and merchants. [1965, 18]
The sanctuary lasted for one month, during which the bazaaris and merchants were
organised and led by the merchanfs guild which had acquired a new life in the rising
protest movement of the bazaaris and merchants. Their organisation was impressive
even to the British, the guild allowing only the bazaaris and merchants to enter the
garden and join the bast; when low-rank governmental functionaries wanted to go in,
they were prevented from doing so. Each guild set up its row of tents, and common
kitchens prepared food for everyone.

For the duration of the bast, the bazaars remained closed and the politicai, as well as

social, life of the city revolved around the British Legation. It was an act of politi

protest which became at the same time, an occasion for social activities, almost a kin
of festival, where a culturally homogenous people lived, ate, drank and smoked
together, held politicai discussion groups and entertained each other. This festival
atmosphere was reinforced after it became clear that the Shah's government was
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unable to harm them. These kinds of protest acts have become a hallmark of Iranian
movements since the Constitutional Revolution.

The merchants paid for ali expenses incurred inside the garden, and twice provided
money to the guild masters for distribution among their apprentices, helping them
remain in the bast by alleviating their families' financial burdens. [Tafreshi-Hosseini
1973, 30] The merchants clearly provided the leadership for the duration of the bast.
The few wealthiest members of the n e w bourgeoisie, w h o had the most to lose, did
not identify themselves too closely or too quickly with the movement. O n the ninth
day of the bast, Haj-Hossien-Amin Oz-Zarb, a prominent merchant w h o was
subsequently a m e m b e r of the First Majlis, and a few supporters arrived at the
Legation. They were received suspiciously by the bazaaris and merchants but insisted,
on their good will, and swore on the Quran that they were united with the bazaaris and
merchants in their goals. [Kermani, 533]

The bast was a complete success, mobilising the people around the bazaaris and
merchants and giving the movement the needed m o m e n t u m to bring about the
triumphant return of the ulama from Q u m . Never before had the bazaaris and
merchants exhibited such a high degree of enthusiastic and optimistic involvement in
the politicai affairs of the country; other segments of the urban population giving them
lively support. It was reported that there was even a discussion a m o n g Tehrani
w o m e n to join in by setting up their o w n tents on the streets adjacent to the Legation's
garden. [Kermani, 536]

At the beginning, the bast formulated five demands which were still moderate and
conveyed them to the government through the British Charge d'Affaires. Four of the
demands were concerned with such immediate matters as the retum of the ulama and
the granting of general amnesty; the fifth repeated the previous demand for the
opening of the 'House of Justice' in which the ulama, merchants and members of
other guilds could participate in investigating ali disputes.
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A s the people's militancy in Tehran increased, news from provincial cities indicated
the spread of rebelliousness to other parts of the country. Some of the provincial
ulama left their cities to join the ulama at Qum. At the same time, there was
restlessness among the governments forces in Tehran which alarmed the Shah. Some

of the merchants resigned their posts and joined the people in the Legation. The court
panicked and the frightened Shah decided to give in to the people's demand by
dismissing the 'Ain od-Dowleh as Premier. The movement, however, had already
passed the stage in which such a dismissal, initially a goal, could have reversed the
growing revolution. Had it come before the bast, it might have delayed the final
showdown, but following demonstration of politicai strength and solidarity, new
demands were raised to correspond to the popular mood. Then, nothing short of a
Majlis and constitution would have satisfied the people.
On August 5,1906, the Muzaffaru'd-Din-Shah succumbed to the force of
the popular m o v e m e n t and issued a farman [proclamation] for the
foundation of an elective assembly. The prestige and authority of the Shah
and his government, however, had fallen so low that the people refused to
end their bast until they were satisfied by the correction m a d e in the
farman and received further assurances for its implementation. [Kermani
1965, 561]
On the day they ended the sanctuary , the bazaaris and merchants went, in a
ceremonial move, to open the bazaars, although it was Friday, the day of worship.
This was a day of historical victory for the bazaaris and merchants who were looking
forward to a significant voice in the Majlis . On September 9, 1906, the regulations

for parliamentary elections were issued, according to which the electorate was divided
into six states. They were (1) Princes and the Qajars (2) the ulama and theology
students (3) notables (Ayan) (4) merchants (5) landowners and peasant proprietors
and (6) the craftsmen.

The intellectuals and reformist bureaucrats were responsible for the writing of the
constitution and regulations for elections. The sacrifices of the bazaaris and small

merchants, had given them a chance a chance to put into effect ideas that they had bee
expounding for more than three decades. According to the election code, however, the
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peasants and tribesmen as well as labourers in the bazaars were excluded from
participating. The franchise was still based on possession of property.
A modification, however, to include the bazaaris who had been, totally denied any
direct involvement in Iranian politics was significant, as, to a lesser extent, was the
inclusion of the merchants. One hundred and five guilds were listed as 'recognised
guilds,' and they, together with merchants, elected 42 of the 60 representatives from
Tehran. The ratio between the two groups was also significant; the craftsmen 32 and
the merchants 10. [Kermani 1965, 1: 632] The percentages for ali people's deputies
elected throughout the country were: craftsmen 26 percent, merchants 15 percent and
the ulama 20 percent. Thus the people of the bazaars and their allies, the ulama,

elected about 60 percent of ali representatives in the first National Assembly. [Shaji'i
1965, 176]
Although the Revolution was victorious in Tehran no simultaneous movement
developed in other cities. After the Shah's acceptance of constitutional mie, however,
other cities began to react in sequence. Since the country was not homogenous, and
different regions had undergone unequal development, the responses of different cities
.and towns differed considerably. Their responses depended largely on the numbers of
the bazaaris and merchants and the strength of the feudal-tribal impediments.
When the former was strong, the results were similar to those in Tehran, usually the
case in the Northern cities, notably Tabriz and Rasht. When the impediments were
strong, the new constitutional issues fused with and were sometimes overwhelmed by
traditional feudal tribal infighting. This generally was the result in the southem
provinces and remote tribal áreas. According to Kermani:
The feudal-tribal courtiers hoped, that by preventing the spread of the
Revolution to other cities, they could eventually take back what they had
been forced to grant in Tehran. The m o v e m e n t in Tabriz, however,
forestalled the realisation of that desire. Tabriz, which was the second
largest city and one of the main commercial centres of the country, was
mled by M o h a m m a d Ali Mirza, the Crown Prince. H e was not about to
change the methods of rule he had inherited from his feudal-tribal
ancestors merely because constitutional mie had been granted in Tehran;
nor were other govemors ready to change themselves. [1965, 24]
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The people of Tabriz would have to fight their o w n battle for constitutional mie. A
number of people decided to do what the Tehranis had done and took sanctuary (in the
British consulate in Tabriz. Consequently, the bazaars were closed; the bazaaris or
merchants joined the bast and crowded the consulate, and its surrounding área and the
nearby mosque. When the leading ulama arrived at the mosque, the Crown Prince
confronted a major act of rebellion.

The leading merchants in Tabriz were more radical than their counterparts in Tehran.
The bast lasted for ten days and the bazaars remained shut down. The Shah sent a
telegram to the embattled Mohammad-Ali-Mirza confirming the Constitution and
ordering him to allow elections for the Majlis. Thus, in Tabriz the bazaaris and
merchants provided the main thrust of the Revolution, After celebrating their victory

they began preparations for the elections. They were determined to have an active role
in the affairs of their own city, clashing with the governor's methods of mie. An
anjoman (Society) was formed consisting of 20 ulama, merchants and revolutionary

intellectuals, to which each guild introduced a representative who participated in the
anjoman. Like similar anjomans in other cities, this became, in effect, a government
within the government. It was around these anjomans that the next round of the
struggle was fought.

4.7 Conclusion

These examples of action through traditional channels had a dramatic impact in the

successful igniting of the Constitutional Revolution. Indeed, it is highly unlikely th
the revolution would have been sparked without these traditional channels.
Furthermore, these examples of the bazaar and ulama, acting either individually or in
conjunction, have been taken from the early period of the Constitutional Revolution
lasting only a few months. They could be multiplied many times with incidents taken
from the whole span of the Revolution.
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It has been shown here that the bazaar is an important centre of news, a place where
opinions are formed and from which rumours are spread over wide áreas with almost
telegraphic speed. T h e importance of the bazaar as an intermediary channel of
communication becomes even more pronounced w h e n one considers that it is linked
through religious ties to other informal communication channels such as mosques,
Islamic schools, and welfare and community organisations. It also provides financial
support for religious and politicai organisations. The bazaar itself had also maintained
extensive national linkages. At the time of the Constitutional Revolution, the
traditional propertied class of the bazaar continued to control half the national
handicraft production, two-thirds of the retail trade, and three-quarters of the
wholesale trade. It comprised half-a million merchants, shopkeepers, traders, and
workshop-owners and had extensive ties through the independent craft and trade
guilds with armies of peddlers, and small retailers. There is no denying, therefore, its
immense potency as a m é d i u m of traditional communication or, indeed, of politicai
communication.

The emergent merchant class was still connected by hundreds of economic, politicai
and cultural ties to its birth place, the bazaar. Because of their connection with the
palace, s o m e of the wealthiest merchants were suspected by the less-fortunate
bazaaris. Nevertheless, the merchant class remained embedded in the bazaars and
moved along with the revolutionary movement originating there. B y comparison with
traditional radicalism of the bazaar, the wealthy m e m b e r s of the merchant class
appeared cautious during the beginnings of the Revolution. After the initial victories,
they wholeheartedly committed themselves to the cause of the Constitutional
Revolution.

In the final analysis, the movement that evolved in the bazaars of the major cities was
deeply rooted in the history of social conflicts of the country and had ali the
characteristics of the traditional movements of the bazaaris and merchants. Involved in
the production of commodities and trade in the bazaars, the bazaaris and merchants
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provided the main thrust of the Revolution. They forced the tribal-feudal m U n g classes
to accept their participation in the politicai affairs of the country. In the struggle, they
relied heavily on centuries-old traditions of resistance in the urban centres, traditions
closely associated with the bazaar and its merchants for w h o m the Constitutional
Revolution, in the early phases at least, was a great historical victory.
However, the objective conditions prevailing in the country as a whole were still
working against the realisation of the historical dream of the craftsmen and merchants,
particularly against the politicai aspiration the emerging merchant class. A s far as the
bazaar and merchants were concerned, the defeat of the Revolution c a m e with the end
of the armed resistance in Tabriz in 1911-12. F r o m then on the deteriorating
conditions in the provinces and the large-scale tribal intervention (for and against the
Revolution) on the national scene overwhelmed and bewildered the Bazaar

and

merchants. The revolution they had set in motion had m n away from them. In contrast
to the First Constitutional Period, the Second Constitutional Period was characterised
by the absence of the bazaar and merchants in the politicai struggle.
The important fact to be noted about the bazaar and the traditional merchants was the
duaUty involved in their tradition of resistance. O n one hand, the radical aspects of that
tradition lent themselves effectively to the Constitutional Revolution and found
organisational expression in the popular anjomans. O n the other the Majlis and the
constitution did not provide the substance to fulfill the aspirations of the masses.

The Constitutional Revolution indicated how the patriotic and democratic movement of
the masses exhausts itself within the framework of a parliamentary system, which was
itself the product of the struggle of a different class in a different historical era. It was
the discrepancy between the dynamism of the mass movement and the timidity of the
adopted institutional forms that enabled, in part the conservative politicians to destroy
the former by pretending that they were safeguarding the latter. Stripped of the
dynamism that produced them, the Majlis and the constitutional form of government
were not only harmless to the mling classes, but were also a welcomed legitimatising
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asset in their hands. Not surprisingly, they retained them. The profound alienation of
the intellectuals is revealed by their beliefs that a constitution and a Majlis were the
panacea for ali politicai, social and economic evils; they would bring national selfdetermination and guarantee politicai liberty, mie of law and justice. Because the print
media, particularly newspapers, were controlled by the Shah during the Qajar
dynasty, the revolutionaries and people in general relied on traditional channels of
communication, primarily public meeting places at the mosque and bazaar to spread
their messages and organise their resistance.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RISE OF THE IRANIAN PRESS
5.1 Introduction

As with ali ancient civilisations, Iran has covered the full spectrum of Communications
media. Oral communication evolved from the rudimentary signals of primitive h u m a n
beings to the extremely sophisticated oral discourse of contemporary Iran. A s noted in
Chapter 4, oral communication, whether on a one-to-one basis in the bazaar or through
sermons and other minbar discourse were cmcial during the Constitutional Revolution
and retain over-riding importance today. Written communication was evident very early
in Iranian history with the survival of cuneiform bricks in the mins of Persepolis and
stele with written inscriptions at other imperial sites. The technique of making papyrus
and writing semi-permanent records on it facilitated the effective administration of the
far-flung empire. Although Imperial Pérsia lacked the elaborate road systems of the
R o m a n Empire, transport networks must have been at least adequate for the
transmission of imperial edicts and other administrative material from the centre of
empire to remote outposts.

The strength and reliance of oral tradition in the Islamic state, coupled with effective
written systems, appear to be the main reasons w h y the printing press was a relatively
late comer to Iran. Even more belated were the exploitation of the printing press as a
newspaper press and the regular appearance of viable newspapers. Although the
electronic media are outside the scope of this thesis, the emergence and exploitation of
radio and, particularly, television, have shown similar time lags. It is very difficult to
explain these lags by the major media of news mass communication without taking
account of the traditional systems with their heavy reliance on oral communication.
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5.2 T h e Missionary Press

The printing press arrived in Iran in the early 17th Century, roughly comparable to the
export of the first presses to Britain's American colonies. Religious emissaries from a
variety of sects and nations were largely responsible for its initial usage. Although
proselytising by missionaries from foreign countries was strictly discouraged a m o n g
the overwhelming Muslim population, religious activity among minority ethnic groups
such as the Armenians was generally tolerated. Printing facilities were brought in by
these sects to support their missions.
The first recorded book printed in Iran in the Armenian language, was published by the
Armenian Archbishop of Julfa in 1640. A second press imported from Europe in 1670
was also established in Julfa. [Kaveh Magazine 1921, Cited M o w l a n a 1963, 167-70]
Several other printing presses were introduced over the ensuing 100 years or so of
Safavi mie, although there are no firm details. Statements by Christian missionaries
provide indications that religious orders were publishing materiais in both Persian and
Arabic, using their o w n presses. Ali semblance of this early expatriate religious press
had largely disappeared by the mid-18th Century in the years of dismption and chãos
following the death of Nadar Shah. (See Chapter 3)

5.3 The Iranian Press in índia

The print media tradition emerged much earlier in the Indian sub-continent than it did in
Iran. Consequently, the first Iranian language newspaper appeared in índia. The Indian
press w a s an artefact of British colonisation with thefirstpress despatched to B o m b a y
by the East índia company in 1674. B y the end of the 18th Century, a burgeoning
newspaper industry had emerged under the British Raj in índia. This capability
included, in North Indian cities, the skills necessary to reproduce 'oriental' scripts,
including Iranian. Thus, the tradition of press communication was m u c h more strongly
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developed in índia than Iran, although the printing press reached índia at m u c h the same
time as the Armenian missionaries published the first books in Iran.
Furthermore, the Persian language had been part of the inheritance brought into índia
by the Moghul Emperors. In the Moghul courts of the early 18th Century, English was
the formal language but Persian was widely used for conversing and disseminating
information. A further stimulus to the production of Iran-language newspapers in índia
was the liberal and Westernised character of índia by comparison with the feudal
despotism of Iran. There was also a degree of freedom of expression and opinion under
the British, conducive to a wide range of publication. For these reasons, Iranian
newspapers were a m o n g the earliest of India's vernacular newspapers. [Mowlana
1963, 182-3]

There is no complete or accurate listing of the Iranian press in índia but it is belie
that some Iranian newspapers had appeared by the end of the 18th Century. The first
m a y have been the Akbar-Irani (Iranian N e w s ) a weekly newspaper pubUshed in Delhi
in 1798. Later newspapers included Meratul-Akhbar (Mirror of News), Meratul-Ahval
(Mirror of Conditions), Jame-Jahan-Nama

(Cosmorama), and Shams-al-Akhbar (Light

of News). (Mowlana's research indicated that Meratul Akhbar was the first Iranian
language Indian newspaper, and Jame-Jahan-Nama

the first weekly) If Akhbar Irani

was indeed the first printed Iranian-language newspaper, and that it circulated in Iran,
then it could be argued that the country's print news tradition goes back about 200
years.
To look briefly at one example of this early Iranian press in índia, the Jame-JahanNama

was a weekly which was first published at Calcutta in 1822. Its publisher was a

Hindu w h o successfully sought a similar concession to that granted to missionary
publishers. The printer was English. Considered the best quality and most popular
Iranian language newspaper in índia, it was published for at least 54 years:
The object of its conductors was declared to be the dissemination of news
from English newspapers and ali the cities of índia. . .This paper
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published letters from correspondents and strongly criticised the system of
government in O u d h and other states allied to the British Government, a
fact which perturbed the British authorities.. .[Mowlana, 187]
An English official, Mr A. Sterling, described it as the best 'native newspaper' that had
yet appeared, its merit consisting largely of judicious selections from the British
newspapers. Its translations, however, from the news sheets of the Hindustani courts
were invariably inaccurate. O n the whole, the editor displayed great propriety and
discretion in observing the spirit of the relevant press regulations. [Cited Mowlana,
191-92] Other critics praised the simple style ofthe Jame-Jahan Nama, comparing it
favourably to the omate style prevalent in other Indian newspapers.

Remarkably enough, this Iranian-language press had a significant impact on the
development of the Indian press. Although partly subsidised by the government, they
were essentially privately owned, reformist in outlook but more informational and
religious than politicai. Local content was directed largely to shipping movements,
appointments, police reports and religious articles, rarely touching upon either local or
international politics. Although it might seem that these newspapers presented excellent
models for emulation within Iran, they were distributed only to a few court officials in
Tehran. They were local papers designed for local consumption within a vast subcontinent; clearly a newspaper published in Calcutta had minuscule relevance to Tehran,
even though the language was Iranian. Although essentially a diversionary alley off the
mainstream of Iranian press development in the 19th Century, the tradition of the
Iranian language press in índia proved extremely valuable in the development of an
exile Iranian press in índia in the late 19th Century. (See below)

5.4 The Press Under the Qajars

The initial steps towards the development of an Iranian press were taken in the early
years of the Qajars by Fath A U Shah's dynamic C r o w n Prince, Abbas Mirza. A s part of
his substantial reforming of the Iranian army, he sent Iranian students to Europe to
study military science. A s part of this exercise, Abbas Mirza facilitated the import in
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1891 into Iran from Rússia of a set of printing presses, using both moveable type and
the lithographic processes. These presses were used to establish the first regular
printing industry in Tabriz. Because Tabriz was the first Iranian city to utilise the
printing press, the city gave its n a m e to the n e w technology. The later Iranian n a m e for
the printing press was Chap Khana, incorporating part of the Turkish n a m e for Tabriz
(Basma

Khana)

with an old word for paper m o n e y (Chaw)

used by the Mongol

invaders in the late 13th Century. Browne also suggests that chaw m a y have been an
adaptation of the Iranian chap, used to describe both moveable type and the lithograph
process. [1914, 7]
By 1824, Tabriz had several presses in operation. The first book published in the city
was a lithograph edition of the holy Qu'run. Other early books were interesting
ventures into contemporary history, a chronicle of the recent war between Rússia and
Iran; and an account of Fath Ali Shahs reign dedicated to Abbas Mirza, the dynamic
chief minister of the early part of his reign. In the absence of a newspaper press, these
books could be said to represent Iran's first attempts at descriptive journalism. Given
the stature of Iranian poetry it is not surprising that a work by the famous Iranian poet
Sa'di was among the early publications, as was a treatise on smallpox inoculation.

In 1824, the first printing press was established in the Qajar capital of Tehran. The f
are uncertain, but it is believed that Mirza Zeinul Abedin, founder of the first printing
press in Tabriz, was asked by Fath Ali Shah to transfer his printing press to the capital.
The press was supervised by a government official and the first works published were
the Qu'run and a book of poetry. A second press, a lithographic press, was transferred
from Tabriz in Tehran in 1824 in circumstances related in 1835 by a European
missionary, Justin Perkins, w h o lived in Iran for some years:
I learn that the [Iranians] are not entire strangers to the art of printing. A
press which operated at Tabriz for several years . . .was sometime ago
transferred to Tehran. A lithographic press is n o w in use, in this city, and
books are bound here very well. The owner of this press w a s once
ambassador to England and speaks our language. [Perkins diary, cited
Mowlana, 175]
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The printing press then spread rapidly to the other principal cities throughout Iran.
According to Browne , the Christian missionaries were active during these years in the
north-west of the country, working particularly among the relevant sections and using
printing presses for their work. American missionaries in particular used an 'imported
printing1 press for the publication of English, Syriac and Persian works. [1914, 8]
The extensive use of the lithograph press in Iran through much of the 19th Century
provides an interesting contrast with the westem press which preferred moveable type.
This is partly due to the development of westem newspapers with their requirement for
quick, daily publication for which moveable type was much more suitable. Indeed, it
might be argued that lithography was impractical for news publication. It was much

more suitable, however, for printing attractive art works and this suited the Iranian tast
for fine calligraphy and art work, particularly in the publishing of the holy books and
poetry.

5.4.1 News Traditions and Iran
By the 1830's, the basic requirement for the emergence of newspapers had been
established: a widespread and commercially viable printing industry. The universal
pattern for the extension of printing from book and pamphlet production to newspapers
was set by Gutenberg in the mid-15th Century. Essentially, the first books published
with the newly-devised printing press were works of religion, most notably
Gutenberg's edition of the Christian bible. Publication moved at an early stage into the
production of works of literature and history designed for a restricted, elite audience.
The demands of practical administration and conduct of trade generated the publication
of official government documentation and commercial development. A desire for more
popular material spawned the publication of ballads, broadsides and other crudely
illustrated publications. With the gradual extension of education stimulated by printing,
there developed a thirst for news which eventually culminated in the publication of
newspapers.
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In westem countries, this process of evolution often extended over lengthy periods. For
example, in England the first printing press was introduced by William Caxton w h o
published the first books, including scriptures, poetry and chronicles in the late 15th
Century. It was not until the early 18th Century, however, that a mature newspaper
press emerged.

Iran followed this broad pattem of development with the early ventures of Christian
missionaries in the 17th Century opening the w a y for entrepreneurial printing
enterprises encouraged by government in the early 19th Century. With reduction of
printing costs and increasing accessibility to printed materiais with the spread of popular
education, it became m u c h less risky for printers to diversify their enterprises into
popular literary forms such as the newspaper. A s noted earlier, the emergence of an
Iranian press in índia contemporaneously with the growth of Iranian printing houses
also provided a model which could be emulated in Iran. There is little evidence,
however, that this model was actually used.
Despite the absence of newspapers, the craving for news was not lacking among the
Iranian people. Apart from traditional oral forms of news, other expedients were used
to disseminate news. Closer contacts with Europe meant increasing visits there from
Iranian students, merchants and officials w h o wrote letters back to Iran containing
international news. Merchants and traders in Iran Europe were in frequent contact and
their letters invariably contained commercial and some social and politicai news. With
the growth of Iranian-language newspapers in índia, occasional packets of these
journals circulated in Iran although they were designed primarily for Indian
consumption. B y the mid-1830's, the basis had been laid for an initial venture into
indigenous publication.

5.4.2 The First Newspaper—Akhbar Vaghayeh

The first newspaper published in Iran was long believed to be the Ruznameh-VaqayehIttefaqiyeh, a weeklyfirstpublished in Tehran in 1851, the third year of Nasseru'd-Din
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Shah's reign. Indeed, Browne's account, based on earlier research by Iranian scholars,
described it as 'the first Persian lithographed newspaper published in Tehran'. [1914,
10] Another account by a British scholar, L.P. Elwell-Sutton describes Iran's first
newspaper as a 'bulletin of court activities' which appeared in 1851. [Cited Mowlana
1963, 196] Research by Mowlana almost 50 years later, however, revealed that this
newspaper was actually the third to appear in Iran, the first being Akhbar

Vaghayeh

(News of Occurrence), a monthly which was first published in late January 1837,
during the reign of M o h a m m a d Shah, Nasseru'd-Din's predecessor. Mirza Saleh
Shirazi, its Iranian editor and pubUsher, had been a pioneer of printing in Iran.

Shirazi studied printing in London in the 1820's, then established one of the first
regular printing presses in Iran. Later he served at the court of Fath-AU-Shah in Tehran
and became an Iranian ambassador in London. While in England, Shirazi spent many
hours at the Royal Asiatic Society further dissecting, and learning from, the British
press. It seems likely that Shirazi tried to convince Fath-Ali Shah to publish a
newspaper for the court but had no success before the Shah's death in 1834. H e did
persuade M o h a m m a d Shah to start the Akhbar Vaghayeh. [Mowlana, 198] The English
meaning, News

of Occurrences, bears an uncanny resemblance to early English

newspapers, also called 'occurrences', and to America's first newspaper, the shortUved Public Occurrences in the late 17th Century.
Considerably more is known about Akhbar Vaghayeh than of most other Iranian
newspapers of the 19th Century because Shirazi lodged several copies of his paper with
the Royal Asiatic Society in London which published the complete text of one issue in
its journal for 1839. [Cited Mowlana, 199] This only surviving copy precisely
deUneated the format and content of the newspaper:
[It] was lithographed on two large fólios, printed on one side only: It was
closely written in a plain hand, and was surmounted by the Persian
emblem of the Lion and Sun. The newspaper was equally divided into
domestic and foreign news. . .While one full page is devoted to four
domestic items, another page contains eight stories from. . .Italy, the
United States, England and Turkey. Three out of four domestic news
[items] are events of the Court of M o h a m m a d Shah and have been written
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in his praise. The fourth story covers the birthday ceremony of the King
of England at the British Embassy in Teheran. Foreign items are drawn
largely from the letters received from Europe and the United States.
Politicai and controversial issues have been avoided; even foreign news
includes items such as commerce, fires and navigation. [Mowlana 199200]
The items of the court are a combination of serviceable narrative and servility, not
dissimilar from stories in other authoritarian press systems, such as the early years

the Sydney Gazette in Austrália from 1803, under the direct surveillance of the Britis
colonial govemors. The newsletters from overseas in Akhbar Vaghayeh have a strong

naval content: a new steam vessel developed in America capable of crossing the Atlanti
in 12 days; the arrival of a British ship-of-war in Bombay. Other items include a fire
Naples; the 25th anniversary of the translation of the new-testament into Persian; the
arrival of the Turkish ambassador, a former superintendem of the Turkish government
gazette; and a confrontation between Sultan Mahmud and a 'petulant, naked, mattedhaired, foul-tongued, impudent, impious dervish who was in both mind and body a
demon.' Subsequently the hairy-head of the mad dervish was 'separated from his
body.1 [Translation cited Mowlana, 200-07]

The newspaper or, more accurately, the gazette, ceased publication in 1840. It has been
argued convincingly by Mowlana that the weaknesses of the Shah and the disorganised

condition of the regime was largely responsible for the newspaper's failure. Figure 5.
shows the headline of Issue No. 10 of Vaghayeh-Ittefaqiyeh, the first regularly
pubUshed newspaper in Iran .
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5.4.3 A m i r Kabir and Vaghayeh

Ittefaqiyeh

The next two newspapers emerged under the mie of Mohammad Shah's successor,
Nasseru'd-Din, who became Shah in 1848. During the vigorous modernising and
reformist administration of Amir Kabir, (See Chapter 3), the foundation of the first
University College, Daral-Fonon, together with the establishment of mail services and
improved roads, created a favourable climate for newspaper publication. The college
press printed hundreds of books and stimulated a literary movement stamped with
Iranian nationalism. In 1851, two new newspapers appeared. An American missionary
journal Zararit Bahra (Ray of Light), published in the Syriac language and of limited
circulation, survived for over 63 years, through the reigns of four Qajar kings and the
Constitutional Revolution ending only during World War 1. This was designed for a
sect of Syrian Nestorian Christians living in Azerbaijan. It was dedicated solely to
religious material, not touching on social or politicai controversy and its circulation
limited to a small Protestam sect in one province of Iran. In the circumstances, its
longevity was remarkable.
According to Browne, the first newspaper circulated in Tehran was entitled Ruznameh
Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh and was a weekly comprising four but sometimes eight pages. It
was the first Iranian lithographed newspaper. [Browne 1914, 10-11] As noted above,
however, Mowlana has shown that what Browne considered Iran's first regularlypublished newspaper was actually the third. He designates it as Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh
very similar to Browne's title as Ruznameh means newspaper. A duplicate copy located
by Mowlana measured seven and one half inches by 13 inches, smaller than foolscap
and significantly different in format from standard western newspapers. The paper was
estabUshed under the direction of Amir-Kabir who considered the country was in need
of a newspaper to complement its university and other aspects of modernisation: A
royal order in the first issue described its editorial policy:
. . .Since the ambition of His Majesty. . .is the education of Iranian
people, and to inform the citizens of this country of both internai and
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foreign affairs therefore, it has been ordered that a paper, which in other
countries is k n o w n as a Gazette be put out, and every w e e k the
appointments of the Court and other news be published. . .[Cited
Mowlana, 99]
This proclamation was amplified by an editorial in the same edition:
It has been resolved that every week a gazette will be published to inform
the people of the decisions and the decrees of his Royal Majesty and his
government, and also to bring news of national and international affairs.
This gazette will not only be instrumental in bringing awareness and
information to the subjects of this government, it will also put an end to
the existing misleading or inadequate m m o u r s or information in regard to
government decrees. [Igbal-Ashtiyani 1962, 148]
Thus, the paper had much in common with the historical gazettes of the authoritarian
press systems. Similar official publications had launched the press of Britain, the

United States, Austrália and many other countries. Interestingly, it seems to have been
partly devised to counter disinformation flowing from mmours and other excesses of
the oral tradition.

As with westem papers, the masthead of the paper included an emblematic device, the
Lion and Sun of Iran. The paper occasionally appeared in six or eight pages but most
issues were four pages. The first page comprised local and court news, with foreign

and other domestic news on the inner pages. As with ali gazettes of limited circulation
subscriptions were high. It seems that subscriptions were maintained by compelling
government officials up to a certain rank to take the paper which was also distributed
the provinces and local authorities. Some copies were also sold to the public in the
bazaar. Apart from the founder, Amir-Kabir, the paper had an editor and publisher, a
translator and business manager a repórter and staff writer, and a printer.
The business manager, an Englishman called Edward Berjis, was an interesting figure

who had worked as a printer in Tabriz, then became an official translator for the Shah,
Nasseru'd-Din. He wrote foreign news and translated news from European papers,
collected subscriptions and handled the accounts. The repórter, Mirza Abdulah, was
responsible for coverage of the court and local news. He and Berjis were awarded court
honours for their outstanding contributions to the paper. [Mowlana, 223]
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Although direct subscriptions and sales of the paper were limited, the conventional
phenomenon of heavy usage of each individual copy was also evident in Iran:
The paper was read and handed around among subscribers' friends in
Tehran and the provinces so that there was not m u c h opportunity for
circulation promotion, especially since [the newspaper] w a s still a luxury
in Iranian society. Widespread illiteracy placed a further ceiling on
circulation increase. B a d roads and slow postal services limited
subscriptions almost entirely to government officials. Furthermore, the
paper was only a governmental sheet and its nature and contents were
such that it could not raise any anxiety in the pubUc. [Mowlana, 223]
According to one analysis, apart from the official decrees, the material that appeared in
the first year of the publication primarily extolled the developments of Europe and
America. They included articles on the consultative assemblies of European countries,

the struggles of the Italian leader Mazzini, and other revolutionaries and libertarians in
their struggle against Áustria, plans for the Suez Canal, European railroad construction,
investigations in human evolution, and the history of American civilisation. [Arianpur
1971, 75]
In issue four of the Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh appeared Iran's first newspaper
advertisement, for real estate. The house for sale belonged to a Christian and interested
buyers were asked to apply to Monsieur Rafaeil or 'whosoever may happen to be in that
house.' [Cited Mowlana, 224] This appears to have been an informal venture as
advertising was not officially accepted until issue 22. Its commercial value, however,

was quickly appreciated as costs per line were equivalent to the sale price of the entire
newspaper. This constrained the volume of advertising which was mostly confined to
houses for sale, changes of address and lists of new books published.

With the death of Amir-Kabir in 1851, much of the impetus towards a varied and
vigorous press flickered away. Publication of Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh continued under the
direction of the Ministry of Sciences but by the late 1850's it had become increasingly

irregular. In 1860, it became Iran's first illustrated paper under the editorship of Sanie
Mulk, the most distinguished Iranian artist of his time. The paper was re-named with
the resonant title of Ruznameh-Dowlateh-Aliyeh-Iran (Newspaper of the Sublime State
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of Iran). It remained m u c h the same in its editorial content, but was given a more
attractive content through thefineportraits of Saniel-Mulk. But, says, M o w l a n a , it was
still the loud-speaker of the court, the state and those in authority. [1963 225]
According to Browne, Saniel-Mulk was not really a newspaper editor but was chiefly
engaged in making designs of the national e m b l e m and drawing pictures of state
notables. [1914, 10]

5.5 Nasseru'd-Din Shah and the Press

Feeble as was the nascent press in Iran during the late 1860's, it did not escape the
close scmtiny of an inherently despotic Shah. Nasseru'd-Din, however, did not resort
to the standard controls of the press in authoritarian western systems, usually the
imposition of licensing or the so-called 'taxes on knowledge' such as stamp duties.
Licensing was unnecessary because the press was already a state monopoly. Because of
the small circulation there was little revenue-raising potential in taxes on the press nor
was there any real need for official censorship w h e n strict controls on publication
prompted stringent standards of censorship. With only one regular newspaper
circulating in Iran in 1860, the burdens of formal censorship were hardly onerous. Nor
was there in any sense a competitive market system, with the single newspaper forced
upon government employees, public servants and land owners. There was, however, a
requirement for censorship with the rapid spread of printing houses and the
proliferation of book publication. With increasing literacy and interest in the outside
world, a 'black market' in books and other printed material began to emerge.
Accordingly the Government established a strict censorship of ali literary production,
including newspapers..
The first censor was, effectively, Saniel-Mulk, former editor of the RuznamehDowlateh-Aliyeh-Iran and superintendem of the state printing press. In 1863, a royal
decree appointed him to guide and control the production of ali printing houses within
the Empire:
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. . .Publication of the books and pamphlets which are harmful and
disastrous for the State and cause aversion and repulsion of the tastes will
not be allowed. [Cited Mowlana, 231]
With the government firmly in control of the press, the Shah also decided to increase
the number of newspapers in Tehran to four by introducing three new papers to be
published at the Darul-Fonon University College. The newspapers were monthlies,

directed to avoid politicai material and deal only in scientific, literary and histori
discussion. The first of these journals, Ruznameh Elmiyeh (The Scientific Journal)
appeared in January 1864, devoted to science and literature, and published at varying
times in three languages—Persian, Arabic and French. The Ruznameh Mellati (The
National Journal) appeared in July 1866, with a focus on historical biography. A
further monthly paper, Ruznameh Dowlati (The State Journal) was published a month
later as a monthly review of court, national and foreign news, supplementing in many
ways the weekly Ruznameh-Dowlateh-Aliyeh-Iran. [Mowlana 1963,253]
These new papers were the responsibility of the Ministry for Science and its minister
Etemadul-Saltaneh. Editors were constantly changed and, in any case, had little
authority, lacking approval to sign their names to articles. According to Browne,
several editors were chosen to write and compile the papers, depending on the whim of
the Minister. [1914,10]

By this time, the Iranian press had settled firmly into the mould of an authoritarian
press. Essentially, the press was a mechanism designed to buttress and enhance the
autocratic government of the Shah. The government dictated the cultural and politicai

aspects of the press. The problems of audience were resolved not by trying to attract a
mass readership, or even a popular readership, but by establishing a captive audience,
based on compulsory subscription of aU government officials and employees to aU three
newspapers. According to figures published in Ruznameh Mellati in 1867, the total
circulation of each newspaper was 1,115. Almost half the circulation was concentrated

in Tehran, Azerbaijan and the officers of the foreign service. If the circulation of th
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Ruznameh Dowlateh Uliyah Iran is added to this list of subscriptions to governmental

papers, it seems a reasonable assumption that total newspaper circulation in Iran fel
below 5,000.

5.5.1 Technology and Transport
Despite this rather dismal picture of an authoritarian, minimal-circulation press,
technological change was starting to bring development in Communications and

journalistic process through the 1860's. The telegraph system began to spread through
the provinces and by 1875, the government newspapers were picking up telegraphed
material. Following a pattem common in western newspapers as the new technology
spread, the Ruznameh Dowlati in 1876 was printing a full page of provincial news
drawn mainly from telegraphed items. Furthermore, crucial advantages of geography
plugged Iran into the international cable system, a matter of urgency to the British
communication with their Indian Empire. Iran was one of the first recipients of

telegraph systems in the Middle East, with an international Une running from the Iran
frontier near Bagdad via Tehran to the Persian Gulf. [Mowlana 1963,238]
A fascinating sidelight of the introduction of the telegraph was the extension of the

traditional Iranian privilege of bast or sanctuary to the telegraph office. In the pu

mind, the wires ended at the foot of the throne in the royal palace. Thus, the telegra
offices were accorded bast, providing some defence against oppression and also a

traditional way of asserting press freedom. This protection was used extensively in t
Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, with people congregating in telegraph offices
throughout Iran and refusing to leave until their demands had been met. This was an

innovatory adaptation of a traditional privilege with mass Communications technology.

Despite the arrival of the telegraph, Iran remained hampered by poor communication
infrastructure, particularly roads which had been allowed to decay under the Qajars.
According to Mowlana, in the late 19th Century, Iran was unprovided with even
tolerably good mule tracks in major áreas of the country. [1963, 235] Even so, the
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telegraph did m u c h to imbue Iran with the flavours of mass communication and
intemationalisation. It stimulated notions of progress and reform while providing a
means by which they might be advanced. Like the press, however, the telegraph system
remained very m u c h a government monopoly controlled by the Shah.
Evidence of this is provided by Nasseru'd-Din Shah's use of both the press and the
telegraph to influence public opinion and, to use contemporary terminology, project a
useful image of himself among the populace. O n a state visit to a remote province
occupying several months, he appointed his chief physician, Hakimul Mamalek, to
produce a newspaper devoted exclusively to the royal visit. According to Browne, the
physician was a front for the Shah w h o wrote his o w n travei paper entitled Ruznameh
Hakimul-Mamalek after the royal physician. [1914, 91] Similar journals were produced
for later royal visits to the provinces, including one with the euphonious English
translation of The Mirror of Travei and Lamp ofSojourn.

5.5.2 A Press Ministry

As noted above, the Ministry of Sciences had been largely responsible for establishing
newspapers and oversighting their conduct, including censorship. B y the early 1870's.
the government had decided that this departmental administration had not been a
success. Lack of popular appeal had forced the closure of the only weekly, Ruznameh
Dowlateh Uliyeh Iran in 1870, leaving only three monthly papers with very poor
circulations. Faced with increasing penetration by imperialists, particularly Britain and
Rússia, the government needed a more effective mechanism for advancing its policies.

In 1871, a Ministry of the Press was founded under the direction of Mohammad
Hassan Khan-Etemadul-Saltaneh, w h o , emerged as the government's chief
propagandist over the next 25 years. Hard-working and scholarly, the author of a
biography of Christopher Columbus in the Iranian language, Etemadul-Saltaneh acted
decisively from the beginning, abolishing the three existing monthly papers and
replacing them with a tri-weekly called simply Iran. H e also established an Office of
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Censorship following the appearance of material criticai of the Shah, some of it printed
in índia and other neighbouring countries, explaining this decision in the following
terms:
The function of the office of censorship was to investigate the books and
pamphlets directed against the state. S o m e of the materiais imported from
foreign countries were libellous and seditious. W h e n the pamphlet of
Sheikh H a s h e m Shirazi, published in B o m b a y , was brought into Iran the
flames of anger of His Majesty went on. It was ordered that ali copies of
this book should be removed and destroyed. . .1 submitted to the Shah
that there was an office of censorship in European countries to prevent
such incidents and told of its usefulness. [Etemadul-Saltaneh 1890, 117]
Iran was also a lithographed paper, and the printing technology must have strained the
production resources on a tri-weekly basis. In format, it was ten by 16 inches, about
foolscap size, and larger than its weekly predecessors. Like them, it was essentially a
government gazette, published by authority of the court and including formal court
news such as decrees, appointments, dismissals, posts and titles. Its front page was
invariably devoted to the activities of the Shah and state functions. Figure 5.2 shows
the front page of an issue of Iran.
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Browne described the purpose and business of Iran as to 'praise the Royal performance
and the doings of the Courtiers, and to enlarge on the security of the country and the
progress of the Government.' [1914, 90] The fawning effusiveness of Iran m a d e it a
principal target of criticism by Iranian liberais.
Despite these limitations, Mowlana detected some changes in the pattem of news
writing from earlier publications. The style was less formal and more akin to popular
idioms. Contents were compartmentalised to accommodate specific ministries; finance,
science, justice and so on. Most importantly, h u m a n interest stories, such as disasters,
weather, fires and accidents, appeared for the first time in Iranian newspapers. A
disproportionate amount of space was given to telegraphic news, including foreign
cables. There were few advertisements, reflecting the lack of demand from a largely
non-urbanised population. The quality of paper used w a s rough, there were no
headlines, and the-front page title and an occasional woodcut were the only
illustrations. [1963, 247-8] This lack of embellishment was probably due to the
technical pressures of producing a lithographed newspaper three times a week.

With his scholarly background, Etemadul-Saltaneh sought to inject a greater literary
content into Iran, a factor that had been lacking in the earlier publications:
[He] offered a starved reading pubUc something n e w in literary fare. F r o m
its beginning, the Iran ran seriais on Iranian and European history. In thus
broadcasting the n e w literature, Etarnadul-Saltaneh and the Iran made their
contribution to the culture and to early journalism. Otherwise, the paper
was nothing but a propaganda sheet of the Shah and his Government with
its most conservative and autocratic nature. [Mowlana, 249]
Etemadul-Saltaneh was both Minister for the Press and editor of the Iran.

5.5.3 Provincial Papers

One of the iron rules of newspaper development is that provincial newspapers
inevitably follow the establishment of a metropolitan press, no matter h o w nidimentary.
With the elements of a newspaper press established in Iran by the early 1870's, it is not
surprising that publication of papers by provincial governors became increasingly
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common. The religious paper Zararit Bahar, published in Azerbaijan, has been noted
earlier. Another Azerbaijani newspaper, Tabriz, had been published briefly by a
govemor in 1858. It could not said, however, that such publication constituted a viable
provincial press. A s Table 5.1 shows, only 12 newspapers were published in Iran
between 1838 and 1872, most of them in Tehran and several with only short periods of
publication. Ali were govemment-owned except for the American missionary journal,
Zararit Bahar.
Table 5.1
T h e Early Newspapers Printed in Iran (1837-1872) 1

Name

Frequency

Founded

Location

N e w s of Occurrences
(Akhbar-Vaghayeh)

Monthly

1837

Tehran

The R a y o f Light
(Zararit Bahar)

Monthly

1851

Rezaiyeh

The Current Events
(Vaghayeh-Ittifaqiyeh)

Weekly

1851

Tehran

Tabriz

Monthly

1858

Tabriz

The Sublime State of Irar
(Dowlate-Uliyeh)

Weekly

1860

Tehran

The Scientific Newspaper
(Ruznameh-Elimiyeh)

Monthly

1864

Tehran

The National Journal
(Ruznameh-Mellati)

Monthly

1866

Tehran

The State Newspaper
(Ruznameh-Dowlati)

Monthly

1866

Tehran

The Newspaper
of Hakimul-Mamalek

Irregular

1869

Tehran

The Mirror of Travei
and L a m p of Soiourn

Monthly

1871

Tehran

Iran

Tri-Weekly

1871

Tehran

Fars

Weekly

1872

Shiraz

The trail-blazer in provincial publication was Fars, a lithographed weekly published in
Shiraz, the capital of the Fars province in the south-east of Iran. It was an eight-page
l

. These papers are in chronological order. The table is based on the work of Hamid Mowl
and Interpretation of Journalism in Iran. 1963, p. 252.
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paper, half in Iranian and half in Arabic, its initial publication coinciding with the
arrival of the Shah's son as govemor. The content emphasised education and cultural
subjects, and it was published in the 'Mirror R o o m ' of the government offices in
Shiraz. Its editor Kashani, produced another early provincial newspaper, the Farhang
(Culture or Education) at Isfahan in 1879. Browne described him as a 'profound and
accomplished scholar.' [1914, 12-13]

Apart from this brief flurry in the provinces, there was little to distinguish patterns
newspaper development in the remaining years of Nasseru'd-Din Shah's long reign.
During the 20 years between 1876 and 1896, when the Shah was assassinated, only six
newspapers appeared in Iran. Most collapsed after a only few issues. The Ministry of
the Press remained the nation's principal newspaper publisher. The Shah and his
ministers were deeply involved with foreign concessionaries, largely ignoring their
propaganda and publicity network. [Qasemi 1993, 17]
In fact, Iran was the only enduring newspaper in Tehran through this period. When the
Ministry of the Press published Elmi (Scientific) paper it survived for only sixty-four
editions. During 1878-79 there appeared two other papers called Ettela'a (Information)
and Nezami (Military), the latter soon disappearing and giving place to Merrikh (Mars).
Merrikh, did not attract readership and after 18 editions it, too, ceased publication.
Hence for several years Iran and Ettelda were the only papers published regularly
within Iranian borders. [Qasemi, 18]
5.5.4 The Shah and Freedom of the Press

The only lively interlude in a generally dreary era for the Iranian press was a brief
flirtation by Nasseru'd-Din Shah with a free press in Iran. During his extended visits to
Europe, the Shah was immensely diverted by newspapers, particularly their wit and
humour. A n interpreter had to read the relevant newspaper to him every m o m i n g . O n
hisfirsttrip he had bought a m o d e m press in Istanbul with a complete set of R o m a n
type, using it largely for the production of foreign books and pamphlets. M o w l a n a
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observes that the propagation of ideas through the press interested him and he was fond
of European papers: 'For a monarch who had a complete monopoly of the press in his
kingdom, the free press of Europe was a wonder.' [1963, 260] During a visit to
Belgium, he wrote glowingly about Belgian press practice:
.. .The kingdom of Belgium is very free, the ordering of ali matters being
in Parliament, where the Deputies meet together and give judgment.. .The
editors of the public papers in this country are extremely free. Whatever
they m a y write, they are in fear of no-one. [Cited Mowlana, 26]
By the mid 1870's, the Shah wanted his own well-edited and interesting paper which
would also be a tool for projecting a favourable persona for him on the international
stage. He decided that this could best be done by recruiting a European editor. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recruited Baron Louis de Norman, a Belgian-born French
citizen to edit a new paper to be called La Patri, a multi-lingual publication in both
French and Iranian. When de Norman arrived in Iran in 1876, he was informed by the
government to conduct his newspaper precisely as he would in France. The liberalism
and desire for 'Europeanisation' of the Shah were presented to him with enthusiasm:
The Frenchman, a republican, totally ignorant of the shah's ways, took
this for plain, and wrote his editorial in accordance with it. The first
number of La Patri was printed on the 5th of February, 1876, a historical
date without any tomorrow. [Mowlana, 261]
An infuriated Nasseru'd-Din Shah terminated publication of La Patri after one issue,
and expelled de Norman from Iran, placating him with three years' salary. In Browne's

under-stated account: '...the inkling of freedom perceptible in the first number prove
displeasing to [the Shah], and the paper was therefore suspended and its editor
dismissed.' [1914, 17] A brief extract from de Norman's 'inkling of freedom' must
suffice to explain the Shah's electrifying response to La Patri:
As to the internai affairs, we shall speak of them with the most absolute
independence. W e have no party, and do not want to have any, w e want
to service the country in showing its true needs. W e shall support
progress; every time that it manifests itself w e shall help it by our
encouragement, but w e shall never be vile flatterers. W e shall not b u m
incense to power; w e shall defend every just cause and blame every
reprehensible act.. .We shall devote ali our cares to merit popular favour,
in constituting ourselves everywhere, and on every occasion, the
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champion of therightsof the country and of the people. [Cited Mowlana,
263]
The fresh air of libertarian press theory had no place in the repressive atmosphere of
monopolistic, authoritarian press structure.
5.6 Conclusion
In the remaining years of Nasserud-Din's reign and, indeed, in the subsequent years
until the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, there were few developments of lasting
significance in the established patterns of authoritarian publication. S o m e interesting
ventures were attempted. After the debacle with La Patri, another French paper, Echo
de Perse was approved and lasted for three years without enraging the Shah. [Browne,
17] A m o n g the better papers was Tarbiyat (Education), published in 1896 in Tehran,
and including cultural, scientific, and social content. Its journalism was notable for a
new emphasis on interpretation rather than reportage, and its style, composition, and
quality of discourse were well regarded. Tarbiyat published regularly until the start of
the Constitutional Revolution.
Ruthless censorship was maintained with swift reprisal directed against any hint of
criticism. O n e of the few newspapers tempting fate was Ehtiyaj (Need), a weekly
politicai, economic and criticai paper appearing in 1898-9. It lasted only seven issues
after criticising the regime and its policy. Its director moved on to publish the aptly
named Eqbal (Chance) paper. [Sadre-Hashemi 1953,222]
A rare non-govemment paper was Adab (Manner), published in 1900-01 and notable
mainly for introducing several pages of photographic reproductions. O n e final
newspaper is worthy of mention in the context of an authoritarian press. This was the
appearance of the Khulasatu'l-Havades (Summary of News), Iran's first daily news
daily newspaper. Like most of the papers published within Iran since 1837, this was
published in 1898 under the imprimatur of the Minister for the Press. Figure 5.3 shows
the headline of Iran's oldest daily paper. (Issue No. 874 (Aug 7, 1902)
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Khulasatu'l-Havades was the brain-child of Abidul-Mameluk w h o succeeded EtemadulSaltaneh as Minister for the Press. The initial issue was published in 1898 on the
birthday of Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah's birthday, and a copy was presented to him as a
birthday present in a court ceremony. H e was also assured that the paper would keep
the citizens informed of the 'important happenings of Iran and the world.' [Mowlana
304] Mowlana has been particularly scathing about the aesthetic quatity of Khulasatu' lHavades , which he described as from first to last a 'sorry-looking, poverty-stricken
sheet', and also about its news content which he considered ridiculously inadequate. H e
did acknowledge, however, that it was the first Iranian paper to use foreign telegraphic
news and its foreign dispatches were 'rather up to date'. Ironically, m u c h of the foreign
news c a m e from Reuter's news agency, owned by the same Baron Julian de Reuter
w h o had been denied the concession of 1972. [See Chapter 3]

The epoch of govemment-financed and controlled newspapers effectively ended when
the Khulasatu' l-Havades, ceased publication in 1903 after 995 issues. Its publication
had been stopped, together with that of the longer-running Iran, and a n e w fortnightly
was created called Iran-e-Sultani (The Royal Newspaper of Iran.) It became
increasingly clear, however, that there was no longer a role for such dreary, reactionary
and authoritarian publications.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter produced a classic picture of an authoritarian press system, its
publications and journalists hamstrung by powerful state control. T h e government
structure, particularly the Ministry of the Press, was dedicated to producing official
publications propagating the interests of the Shah and his regime in the most slavish
way. In terms of promoting the interests of a highly-political monarch and his court, the
exercise was conducted with some flair by Etemadu-Saltaneh as Minister for the Press
or, more accurately, the chief editor of the regime. Etemadu-Saltaneh also had an oddly
liberal tinge and a respect for scholarship with gave a quirkish quality to some of his
publications. Even so, it was a dispirited, enervated state press in the late 1890's.
Journalism was the creature of the m e n in power.
Despite this generally depressing picture, something of a sea change was under way in
the last 20 years of the 20th century, although it took time for this n e w configuration to
emerge. In short, there was a passage of journalism from m e n of power to m e n of
revolution, exemplified in the emergence of a spirited, talented Iranian press in exile,
defined by Mowlana as the n e w press of Iran. [1963, 256] It was a privately owned
press, not the creature of authoritarianism. Indeed, it had ali of the attributes of a
libertarian press system, courageous and outspoken, committed to the public interest. It
was progressive, not reactionary. A n d it was revolutionary, not conservative and
repressive:
It launched its attack on the autocratic regime of the Shah most
vigorously. A s the press became offensive and effective, the authorities
yielded. B y the beginning of the 20th century, [1906-11] w h e n the long
battle was over, the press had won: Iran had a Parliamentary Constitution
and the n e w press had won. [Mowlana, 266]
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6.2 T h e Exile Press
The procession of Iranian publishers, writers and journalists from Iran to avoid the
autocratic regime and practice their crafts in relative freedom began in the 1870s. These
migrants pioneered the production of exile papers directed against the Shah and his
court. W h e n social and economic conditions worsened in Iran in the 1890's, a new
wave of liberal and progressive Iranians left for Europe and neighbouring countries.
Additional exile newspapers appeared in Turkey, France, índia, and Egypt. The history
of Iranian journalism in the latter 19th century was largely the history of Iranian exiles
producing criticai newspapers free of the Shah's constraints. The following notes
briefly describe the principal exile papers and their contributions to the Constitutional
Revolution. It should be noted that different aspects of some papers considered here are
discussed from different angles in Chapter Seven.
Akhtar (Star) Paper
The first exile newspaper was the eight-page weekly Akhtar (Star) a weekly newspaper
first published in Istanbul in 1875 under the editorship of two young liberais—Mirza
Mehdi and Mohammad-Tahir, both from Tabriz. A s soon as the paper rolled off the
press, the first copies were the way to Iran. Akhtar transmitted the notions of
fundamental reform and modernisation into the country. In the later period of the
concessions, it fought vigorously against economic penetration of European
imperialism in Iran. Although the paper was banned in Iran, Akhtar was circulated
clandestinely by liberal opponents of the regime. The paper attained such importance
and influence that its news was considered the authority for discussion in assemblies
and meetings. It was always under remorseless attack by government publications. In
1893 the government paper, Nasseri, was published in Tabriz, with a principal
objective of stifling Akhtar 's 'influence on the public. According to Browne [1914]
Aktar in 1887-8 was the only Iranian paper worth reading:
The light of civilisation shone from its page on the people's hearts, and
the taste for reading newspapers was derived from it. .. The Akhtar was
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always in each period of its existence the lamp of ali assemblies of
cultivated m e n and the centre round which rallied the most accomplished
and enlightened of the Persian exiles, and was maintained by the literary
cooperation of patriotic scholars. [Browne, 17-18]
It became so influential in Iran that the term Akhtar was applied as a generic label to
newspaper sellers. It had a readership and influence beyond the Iranian borders in
southern Rússia, Turkistan, índia and Iraq. Its sellers were even regarded with
veneration by the c o m m o n people of the Caspian region w h o considered the reading of
newspapers improper. Another innovatory feature of Akhtar was that it had its o w n
printing press in Istanbul, publishing a printed product from moveable type,
differentiating it from traditionally lithographed newspapers in Iran. Thus, Akhtar
contributed to the development of typography in Iranian journalism for it was the first
newspaper printed with moveable type.
According to Sadre-Hashemi, a famous Iranian scholar and journalist, Akhtar was not
only the first paper printed by the Iranian liberais in exile but it was also the first
successful paper privately owned by Iranian journalists. [1948, 1: 64] The paper
continued its publication for more than 20 years, until 1896. The newspaper also had an
impact in stimulating new publications, as the subsequent publishers of the Hikmat
paper in Egypt and the publisher of Sorayya and Parwarish papers were involved in
publication of Akhtar. Apart from setting a model for exile publications, it was also the
first successful venture into private newspaper ownership by Iranians. After 20 years
publication, the Akhtar was finally suppressed by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul
and its printing house confiscated in the dramatic events associated with NassenfdDin's assassination. The paper also contributed early martyrs to the cause of press
freedom when one of its editors and a respected writer were butchered in Tabriz because
of suspected complicity in the Shah's death. [Browne 1910, 94-95]

Hikmat (Wisdom) Paper
Hikmat was a weekly newspaper printed in Cairo (Egypt) in 1892-3. Its publisher,
Mahdi-Khan-Nyrisi, also co-operated in the publication of Akhtar. Hikmat also
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achieved considerable recognition in Iran, especially for its promotion of puré Persian
language undiluted with Arabic. O n e of the most notable productions of Hikmat was a
p õ e m k n o w n as Faryade-Watan

(the Lament of Fatherland) in the metre k n o w n as

Tawil (Long).

Sorayya (The Plêiades) Paper
Sorayya was also a weekly printed in Cairo (Egypt) in 1898-9, a few years after
Hikmat. It secured particular repute under its first editor, Mirza-AU-Muhammad-KhanKashani, some of its admirers nominating it as the best paper published during the
Qajar regime. O n e of its best-known articles was the Topic of Conversation [Maqala-iMusahabaJ, a regular comment piece. It engaged in a prolonged controversy over HajiNajmu'd-Dowel's Calendar with Tarbiyat newspaper. O n e of its editors was a founder
of Tabret College in Tabriz, and the paper was a staunch defender of the coUege against
its critics. In the middle of its second year Mirza M u h a m m a d - K h a n left Sorayya and
founded the Parwarish (Education) paper [Browne 1914, 67].
Parwarish (Education) Paper

Parwarish was a weekly newspaper first published in Cairo in June 1900. The owner,
editor, and writer was Mirza-Ali-Muhammad-Khan-Kashani. M a n y Iranians considered
this the best Iranian newspaper, and it was highly regarded by the young, exciting the
emotions and compelling the affections of the Iranian public. In terms of style and tone,
the paper was considered to have a peculiar quality of beauty. The fiery utterances and
sweet eloquence of this paper caused something of an intellectual revolution. After the
Qanun (The L a w ) paper, it wasfreestin its language of ali the Iranian papers during the
period of autocracy. It earned respect by the vehemence of its utterance, and its violent
attacks on the administrative methods of the government. It was a persistem critic of the
unpatriotic actions and policies ofthe Chief Minister, Aminu's-Sultan. [Brwone,1914,
58]
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Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord) Paper
Habl-al-Maitn was a weekly newspaper published in Calcutta (índia), originally

lithographed and subsequently printed in 1893-4. It was edited and written by SayyedJalalu'd-Din-Kashani. Habl-al-Matin held a particular esteem among men of learning

and influence. Part was always devoted to religious matters, and it was a champion of

Pan-Islamism. The Habl-al-Matin established such a firm hold on the Iranian audience

as an exile newspaper that it was launched in a Teherani edition in April 1907 at th

height of the Constitutional Revolution, appearing daily under the editorship of Say
Hasan Kashani. The revolutionary journalist, Sheikh Yahay Kashani who had
contributed extensively to the Calcutta edition was responsible for its editoriais,
Habl-al -Matin, in Mowlana's judgment 'the most important daily newspaper of the
constitutional period.' [346]
The Qanun (Law) Paper

The Qunun was first printed in London in 1889-90. It was edited and written by MirzaMalkom-Khan. (See Chapter 3) The entry of Qanun into Iran was absolutely
prohibited, and access to it was highly prized. Qanun was printed with a simple
language and format. In the first editorial, its director wrote: '...My purpose of
publication of the Qanun paper was the creation of law and order in the Iranian

society...and encouragement of the state to obey the law...'. [Qanun 1889, No. 1] It
wasted no time in launching an onslàught on the detested Iranian government:
The control of ali affairs of state in the hands of ignorant and base-bom
persons. The right of the state bartered to please legation dragomans. The
titles and offices of the state playthings of successful knaveries. Our army
the laughing-stook of world. Our princes deserving of the pity of beggars.
Our towns each a metropolis of dirt. Our roads worse than the tracks of
animais. [Browne 1914, 37]
The word Qanun was an anathema to Nasseru'd-Din Shah who opposed any system of

jurisprudence. The establishment of a newspaper under this rubric by his old
antagonist, Malkom Khan added further salt to the wounds, particularly as Malkom
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K h a n wrote the bulk of the editoriais. Malkom-Khan was particularly insistent in
demanding a Majlis representing the people, and ensuring their freedom to discuss aU

matters connected with the welfare of the State. His writings indicate that he was much
impressed by the British parUamentary system:
The leaders of church and state, and ali persons of intelligence, must in
response to the demands of this time for increased watchfulness, unite to
support this Assembly, and seek by every means to m a k e the [Iranian]
people understand that the regeneration of [Iran] depends on carrying out
the law, and the carrying out the law depends on the consideration and
authority enjoyed by this Assembly. [Cited in Browne 1914, 37]
Many Iranians were imprisoned and punished for reading Qanun or having it in their
possession. The Qanun's style was so lucid that it was comprehensible to large
segments of the population. Despite stringent prohibitions, Qanun was smuggled into
Iran inside books and envelopes.

Table 6.1 presents the 12 major newspapers in exile published between 1875 and 1900.

Table 6.1
Some Iranian Publications in Exile1 (1875-1900)

Name

Frequency

Founded

Location

Akhtar (The Star)
Al-Urvatul-Vosghe
(Indissoluble Link)

Weekly

1875

Constantinople

Weekly

1882

Paris

Qanun (The Law)

Monthly

1889

London

Shahsavan
(After a Tribe in Iran)

Monthly

1889

Constantinople

Hikmat (The Wisdom]
Habl-al-Matin
(The Firm Cord)

weekly

1892

Cairo

Weekly

1893

Calcutta

Sorayya (The Plêiades)

Weekly

1898

Cairo

Parvarish (Education)

Weekly

1900

Cairo

l

. The papers appear in chronological order based on the work of Hamid Mowlana, 1963, p. 295.

6.2.1 T h e Rationale of the Exile Press

In m a n y ways, the development of the exile press was an unco-ordinated venture
into the unknown. Expatriate Iranians in several countries, some in the Middle East,
some in Europe, some in índia, shared similar patriotic impulses and the pragmatic

skills to raise capital and start newspapers. It is very much the story of trail-blazi
journalists who could not have known where their labours would lead. In the early
difficult days of the mid-1870's, the achievement in just over 30 years of a National
Parliament, a constitutional government and a free press was not even remotely
foreseeable. It was, says Mowlana, the story of individuais who participated in the
drama without foreseeing what the ultimate product would be. [1963,272]
The Tobacco Concession of the early 1890's gave the exile press the first
opportunity to campaign in a relatively concerted away about the conduct of the
regime. With the domestic press totally controlled by the government, little criticai
scmtiny was applied to this extraordinary arrangement within Iran. The exile press,
however, had no such inhibitions and they tackled the issue with considerable
virulence. Akhtar in Istanbul was able to draw on sources in Turkey to announce the
deal before it was public knowledge in Tehran. It was followed by detailed
questioning of the issues involved from the other exile newspapers. Newspaper
campaigns from outside of Iran generated public pressures within the country which
encouraged the religious leaders to prohibit the usage of tobacco. (See Chapter 3)
With the withdrawal of the concession the exile press acquired immense stature and
influence within Iran:
In the tobacco issue the press won a beach-head. A quarter century had
changed the Role of the journalist. N o longer was journalism a state
monopoly. It was showing that it could be a n e w engine of pubUc opinion
in Iran. . .The tobacco issue was ended, but not its consequences, and
a m o n g them undoubted was a great loss of royal influence as well as
foreign prestige. O n the other hand, a corresponding gain of prestige
could be seen for the liberais and the clergy as w e U as those few papers in
exile. The government papers published in Tehran and other cities were at
their lowest ebb. [Mowlana, 294]
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6.2.2 Expansion of the Exile Press
The Tobacco Concession controversy was a great boost for the development of the
exile press through the 1890's, despite the demise of Akhtar. A second paper was
started in Istanbul, Shahsaven, called after an Iranian tribe. It published only 300
copies a month, each placed in envelopes and addressed to statesmen, merchants,
and theologians in Iran. [Browne 1914, 106] Hikmat and Habl-al-Matin were first
published in the early 1980's. (See above) In total, 22 newspapers were published
outside Iran, almost ali of them liberal and revolutionary. Fifteen of these
newspapers were located in índia, with seven in Calcutta and four in Bombay.
Because of the c o m m o n eastern border and the Persian Gulf it was relatively easy to
smuggle newspapers into Iran from índia. The only other significant concentration
was in Istanbul with two, although the influence of the Ottoman city was
disproportionate because of Akhtar's role. Again, the c o m m o n border assisted
distribution, particularly into the important north-west province of Azerbaijan.
Iranian merchants abroad played a significant role in funding these expatriate
publications.
Mowlana has identified several 'shared characteristics' of the newspapers in exile.
They were extremely patriotic and they pressed for constitutional and individual
rights. They advocated modernisation, perhaps even westemisation for Iran.
However, there was considerable divergence about h o w traditional patterns could be
supplanted by m o d e m institutions. Papers such as Al-Urvatul Vosgha (Indissoluble
Link), influnced by the editoriais of Jamalled Din, emphasised Pan Islamicism and
reform in the framework of Islam and traditional cultures of the Middle East. O n the
other hand Parvarish in Cairo and Akhtar in Istanbul were strongly committed to
westemisation. [1963, 298]
Of the exile press, it must be said that it had very little of the qualities that
characterised the westem press, In particular, there was little sense of traditional
journalistic method, the adoption of a pro-active role in hunting out news, of
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building up information through extensive research and investigation. It was
polemicai in the best sense of the term, but lacked the urgency and vitality of westem
journalism. It was hortatory and subjective, not stamped with the passion for the
objectivity principie that dominated m u c h westem journaUsm, particuarly American
journalism, of the period. It still smacked of the conventional pamphlet rather than
the broadsheet or the tabloid, usually consisting of four pages of roughly foolscap
size.
What news there was invariably dated quickly because of distribution difficulties.
Getting a paper from Cairo, Calcutta, Paris or London took several weeks, and there
was always the risk of interception at the borders or strictly enforced bans within
Iran. Even from Istanbul, the logistics of distributing newspapers across the border
in Iran were often extreme. For long periods ali subscriptions to the Habl-al-Matin
were banned in Iran. Even so, the exile newspapers built up considerable audiences,
penetrating several thousand homes regularly but with a m u c h greater readership per
copy than could be contemplated today.
With aU the imperfections, the exile press did a remarkable job in establishing
journalism as a social and revolutionary force within Iran. It demonstrated to
potential publishers and journalists within the country the potency of a libertarian (or
social responsibility) press. It established the newspaper and the journalist as
intruments of influence and power. A b o v e ali, it established an order of battle for
Iran, placing the press squarely in the vanguard of an incipient revolutionary
movement.

6.3 The Domestic Press in Iran

With the government press essentially moribund, and the Iranian audience picking up
most of its foreign and domestic news from the exile press, opportunities began to
open for a cautious extension into Iran, based on the precepts of private ownership.
This did not m e a n that the exile press dried up. After the assassination of Nasseru'd-
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Din in 1896, further exile newspapers appeared in Calcutta (1897 and 1899), Baku
(1905), London (1906) and B o m b a y (1906). Iranian audiences learned first of the
Russo-Japanese war and the Russian revolution of 1905 from the exile press. The
government papers remained universally drab and lacking in news values. Although
the newspapers in exile were rarely profitable, their product was m u c h better than the
domestic in terms of editing and production. Their presses, paper and ink were
superior to anything available in Iran. Subsidies from Iranian merchants and
business people abroad helped to cover deficits. Even so, the configuration of
newspaper publishing within the country began to change.

In particular, the government newspapers were close to expiry. The death of
Nasseru'd-Din Shah had moved an irresistible force from the path of a more flexible
press. The ingenious Etemadu-Saltaneh had died, further weakening the organisation
of the government press. Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah and the Ministry of the Press were
less capable of keeping the screws d o w n hard on the indigenous press. For the first
time, there was a recognition that the established system of irregular publication
based on monthly, weekly and bi-weekly publication had to go. Furthermore, the
problems of distribution within the country had to be addressed. The primitive postal
system, circulation through government office, or collection at newspaper offices did
not constitute an adequate infrastructure for the dissemination of news. Aberrations
of publication depending on whether it was summer or winter could no longer be
countenanced. It was m u c h easier, says Mowlana, to get an exile paper from Baku or
Instanbul to Azerbaijan, or a paper from the Indian borders to the western and
southem provinces of Iran than to get a government paper from Tehran to the outer
provinces.

One consequence of this re-assessment was the introduction of the first daily
newspaper the Khulasatul-Havades, whose introduction was referred to briefly in
Chapter 5. This paper, however, ceased publication in August 1903, lasting for
almost five years. It had some merits, notably its telegraphic news, but its
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journalistic style o w e d nothing to the terse presentation of news. Essentially, it was
producing court news in a manner even more effusive and nauseating than the
government newspapers at the height of Nasseru'd-Din's reign. O n e alternative
might have been to subsidise a private press, even if subject to strict government
controls on licensing. Muazffaru'd-Din Shah, however, w a s preoccupied with
overseas travei and his private concems, failing to address the challenges of the exile
press and the lack of an effective domestic counterpoint within Iran. Thus, issues
such as the Russian loan in 1903 permeated public opinion through the vigorous
protests of the exile press, with no effective response from the government.

In sum, the vitality and popularity of the exile press was in gross imbalance with the
increasing impotence of the detested and little read domestic press. T h e rising
fortunes of one were inversely proportionate to the decay of the other. There was a
clear opportunity emerging by 1903-04 for the extension of the modus operandi of
the exile press into the vacuum left by the disintegration of a feeble domestic press.
This synthesis was achieved by the emergence of a revolutionary press within Iran,
deriving from the exile press but ultimately absorbing it.
6.4 The Rise of a Revolutionary Press

In basic terms the rationale for the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 has been
summarised with characteristic elegance by Mowlana. The Iranian Revolution was
conceived by the twin movements of nationalism and constitutionalism. A n d
printers, publishers, and journalists were important influences in preparing the public
for revolution and in maintaining the fighting spirit against despotism. [1963, 300]

The fundamental conjunction was simplicity itself. Revolutionary ideas were brought
into Iran by the distribution of the exile press. A n d a growing revolutionary
movement was organised to distribute these papers and exploit their radical content.
In time, a rapidly-growing revolutionary press within Iran largely assumed the
revolutionary functions undertaken so effectively by the press in exile. A further
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factor in this equation was the development of an underground press through the
publication of shabnameh or nocturnal letters. Furthermore, the growing strength of
the anjomans, or secret societies fostered the emergence of a politicai press in Iran
which evolved into an embryonic political-party press. Finally, the whollygovernment-controlled administration of the domestic press was supplanted by an
increasingly-privately-owned press.
In a tactical sense, the way for the revolutionary press had been cleared by the
existence of clandestine printing of revolutionary pamphlets, periodicals and even
placards from at least as early as 1891. According to Browne, the revolutionary
leaders used the 'tool of journalism' to put out this material. O n October 7, 1981, a
government paper in Teheran conceded that revolutionary pamphlets and placards
had been distributed:
It minimised their importance, but declared that four persons accused of
their authorship had been arrested and exiled. [1914, 102]

By 1903, the latent hostility within Iran over the customs tariffs and the handing over
of organisation to Belgian officials, notably M . Naus, began to find expression
within the country. There were serious riots in Teheran and Yazd. T h e ulama,
particularly in Tabriz (Azerbaijan) were active in denouncing the n e w customs duties
and trade regulations. [Browne 1910, 107] T h e London

Times in August 1903

described the Outlook in Iran as gloomy, the disturbances as continuing, and the
government as helpless for lack of troops and money. [August 21, 1903, cited
Mowlana, 310]

Under considerable pressure, the Chief Minister resigned and was replaced by the
redoubtable Aynu-Dowleh, an intermittent but influential figure on the Shah's side
through the Constitutional Revolution. (He was a grandson of Fath Ali Shah, the
first of the Qajar rulers.) Aynu-Dowleh detested the press, even the languishing
government newspapers; both the daily Khulasatul-Havades and the tri-weekly Iran
collapsing during his ministry. His greatest fear was that the controlled press in Iran
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might become as aggressively revolutionary as the exile press. Accordingly, he
imprisoned or exiled several editors and suppressed newspapers. According to
Malekzadeh, press control in Iran became so severe that news reading was m a d e a
politicai crime. [1951,1: 270]

Aynu-Dowleh's ill-considered repression had the effect of accelerating the
revolutionary movement by generating extreme discontent among Iranians. This was
reflected in increased activity by the Anjomans.

A n d it also gave increased

m o m e n t u m to the emergence of an underground press and the widespread
publication of Shabnameh. This was at a time whenrivalriesbetween Rússia and
Britain were at fever pitch and both sides were propagandising heavily in Iran. The
Russians published a newspaper in Iranian to present their case, a weekly edited by a
Russian and aimed particularly at the Caspian Sea border region of Iran. According
to Browne, the Russian newspaper was founded during the Russo-Japanese war of
1904-05 to proclaim the Russian advance and victories which, of course, never
transpired. It was distributed throughout Iran by Russian consulates. [1914, 110;
1910, 134]

6.4.1 Journalists and the Anjomans

The advent of a more confident and competent press was also apparent in the
growing participation of journalists in the anjomans. This was largely a recognition
of the increasing importance of public opinion, as influenced, and refracted, through
the newspapers, but it also recognised the growing professional stature of
journalists. With religious leaders, journalists played an important role in the
formation and development of anjomans.

O f the 54 m e m b e r s of the first

revolutionary committee, 20 were journalists and writers with the remainder, largely
comprising ulama and merchants. [Mowlana 1963, 315] The distinction between
writers and journalists is unclear. A logical division would be to categorise writers as
the producers largely of the extensive pamphlet material, confining journalists to
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press materiais. Journalists, however, produced pamphlets and writers contributed
material to the newspapers.

Apart from stature given by access to the columns of the press, journalists were
invaluable to the organisation of the revolutionary movement because they were
accustomed to operating clandestinely. Furthermore, they had the virtue of
anonymity because much of their material was published anonymously. It is unclear
whether Iranian journalists abided by any code of protection of sources, part of the
journalistic method applied in many Westem countries. They had the opportunity,
however, to operate secretly or openly by and through the newspapers. [Mowlana
1963, 318] In short, they could act as both journalists and citizens; they could
operate either through the newspapers or by clandestine networks. An outstanding
example of the prominence of journalists in the anjomans was Mirza Agha Khan
Kermani, one of the editors of the Akhtar and the founder of an anjoman in
Kereman. Thus, their status differed from the religious leaders who were important
and respected because of their access to and, frequently, virtual control of religious
and educational networks. Inevitably, intelligence of the revolutionary movement in
Rússia in 1904-05 filtered into Iran, particularly in Tabriz in the north-west. A
number of journalists were members of the Anjomans in Tabriz, and assisted the
creation of awareness of the rising revolutionary tide in Rússia, a further stimulus to
the national awakening in Iran.

A crucial step was the drafting in May 1904 by the revolutionary committee in

Tehran of a charter containing 14 articles as a general program for a general uprising.
The thrust of the charter was the dissemination of information and it contained

specific tasks for translators, writers, intelligenstsia and printers. Particular stress
was placed on the revolutionary press whose functions were laid down in articles 10
and 11. Under article 10, journalists and other revolutionary writers were directed to
establish and maintain contacts with the important exile press, and to prepare
explanatory articles for foreign newspapers on the incipient revolutionary spirit in
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Iran. M o r e importantly, journalists and writers were ordered to establish an
underground press, giving formal status to the shabnameh or noctural letters which
had existed since the early 1890s.

6.4.2 The Underground Press

Some consideration has already been given to the shabnameh and the treatment here
is directed largely to their qualities as newspapers. According to Mowlana, some 50
samples of these small sheet papers, generally about quarto size, have been

preserved in the Majlis Library in Tehran. Regrettably, very little of their content is
available in English. The shabnameh usually bore the imprint of an individual
journalist or writer rather than a conventional newspaper masthead. Some of the
papers were produced by small printing presses operated secretively; others were
'jelly graphed', an indigenous duplicating or roneoing process. Mostly, the
shabnameh carried neither title nor date of pubUcation:

[The shabnameh] carried the editoriais of the revolutionary leaders and
news of general uprising. S o m e of these papers even came out daily but
most of them were weekly, and often irregular. A s the time went on the
secret societies m a d e use of this n e w technique in their struggle to
overthrow despotism. The papers were usually delivered at night to the
homes of people...[Mowlana 1963, 310]
Printing supplies were often short and expedients for ink and paper were applied.
Lack of type was a more serious constraint. Ali supplies had to be imported and
irregular import flows constrained printed papers. Mowlana expressed amazement at
the ingenuity and energy of revolutionary journalists, propagandists and popular
politicai writers servicing the underground press:
The fact is that the newspaper had won great respect in this period. [190106] 'I saw it in the paper' began to be taken seriously in answer to the
question, 'how do you k n o w that?' Information was also disseminated
among the c o m m o n people by the pubUc reading of newspapers in coffee
houses and other public places. [Mowlana 1963, 319]
d-Among the underground papers published regularly and under distinctivetitleswere:
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Lisanul-Ghayb

(The Tongue of the Unseen), published during 1901-02 by a

revolutionary anjoman in Tehran.

Ghayrat (The Zeal) edited and published by another anjoman in Tehran during the
same years. A m e m b e r of the revolutionary committee publishing Ghayrat was Mirza
M o h a m m a d Ali Khan w h o was killed during the subsequent revolution.
Ghaybi (The Unseen), edited by a revolutionary leader, and published in Isfahan.
Hamman-e-Jinniyan (The Genie's Bath) published in Iran during the final days of
Qajar authoritarianism [Browne 1914,20].

In terms of press theory, the role of the journalists who worked for the underground,
revolutionary press has m a n y elements of the democratic participam model outlined
in Chapter 2. In short, the journalists were not objective observers applying a
rigorous and standard journalistic method to gather and present news. They were
actually participating in the build-up of the revolution as direct participants, by
writing propaganda and polemicai content to stir up the revolutionary consciousness
of the mass audience. Thus, they provided a democratic-participant counterpoint to
the remaining vestiges ofthe Qajar's autocratic press.

6.5 Journalists and the Revolution

It is virtually impossible to give a comprehensive, cohesive account of the role of
Iranian journalism during the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) in the absence of
primary source material. While newspapers multiplied during this period, and m a n y
copies survive of single issues, very little of this material has been rendered into
English. While the Constitutional Revolution has spawned a substantial literature
from Iranian scholars, a very small part of it deals with the methodology of Iranian
journalists or any sort of consistent content analysis of the individual papers. This is
a pity because the Constitutional Revolution provides an opportunity rare in the
history of journalism to analyse an authoritarian press at the point of becoming a
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revolutionary, or democratic participam press, and then a modified libertarian press.
It is, therefore, something of a misnomer to talk about 'covering the revolution', the
heading that M o w l a n a gives to his account of the press during the revolution proper.
The account that follows, therefore, does not pretend to be anything other than a
commentary on principal themes.

6.5.1 The Constitutional Basis

The greatest fundamental reform that the revolution brought to Iranian journalism
was the protection of the constitution, a benefit, of course, that it shared with the
Iranian population at large. Thereafter, the Iranian press had a constitutional basis
that might be ignored or discounted but that could never be totally rejected. In theory,
the constitutional documents established libertarian press theories in Iran, although
this libertarian foundation was not always been applied, even during the currency of
the revolution itself.

The initial constitutional document, the Farman or Royal Proclamation by
Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah on August 5, 1906, does not m a k e any direct reference to the
role, freedoms or responsibilities of the press, although it does provide that the text
of 'this August rescript' should be published and proclaimed 'so that ali the people of
[Iran], being duly informed of our good intentions, ali of which the progress of the
Government and people of [Iran], m a y with tranquil minds, engage in prayer for
us." [Browne 1910, 354]

The Electoral Law promulgated on September 9, 1906 makes no direct reference to
the press as having a recognised role in the conduct of elections, although there are
two sections which imply such a role. Article 18 provides that the time and place of
the election must be m a d e k n o w n a month beforehand by the local government 'by
means of printed leaflets and other suitable channels of advertisement.' [Browne
1910, 358] Article 23 provides that ali written or spoken statements of members of
the Assembly on the affairs of the Government or Nation shall be 'free', evidently an
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extension of parliamentary privilege on statements m a d e inside the parliamentary
chambers. This privilege, however, is seemingly qualified by confinement to
comment on government and national affairs. Furthermore, such privilege is not
available to a member making speeches or writing contrary to the public good. Such
members, according to the enactment of the 'most luminous law', shall deserve
punishment. It is unclear to what extent such qualified privilege would extend to
press reporting or comment on such material. In Westminster countries at least,
coverage of such matters would attract a limited privilege for reporting of
parliamentary proceedings.
The Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906 are rather more specific in relation to

press rights to report the Majlis, particularly in the rights given to the press in the

initial section on the Constitution of the Assembly. Under Article 13, it is prescribed
that the deliberations of the Majlis must be public in order to give effect to their

results. The internai regulations of the Majlis provide that journalists and the public
have the right to be present but not to speak. Article 13 continues:
Newspapers may print and publish ali the debates of the Assembly,
provided they do not change or pervert their meaning, so that the public
m a y be informed of the subjects of discussion and the detail of what takes
place. Everyone, subject to his paying due regard to the public good, m a y
discuss them in the public Press, so that no matter m a y be veiled or
hidden from any person. Therefore ali newspapers, provided that their
contents be not injurious to any one of the fundamental principies of the
Government or the Nation are authorised and allowed to print and publish
ali matters advantageous, such as the debates of the Assembly, and the
opinion of the people on these debates. But if anyone, actuated by
interested motives, shall print in the newspapers or any other publications
anything contrary to what has been mentioned, or inspired by slander of
calumny, he will render himself liable to cross-examination, judgement
and punishment, according to law. [Browne, 364]
Although heavily dependent on interpretations of the 'public interest', or 'interested
motives1, or 'change or pervert their meaning', this is a more copious statement on
press privileges in relation to reporting Parliaments than most western-nation

constitutions provide. In theory at least, it gives the press a reasonable guide to wha
they may or may not publish

The Supplementary Fundamental laws promulgated on October 7, 1907 include a
section on 'Rights of the Persian Nation' which is essentially a Bill of Rights in the
accepted westem sense. Although it includes no specific press freedoms, it does
incorporate a quaUfied protection against censorship in Article 20:
Ali publications except heretical books and matters hurtful to the
perspicuous religion [of Islam] are free, and are exempt from the
censorship. If, however, anything should be discovered in them contrary
to the Press L a w , their publisher or writer is liable to punishment
according to that law. If the writer be known, and be resident in [Iran],
then the publisher, printer, and distributor shall not be liable to
prosecution. [Browne, 375]
The rights guaranteed by the Fundamental Laws also protected from censorship
material passed through the post office (Article 22) or transmitted by telegraph.
(article 23) Clearly, the main punitive thrust of article 23 was levelled against the

writer or journalist, rather than the publisher or the printer and distributors who have
only a technical responsibility for what appears in the paper. Furthermore, the only
restraint on publication is heresy or other material considered deleterious to the

Islamic religion. There is a clear intent that politicai and public debate should be free
The reference in this constitutional provision to the press law refers to a set of laws
comprising an introduction, six chapters and 52 articles. This codification includes
sections on Journals and Newspapers; The limitation of fault in relation to the
Assembly; and Trial and Punishment for infringements. This suggests that
censorship and punishment of newspapers and journalists would also be applicable
to reporting of wider matters of public interest. This is the interpretation of Qasemi,
that publications and the press are free to present ali matters 'except those that are
detrimental to the fundamental principies of Islam or the rights of the public' If, says
Qasemi, publishers, journalists or writers published a criticai article in breach of the
press law, then they would be liable to punishment. [1993, 30] Regrettably, it is
impossible to carry this analysis any further in the absence of the detailed provisions
of the Press Law.

6.5.2 T h e Journalistic Record

The role of journalists in the revolution itself was threefold: to report the news of the
general uprising and subsequent developments to the people; to interpret events as far
as possible; to disseminate knowledge, and awareness about constitutionalism to the
people. Remarkably, it is possible to pick up more from the various accounts of h o w
the London Times covered the war than the practical details of h o w the swelling
ranks of Iranian journalists, working in a constitutional context of significant
freedom, covered the war.

On the analogy of information about how foreign correspondents covered the war a
few suggestions might be made. Journalists were given reasonable access to what
today would be called 'news opportunities'. That is, they were able to attend and
report public events with some official recognition of their role and responsibility.
Secondly, major public and military officials were available for interview, although
there were not formal press conferences on contemporary lines. Thirdly, there were
designated spokespersons w h o m a d e material available and answered questions.
This kind of projection, of course, must be treated with considerable caution. There
are numerous reasons w h y the correspondent of the august London Times might be
given special privileges. References to reports from lesser European correspondents,
however, do suggest that channels of formal assistance existed for journalists,
particularly in Tehran. It would also seem that Iranian journalists exercised their
skills in a manner consistent with conventional notions of news gathering. Clearly,
Iranian journalists directly reported the tumultuous events in the capital in 1907-09,
although coverage of events in other cities was largely dependent on newsletters or
reportage from observers. Conversely, newspapers in the provincial centres were
dependent on similar informal news sources for their coverage of what w a s
happening in Tehran. There seems to have been no organised or co-ordinated use of
the telegraph for extensive newsgathering in a national sense.
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Summarising the achievement of Iranian newspapers in covering the Constitutional
Revolution, Mowlana concedes that it seems incredible that newspapers had no
organised means of covering the general uprising but relied almost wholly on the

chance arrival of private letters and of official and semi-official telegrams: 'Only in
Tehran were the newspapers able to cover the events on the spot.' [1963, 329]
In the absence of direct, observational coverage a useful expedient was to fill the
columns with activities of the anjomans. This was certainly revolutionary news but
in terms of professional journalistic method it was akin to covering World War 11
from the pages of the House of Commons Hansard. Even so, the newspapers were
dominated by politics and revolutionary coverage. There was little other topical news
and advertising was sparse. Monthly magazines had largely gone out of fashion, and
the drift was firmly towards daily and weekly production.

Even if the Constitutional Revolution was restricted in the opportunities it gave for
journalistic development it did impose intense pressures on newspapers and
journalists. The oscillations in fortunes between the revolutionary movement,
focussed on the Majlis, and authoritarian reaction, focussing on the Shah and his
Russian supporters, were reflected in the opportunities, and indeed the fate, of
individual newspapers and journalists. By late 1906, on the eve of the principal
period of revolution, Mowlana concluded that the press had done well and that
Journalism had made distinct gains in prestige:
Iranian journalists were beginning to understand that there was something
called 'public opinion' and that they could circulate their papers a m o n g a
large audience if they recognised the right method. Newspapers were
coming to be regarded as a necessity in Iranian society.. .There can be do
doubt that the levei of literacy in Iran wasrising.. .The state of reading
was fed largely by journalism. Newspapers probably went to the homes
of a great majority of the literate population. But each copy passed from
hand to hand, and was read aloud in the coffee-houses and assemblies,
and its articles were discussed and thoroughly digested. [1963, 330]
The Qajars had wasted their historical opportunities to establish, and perhaps to
manipulatre, a mass press. By acting as a conduit between new and old an
increasingly independent press made a substantial contribution to the early phases of
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the Constitutional Revolution, effectively laying the foundation stones for its
success. Between 1906 and 1909, it went through a 'remarkable series of
transfigurations.' [Mowlana 1963, 332]
6.5.3 A Transfigured Press: 1906-11

The inauguration of a constitutionally 'free' press was relected initially in the remo
of the prior restraints on publication. Where the censorship processes of the Qajars
required submission of ali material for publication to the Ministry of the Press for
approval, the newspapers n o w were technically clear of such prior restraint. S o m e
constraints still lingered, however, in a technical obligation for a newspaper to obtain
a licence before starting publication. The first 'free' newspaper appeared in Tabriz in
October 1906, almost a year after the start of revolution. This was the quarto-sized
Melli (The National), a weekly which became the official journal of the Tabriz
Anjoman.
Of great significance was the appearance of the eight-page daily Majlis, first
published in late November, 1906. Majlis was the vision of A g h a Mirza Mohsen, a
Uberal w h o sought a license to publish afreenewspaper and to report the news of the
National Assembly. A royal decree gave him 'the privilege of a free press to publish
his paper and to choose his o w n staff of reporters and writers.' According to
Mowlana, this decree was an important document because it effectively led to the end
of press censorship in 1907. [1963, 335]

Majlis had the basic attributes of a parliamentary record in the sense of the
Westminster Hansard and the U S Congressional Record. It was staffed by an
outstanding group of revolutionary journalists w h o stuck with the paper through five
turbulent years. They included Sheikh Yahya Kashani, w h o had been a contributor
to the exile Habl-al-Matin in Calcutta. It was arguably the most successful newspaper
of the period because of its direct concem with the most important topical issue, what
happened in the newly-formed Majlis and h o w well it did its job:

The appearance of the free press and theriseof the c o m m o n m a n were
closely integrated. The daily Majlis appeared just as the c o m m o n m a n
began to win recognition under the parliamentary constitution. The
[e-ditorial staff] not only gave the public what it wanted, but also what was
in its best interest. The result was tremendous. The circulation of the
Majlis first reached 7,000 and then gradually rose to 10,000. [Mowlana
1963, 337]
For thefirsttime, Iranian journalists were also compelled to grapple with the
intangible quality of news, news values and newsworthiness, a battle which had
preoccupied their colleagues in advanced westem systems of news organisation for
more than a century. Under the Qajars, news values were essentially irrelevant. The
requirement was for basic material which could be translated into fulsome praise of
the regime and government:
If God let things happen that were not in accordance with this conception
of the fitness of things, [the journalist] simply suppressed them. H e
refused the responsibility of letting his readers learn about things that he
k n e w ought not to have happened. However, in the 20th Century, the
[Constitutional Revolution] was giving editors a n e w conception of news.
[Mowlana 1963, 337]
Conversely, there was a remarkable development in news sources as public groups
and individuais recognised the benefits of a free press and public opinion. This was,
perhaps, manifested firstly in the members of the Majlis and their recognition that

their deliberations were not confined to the four walls of the parliamentary building,
but projected to a vast mass audience. The new privilege of the franchise, albeit to a
limited group of voters, was accompanied by the broader privileges of access to
regular news coverage.

These new-found freedoms and the aspirations associated with them were rudely
dashed after the death of Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah who had ratified the Fundamental
Laws a few days beforehand, In a symbolic gesture, his successor and son,
Mohammad Ali, spumed the Majlis and the press by excluding them from his
coronation. The Ministry of the Press revived attempts to impose prior restraint and
further restrictions on the newly-free press. The Majlis, however, was not to be
intimidated and, as we have seen, the Supplementary Laws contained a vigorous
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statement of therightto a freepress. According to Sadre Hashemi, the press was
already recognised as the westem conception of a 'Fourth Estate of the Iranian
Constitution' and 'we cannot have freedom' unless w e have a freepress.'[1948 1:
17-18] A society was formed called the Anjoman-e-Gulestan comprising newspaper
editors and other revolutionary leaders w h o sought for the constitutional freedom of
the press bestowed in the Bill of Rights in the supplementary laws which were
approved by the Majlis in October 1907.

Despite the guarantees of press freedoms, there was repression of newspapers
during the Constitutional Revolution, even from the Majlis, which suppressed
newspapers particularly for criticisms of the religious leaders. This, of course, was
not inconsistent with the constitutional provisions outlined above, but it did not
accord with the notion of the press as a Fourth Estate of the Realm. At the height of
his powers, the suppression of the press by M o h a m m a d Shah was an overwhelming
disincentive, and m a n y newspapers were either forcibly closed or effectively
discouraged from maintaining publication. With the abdication of M o h a m m a d Ali
Shah and the assertion of the Constitution in 1909, newspaper publication resumed
but in a m u c h more muted way.

The ebb and flow of fortunes during the Constitutional Revolution also took a heavy
toll of journalists. T w o were strangled, including Mirza Jahangir Khan, considered
by both Browne and M o w l a n a to be one of the most courageous editors of the
revolution, if not the greatest one. Another was poisoned. Others were imprisoned,
banished or had theirrightto publish taken away. The constitutional provisions did
not guarantee anyrightto either publication or protection from the excesses of the
law. At the height of the authoritarian reaction under M o h a m m a d Ali Shah,
newspapers and journalists were exceedingly vulnerable. Although constitutional
rights were essentially restored after the overthrow of M o h a m m a d Ali Shah,
repression rose to n e w heights of severity in the years of Russian supremacy in
1911-12 and subsequent years, as Browne records:
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Behold, then, Tehran prostrate beneath the iron heel of Colonel Liakhoff
and his Cossacks, despotism once m o r e triumphant, the young
Constitution crushed, the Press gagged, the popular leaders either
violently slain(like Mirza Jahangir Khan, the editor of the Sure-Israfú...
or in chains. . .or fugitives in the forests. . .or refugees at the British
legation. For the time being aU hope of freedom and better government in
Pérsia seemed to be at an end. [1914,213]
The press was very much a target in this bloody saga of repression. In terms of
sacrifice, particularly loss of human life, the Iranian press in the Constitutional
Revolution made a more substantial contribution to press freedoms than their
colleagues in most Western countries.

While Browne was sometimes inclined to patronise the Iranian press, he was a
staunch defender of its basic achievement. He praised particularly the standards of
newspapers such as Sure-Israfil (Angel of the Resurrection), the Habl-al-Matin, and
the Musawat (Equality). These newspapers, he said, were of a very high order, and

the papers afforded ex.amples of a prose style 'forcible, nervous .and concise, hithert
unknown.' [1910, 121] He fiercely rejected criticism by the London Times in 1908
that the 'free press of [Iran]. . .proved to be as mischievous and as dangerous as it

that proved to be in other Oriental lands.' At its best, said Browne, the free [Iranian
press reached a very high levei, and at its worst it was superior to certain 'English,
French and American papers'. [128]

6.6 An Enhanced Press

In a technical sense the Constitutional Revolution enhanced the press in two ways.
Firstly, it brought new formats of design and genre to the traditionally cramped
confines of Iranian newspapers. Despite supply problems, the new breed of
publishers was prepared to experiment with larger formats. For example, the IraneNuw (New Pérsia), first published in August 1909, adopted a folio-size common to
many westem newspapers, which it also emulated in form and style. There was also
an enhancement of genres with entry into hitherto neglected fields such as scientific
newspapers and women's newspapers (see below). The spread of the Tanz
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newspapers— satirical, comical or derisory newspapers, often with strong social and
pohtical elements, is considered separately in Chapter Seven.

The enhancement of circulation was a largely inevitable consequence of changes in
audience. The exile newspapers had given Iranians a taste for news which had never
been tapped by the drab government newspapers whose audience w a s largely
conscripted government officials. The shabnameh

were not really altematives to

conventional newspapers but also a complement. In tum, they contributed to the
increasing audience d e m a n d for the widening range of genre newspapers.
Improvements in format, design and style m a d e newspapers more attractive,
enhancing audience appeal and access. Ali of these factors coalesced in audience
d e m a n d which stimulated the rapid growth of n e w titles and the aggregate
circulation.

Appendix 3 illustrates this great surge in newspaper demand and its consequent ebb
and flow in a series of tables extending from 1907 until 1925, the end of the Qajar
dynasty. In particular, it lists the titles published each year, their places of
publication, and their genre. It must be emphasised that the titles do not distinguish
between n e w and existing newspapers published each year, but give an aggregate
picture. Thus, it is possible to point to the peak of the n e w w a v e of newspaper
publishing in 1907-08, its precipitate decline after the Second C o u p detat and
suppression of the press by M o h a m m a d Ali Shah in 1909, renewed growth but not
to the peak previous levei after the restoration of the constitution, then further decline
after the reactionary triumph of December 1911 and the subsequent plunge into drift
and disorder. Although the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution is not a
principal theme here, the tabulation presented until 1925 makes it possible to trace the
subsequent erratic patterns of sporadic growth and contraction.

Browne estimated that during the Constitutional Period the circulation of the
newspapers went up significantly, with most enjoying sales of 2-3,000. Thus the
Mosavat

(Equality) had a circulation of 3000, the Sure-Israfil (The Angel of

Resurrection) from 5000 to 5500; the Majlis (Parliament) gradually rose from 7000
to 10,000 and the Anjoman (Assembly) in Tabriz 5000. [1914, 25] During the
Second Period of the Constitutional Revolution, (July 1909 -late 1911), although
more daily newspapers appeared, and they were generally bulkier, their overall
circulations declined. Thus the Istiqlale Iran (Independence of Iran) paper had a
circulation of from 800 to 1000 copies, and the Irane Nuw (New Iran) paper, which
had the largest circulation very rarely reached the 3000 mark. Browne ascribed this
diminution in the number of readers to greater poverty resulting from incessant
disorder and disturbances, and a continuing high illiteracy rate: There were,
however, some bright spots in these erratic patterns of demand:
One point worthy of mention is that in the latter days of the period of
Autocracy the wealthy and well-known Hajji-Zaynu'l-'Abidin Taqioff of
Baku, an eminent philanthropist, subscribed yearly for nearly 500 copies
of the Calcutta, Habl-al-Matin, paying the subscription himself, and
arranged that they should be sent gratuitously to the Shi'i doctors of
theology and students 'residing at Karbala, Najaf and others of the Holy
Shrines, regularly and directly from the chief office. This great service
rendered by his director to the enlightenment of the Ulama' and their
politicai awakening was conducive to the circulation of newspapers in
spiritual cireles and societies. [Browne 1914,26]
Another advance conducive to higher circulation was the replacement of the
traditional Nasta'liq writing, with Nask writing in newspapers. The latter style was
better suited to the increasing shift from lithograph publication to moveable type.

In terms of numbers of newspapers published, the peak year was 1907 when 84
newspapers were published, followed by 1910 when 36 newspapers were
circulated. This fali by more than half illustrates the net impact of Mohammad Ali
Shah's ferocious clampdown on the press. Somewhat remarkably, the gradual

decline in the fortunes of the constitutionalists from 1911 was reflected in a relativ
minor decline in newspaper titles, with 33 newspaper titles listed in that year. The
greatest number of newspapers was published in Tehran (148 newspapers),
followed by Tabriz (51), Rasht (25), Isfahan (20), and Mashhad(lO). [See Appendix
3]
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6.7 A Party Press

The official politicai parties, such as the Democrats, Union and Progress, Moderates,
only emerged in the Second Period of the Constitution, and were generally
recognised only after the opening of the Second Majlis. on November 15, 1909). It
is, therefore, not correct to link any of them to newspapers before that date. During
the First Period of the Constitution the only organised party was the Social
Democrats whose organ was the Mujahid (Fighter) paper, published at Tabriz.

The number of politicai newspapers increased gradually in subsequent years, and the

poUtical parties began to publish their own newspapers. It was inevitable that politica
leaders, once they had discovered the usefulness of the press in dealing with

controversy, should employ newspapers as politicai tools to help them fight the battle
which revolved around the Parliamentary Constitution. According to Mowlana :
After the Iranian Revolution, as party feeling grew, many editors found
themselves the mouthpieces of the politicai parties. T o some extent, the
power of the press in this period rested in the final analysis upon the
ability of its editors to create a party and lead it. The joumal of opinion of
the revolutionary days was, by its very nature, predestined to become the
organ of a party, or at any rate the mouthpiece of a school. The flood of
Iranian opinion suddenly released after years of suppression was not to be
denied an outlet. During 1911-1925 it found expression in high-sounding
phrases and often irresponsible abuse. Yet, the years between 1912 and
1925 were stormy also because of the clash of the big powers-especially
Germany, Britain and Rússia- in Iran. While thisrivalrywas not a n e w
phenomenon in itself, its effect on Iranian journalism was important
because it w a s coloured by propaganda and profound ideological
differences. [1963, 406]
With the introduction of a constitutional system and Parliament influenced by westem
models, it was perhaps inevitable that Iran should gradually adopt a politicai party
system. Thus, the new parties were often modelled after European archetypes. Apart
from westem influence, there was also the experience with, and development of the
anjomans. In 1909 the first two official parties were founded, under the names of
Democrat and Moderate. The Moderates who had a majority in the Majlis, represented
the privileged classes, the aristocracy, the rich merchants, and a few of the liberal
clergy. They were in favour of gradual and moderate reform. The Moderates had three
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dailies, two weeklies and one bi-weekly-papers, printed in Tehran. The

Anjoman

(Council) paper was their official organ. Other papers were affiliated with other par
and supported their policies. The Democrats were a minority but had considerable
influence in the National Assembly. They were highly liberal with a decided tendency
toward socialism. [Mowlana, 1963, 408]

Unlike the Moderates, the Democrats established a relatively large network of
newspapers throughout the country. There were 14 papers, including 11 weeklies,
two bi-weeklies, and one daily paper. Their main organs were the daily Irane-Nuw
(New Iran) in Tehran, the weekly Shafagh (Aurora) paper in Tabriz, and the bi-weekly
Nuw-Bahar (Early Spring) in Mashhad. By 1912, journalism in Tehran was almost
completely partisan. Although some papers such as Sharq (The East) and Raad
(Thunder), claimed to be independent, they were linked in the popular consciousness

with the Moderates. Editoriais assumed the right of a newspaper to play a leading rol
in politicai leadership, to write about merits of candidates, to instruet and direct

public, to criticise the local and national administrations, and to speak with author
on many subjects.

One example of an important politicai paper was the Tajaddod (Renaissance), the
organ of the National Democratic Party founded by Mohammad-Ali-Khiabani. A

former deputy to the Majlis, he was a talented orator and vigorous politician. He wen
to the Caucasus in 1911 and established contacts with Russian revolutionaries.
Returning to Tabriz, he started underground activity with the aim of liberating Iran
from foreign influences by founding the National Democratic Party. [Mowlana,
1963,419] The Tajaddod was his main weapon in the early period. His paper printed
his fiery speeches and demands for radical reform.

6.8 A Women's Press

During the Constitutional revolutionary period, women journalists were active,

creating a range of new publications targetted at a female audience. Between 1906 and
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1925,12 newspapers and magazines were printed and edited by Iranian women. If the
number of w o m e n contributors is included, it is a reasonable assumption that at least
30 w o m e n journalists were active in writing, editing and publishing newspapers.
Table 6.2
Women's Publications—1906-1925
Name

Frequency

Year

Irregular

1910

Tehran

Shokofeh
(The Blossom)

Fortnightly

1913

Tehran

Zabane-Zanan
(Language of W o m e n )

Fortnightly

1919

Isfaihan

Alame-Nasavan
(The World of W o m e n )

Bi-monthly

1920

Tehran

Jahane-Zanan
(The World of W o m e n )

Fortnightly

1921

Mashhad

Nasavane-Vatankhah
(Patriotic W o m e n )

Irregular

1924

Tehran

Nassavan-Sharq
( W o m e n of the East)

Fortnightly

1925

Anzali

Danish
(Knowledge)

Location

Contents of these publications included social, ethical, and family topics. The bulk of
the newspapers were printed in Tehran.
6.9 Conclusion

Appendix 4 presents a series of tables directed to giving an overview of the growth o
the Iranian press between 1837, when the first newspaper appeared, until 1925,
when the Qajars were displaced by the Pahlavi regime. The tabulations reinforce three
key points. Firstly, very few newspapers were published in Iran before 1906, the era
of authoritarian Government population. Secondly, the Constitutional Revolution
produced a remarkable generation of news titles. Admittedly, this levei was not
sustained but even under extreme repression, overall publications did not slump to the
leveis of the pre-revolutionary period. Thirdly, a reasonable record of press
publication was sustained until 1925.
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The conclusion is unmistakable that the Constitutional Revolution pushed Iran firmly
into the mass Communications era. Furthermore the Constitutional Revolution
established the constitutional basis of an enduring system of press freedom, press
independence and press initiative. Constitutionally, Iran has had a libertarian press
system with enduring revolutionary overtones. In no sense has its press tradition ever
reflected the tenets of developmental journalism. Finally, the Constitutional
Revolution established journalism as a profession with its own distinctive ethos and
methodology. In every respect, the revolution had a transfiguring impact on the
Iranian press and the practice of Iranian journalism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A REVOLUTIONARY PRESS
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, three types of publications of primai importance in the Constitutional
Revolution are considered: the politicai papers, the humorous or satirical papers (Tanz),
and nocturnal letters or underground papers (Shabnameh). Examples of each genre will
be discussed in the light of their basic functions:
•

The leadership function of the politicai press;

•

The persuasive or stimulative function of the Tanz;

•

The information function of the Shabnameh or underground papers.

Further account is also taken of the important contribution of exile papers that were
published outside of Iran during the revolutionary period. (See chapter 5) Finally, the
role of the press associated with the secret societies (anjomans) during the revolution is
considered.
During the revolutionary period, popular literature and poetry, especially new poetry
and satires, played an effective role in enlightening Iranians. It should be noted that the
best humorous or caricature publications appeared in poems. Poetry embodies m a n y
Persian values and, reciprocally, sensitivity toward these values culminate in love of
poetry. The result is an idiosyncratic form of poetical expression whose distinctiveness
and subtlety often eludes successful translation. Even so, the satirical quality and the
biting humour of this characteristic poetry emerges in the translations quoted below.
The Iranian journalists recognised that emotive poetry could be a powerful instrument
for the revolution. Hence, popular poems were used by journalists and revolutionary
forces as a politicai instrument, particularly against corrupt and hypocritieal officials.
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A characteristic of the poetry of the constitutional revolutionary period was its attempt
to liberate itself from the strict metric requirements of traditional Iranian poetry, and to
bring the language of the poet closer to the vernacular. Politicai journalism was
supported by the n e w form of poetry, and m a n y of the politicai issues of this period
were translated into poetic forms. Arianpur argues:
Poetry w a s used in the revolutionary struggle to educate and excite the
people, and ballads became a popular genre. M a n y ballads of nationalist
content spread rapidly in the major cities and were recited by the populace.
[1971,30]
7.2 The Leadership Function of the Politicai Press

The evolution of the main newspapers comprising the politicai press has been
considered in chapter 5. T o recapitulate briefly, the first, and perhaps the most
important of the papers to emerge during the actual revolution w a s the Majlis
(Parliament), providing full reports of the debates in the National Assembly. Even
earlier in the revolutionary period, however, active and influential newspapers with a
firm poUtical orientation had been published. Examples were Sure-Israfil (The Angel of
Resurrection), Habl-al-Matin (Firm Cable), Mosavat

(Equality),

Nasime-Shomal

(Northern Breeze). According to Browne, these newspapers provided patterns of a
prose style, forcible, nervous, and concise, hitherto almost unknown in Iran. [Browne
1914, 25]

Thus, revolutionary thought was fostered and expanded by politicai journalism during
both the lead-up to the Constitutional Revolution and its culmination. The year 1907
was significant for Iranian journalism not only because the number of politicai papers
increased but also the format and size of some papers were changed. Newspapers
published editoriais against the Shah's policies. N e w writing styles emerged dictated by
simple, pungent prose, and there was a greater focus on religious and politicai ideas.
Politicai journalism was supported by the n e w forms of poetry and the vernacular. In
total, the politicai press was s u m m o n e d as a social and politicai tool for awakeníng the
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people against the autocracy, illuminating public opinion and supporting the
revolutionary forces.

Table 7.1. provides a select list of important politicai newspapers and periodicals
pubUshed during the broad preparatory period to the Constitutional Revolution and the
Revolution itself. Included are publications which contained criticisms, mild or
vituperative, of the principies of administration, complaints about government poUcies,
guidance for the revolutionary spirit in assailing the detested aristocracy. It will be
noted that there is s o m e overlap between exile papers and political-leadership
newspapers here, although the bulk of the newspapers were published in Tehran. It is
impossible to differentiate the two categories completely, so the politicai qualities of
some exile newspapers are treated here, although the principal examination of exile
newspapers falis in a subsequent section.
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Table 7.1
Politicai Press Leaders of the Constitutional Revolution

Name

Frequency

Founded

Location

Star (Akhtar)

Weekly

1875

Istanbul

Indissoluble Link
(Al-Urvatul Vosgha)

Weekly

1882

Paris

L a w (Qanun)

Monthly

1889

London

The Plêiades (Sorayya)

Weekly

1898

Cairo (Egypt)

_

Education (Parvarish)

Calcutta

Parliament (Majlis)

Daily

1906

Tehran

The Call of Homeland
(Nedaye Vatan)

Daily

1906

Tehran

Weekly

1907

Tehran

The Firm Cord
(Habl-al-Matin)

Daily

1907

Tehran

The Holy Spirit
(Ruhul-Ghudus)

Weekly

1907

Tehran

Equality (Mosavat)

Weekly

1907

Tehran

Civilisation (Tamaddun)

Weekly

1907

Tehran

The T m e D a w n
(Sobhe-Sadeq)

Daily

1907

Tehran

N e w Iran (Irane-Nuw)

Daily

1909

Tehran

The Angel of Resurrection
(Sure-Israfú)

7.2.1 Akhtar

(Star) Paper

Akhtar was both the first Iranian newspaper printed outside of the country and the
important politicai newspaper. It appeared for more than 20 years, until publication was
ultimately suspended in 1895-6 by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul. Akhtar (Star)
was atiberalnewspaper published by exiled intellectuals but also expressing the general
concems of the Iranian merchant class, summarised by Keddie :
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It is clear enough that the concessionaire will commence the work with a
smaU capital and will purchase the tobacco from the cultivators and sell it
to the merchants and manufactures for higher prices, and ali the profits
will remain in the purse of the English. A s the Persian merchants have no
rights to export tobacco from Pérsia, those w h o were formally engaged in
the trade will be obliged to give up their business and find some other
work. The Caucasian does not take into account h o w m a n y merchants
w h o were engaged in this business will be left without employment.
[1966a, 49]

Throughout its existence, the Akhtar was ever the beacon around which rallied the mos
accomplished and enlightened of Iranian exiles. In Mowlana's summation, it was

maintained by the literary co-operation of patriotic scholars. [1963, 274] Journalists
working on Akhtar included Mirza Aqa-Khan-Kermani, author of many volumes, and
Shaykh Ahmade-Ruhi, also of Kerman, two of the revolution's earlier martyrs; Mirza
Mahdi of Tabriz; Mirza Ali Muhammad Khan of Kashan, (editor of the Sorayya or
Plêiades and Parwarish or Education) and Hajji Mirza Mahdi of Tabriz, who was

principal writer and acting editor of the paper until it ceased publication. Figure 6
shows the first page of the Akthar (Star) paper, Vol 21, No. 1, 1894.
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7.2.2 Al-Urvatul-Vosgha

(The Indissoluble Link) Paper

ALUrvatul Vosgha (The Indissoluble Link) paper, printed in Paris by Sayyed-JamaUed-

Din-Asadabadi in 1882, with mainly politicai and anti-foreign content, was published in
Arabic. This paper was widely read in the Muslim countries of the Near East including
Iran, Turkey and índia. Although the paper was forbidden by Nasseru'd-Din Shah, it
was circulated in Iran. According to Mowlana:
The Autocratic rulers of the Near East were alarmed by its attack and its
growing influence. The British government stopped its circulation in índia
Sayyed Jamalled-Din-Asad-abadi [the editor] travelled to Europe for two
years till 1892 and wrote articles for an Arabic magazine.. .[1963, 280]
Sayyed-Jamalled-Din was also closely associated with Qanun (The law), printed in
London by the Iranian exile, Malkom-Khan, and discussed in detail below. Speeches

and newspapers were his favourite politicai tools. His ferocious editorial style emerge
in this onslaught on the Shah published in Ziyaul Khafiqayn (The Light of two
Hemispheres), another exile paper published in London on March 1,1892;
When this Shah, this viper of sin obtained control of the kingdom of Iran,
he began gradually to infringe therightsof the ulama, lower their status,
and diminish their influence, on content of his desire to exercise despotic
authority in his vain c o m m a n d s and prohibitions, and to extend the scope
of his tyranny and oppression. [Browne 1910, 25]
H e sought to show in his editoriais the corruption of aU branches of administration, and
the absence of the mie of law. The February issue of Ziyaul-Khafqyn in 1892 carried
one of his longest editoriais. He wrote in part:
A fifth of the Persians have fled into Turkish or Russian through the
streets and markets...rejoicing in spite of their tattered garments, their
sombre countenances, and the meanness of their deliverance and thanking
G o d for satellites...The government has over-ridden and destroyed the
Holy L a w , detests and repudiates civilised administration, despises and
ignores the laws of reason and c o m m o n sense...[Browne 1910, 27-8]
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Sayyed-Jamalled-Din was a great journalist w h o was largely responsible for the
inception of revolutionary journalism in Iran. He wrote criticai articles against the
concession given to Europeans, particularly the establishment of the Russian Cossack
Brigade in Iran in the 1870's. According to one editorial:
Ali foreigners have learned that yours is an authority not to be resisted, a
strength not to be overcome and a word not to be ignored... But the
danger is n o w great and the emergency criticai, for the devils have
combined to repair the hurt which they have sustained, and are eager to
attain their end, and they are determined to mislead that m a n of sin into the
expulsion of ali the rehgious leaders from the country. [Browne 26]
7.2.3 Qanun

(The L a w ) Paper

M a l k o m Khan founded the famous newspaper Qanun (The L a w ) in 1890 in order to
propagate his views to Iran from London, where he was in exile. Although the paper
was a sporadic, one-man enterprise, it became so influential in Tehran that it was
banned. Its mere possession became a state crime, and it was later hailed as a major
factor in the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution. The first issue set the tone
the 40 issues that appeared in the next eight years. Headed with the slogan 'unity,

justice, and progress'; it began with a Muslim prayer in Arabic and then a long editor
in straightforward Iranian stressing the need for national laws. [Abrahamian, 1979,
398] Here is a sample of Malkom Khan's vigorous editorial writing:
God has blessed Iran. Unfortunately, his blessing has been negated by the
lack of laws. N o one in Iran feels secure because no one in Iran is
safeguarded by laws. The appointment of govemors is carried out without
laws. The dismissal of officers is done without laws. The monopoUes are
sold without any laws. The statefinancesare squandered without laws.
The stomachs of innocent citizens are cut open without laws. Even the
servants of G o d are deported without laws. Every one in índia, Tiflis,
Egypt, Istanbul, and even among the Turkaman tribes knows his rights
and duties. But no one in Iran knows his rights and duties.
By what law was this mujtahed deported?
By what law was that officer cut into pieces?
By what law was this minister dismissed?
By what law was that idiot given a robe of honour ?
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The servants of foreign diplomats have more security than the noble
princes of Iran. Even the brothers and sons of the Shah do not k n o w what
tomorrow will bring whether exile to Iraq or flight for dear life to Rússia
[Qanun, February 1, 1890].
Subsequent issues of Qanun described the type of laws that would establish security
and thus stimulate social progress, free discussion of ali topics and freedom of
expression. Malkom-Khan printed the letter of an Iranian merchant describing his
views on the increasing number of concessions being granted by the government:
A merchant from Qazvin writes: By what law does the government sell
our nationalrightsto foreign racketeers? Theserights,according to both
the principies of Islam and the traditional laws of Iran, belong to the
people of our country. These rights are the means of our livelihood.
The government, however, barters Muslim property to the unbelievers.
B y what law? H a v e the people of Iran died that the government is
auctioning away their inheritance?
Dear merchant, the government has mistaken our inception for death. It is
time for the Mujtaheas and other knowledgeable persons to arise and save
the people of Iran: law and more law. [Qanun, July 6, 1890]
The writings of Malkom-Khan were of two-fold historical importance. Politically, they

buttressed and advanced the Revolution, the renovation of Iran, and the founders of the
movement of Iranian nationalism. From the literary point of view, they were the sole

origin of a peculiar style, at once easy and agreeable, admirably suited to fluent poli
communication. [Browne, 1914, 19] Figure 7.3 reproduces the first page of Qanan
(Law) paper No. 21,1895.
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7.2.4 T h e Politicai Press in the 1890's
Following the pioneering work of Akhtar and Qanun, both exile newspapers, the
politicai press developed its skills and influence through the turbulent 1890's, both
exploiting and taking advantage of mounting unrest. With the arrival of the agents of
the British Tobacco C o m p a n y and the public knowledge of the granting of the
monopoly, opposition surfaced immediately. The callous insensitivity of colonial
agents further inflamed the people. Shabnameh

began to appear condemning the

government for selling the country to infidels. Nationalism conceived through a
reUgious perspective was the dominant theme of the anti-monopoly agitations.
There was also increasing awareness permeating ali strata of Iranian society about
freedom, liberal equality, and democratic mie due to an increasing interaction with
Western societies. Prominent critics such as Mirza Saleh Shirazi, Mirza Ali Khan
Amin-Al Dowleh, Sayyed Jamalled Din Assadabadi, and others w h o were criticai of
the feudalist state and foreign domination of Iranian socio-economic affairs, were
among the first to generate a bourgeois awareness in the society. Newspapers such as
Sorayya (Plêiades), Parwarish (Education), Habl-al-Matin (Firm Cord), together with
established newspapers such as Qanun (The L a w ) , and Akhtar (Star) continued as
effective critics and propagandists.

For example, the first issue of Qanun in February, 1890, emphasised the 'disordered
and corrupt conditions of Pérsia, which were ascribed, firstly to the absence of any
law, and secondly, to the misdeeds of the Prime Minister, the A m i n u s Sultan'.
[Browne 1910, 35] Other politicai newspapers capable of giving politicai leadership
gradually emerged in the build-up to the Constitutional Revolution: Sorayya (Plêiades),
and Parwarish (Education) were both exile newspapers. Habl-al-Matin (Firm Cord)
was an exile paper published in Calcutta in its first incarnation then, from 1907,
published in Tehran where it became perhaps the most significant of the politicalleadership papers pubUshed in the capital.
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Largely through the efforts of the exile press, journalism had emerged as a social and
politicai force by the end of the 19th Century. As Mowlana points out, even the most
obstinate bureaucrat had been forced to concede that the press was not to be abused
with impunity:
The 19th century Iranian journalists had learn a lesson that apparently has
to be re-learned at regular intervals - w h e n the public supports them, no
power is strong enough to throttle press freedom. They learned that w h e n
editors are identified with the public cause and put responsibility to the
people above w h i m s and personal convenience, they not only win the
essential backing, but help to generate other forces for freedom within the
country. The newspapers in exile did their work well. In the closing years
of the 19th century Iranian journalism had established itself as a
revolutionary force. F r o m then on, the country was in battle, fighting for
the ultimate victory that the press had helped to engineer. [1963,295]
Although the papers in exile suffered financially, they were better edited and printed
than government papers within Iran. Europe and índia had better printing presses,

better paper and ink, and better facilities for transmission of news. Iranian journalists
were able to capitalise on this strength through the financial aid of Iranian merchants
abroad so many revolutionary papers were able to continue their publication. The rise
of the exile press caused the decUne of government papers in Iran. In the closing years
of the 19th century, there were about six exile papers for each newspaper published in
the country. The intellectual and politicai atmosphere in Iran at the end of the 19th
century was stimulated by an educated group very small but with great influence. The
newspapers in exile shared several characteristics. They were intensely patriotic and
they wanted constitutional rights. They advocated westemisation or, in a more general
sense, modernisation of Iran, but differed widely on how the traditional ways could be
replaced with modem institutions.
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7.2.5 Habl

al-Matin (Firm C o r d ) Paper

The Habl al-Matin (Firm Cord) began publication in Calcutta in 1893-4 with a staff of

Iranian intellectuals. It was the oldest and most important of the regularly publishe

newspapers. Part of it was always devoted to religious and politicai matters during t
revolutionary period. According to Habl-al-Matin :
The government must reverse its present disastrous policy of helping
Russian merchants, creditors, and manufactures at the expense of Iranian
businessmen. The government must protect our businessmen, even if
their products are not yet as good as those of foreign competitors. If the
present policy continues, our whole economy will be ruined. [June 19,
1905]
Habl-al-Matin's criticism of the Shah strengthened during the Constitutional
Revolution:
At aU events the National Assembly ought to make an investigation, and
should ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether the report is true that
while w e are living in our house others are arranging its disposal and
making compacts and conventions with one another without even
informing us of the matters. [1907, N o . 113, 1907]
Publication of Habl al-Matin was interrupted by the reactionary Coup d'etat and
Bombardment of the Majlis on June 23 1908. After the restoration of the Constitution
and the conquest of Tehran by Nationalists it again issued several numbers. It was,
however, suspended and its editor tried and condemned to two years imprisonment by

the restored Nationalists for printing a criticai article. Habl-al Matin was the most
important daily newspaper of the constitutional revolutionary period, influential

particularly in its politicai articles on foreign affairs, especially its criticism o
Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. Figure 7.4 shows the first page of the Habl al-Matin
(Firm Cord) paper, Vol 5, No. 1, 1898.
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Habl-al Matin exemplified the good qualities of both the exile press and the politicalleadership newspaper published in Iran during the Constitutional Revolution. It was

also a strong affirmation of both the literary, poetical and Tanz traditions. An example
is a põem by Malikulsh-Shuara-Bahar (The King of Poets) entitled A criticai Tribute to
Sir Edward Grey printed on November 11, 1912. This long politicai põem satirises the
British Foreign Secretary and reflects the interesting perspective of Habl-al Matin in
treatment of the regime and the interference of foreign powers in the internai affairs
the country, particularly Rússia, Britain and France:
To London speed, O breeze of dawning day,
Bear this m y message to Sir Edward Grey.
To thee in skill, wise Councillor of State,
Ne'er did the world produce a peer or mate!
Great Peter's schemes to thine were shifting sand;
A n d weak by thine the plans that Bismarck planned
Ne'er from Toulon Napoleon's hosts had gone
If on the Pyramids thy n a m e had shone.
Had Paris been in league with thee, in vain
The German hosts had swamped Alsace-Lorraine
Had England 'gainst the States sought help from thee
N o Washington had w o n them victory.
Had the prestige companioned England's arms
Ne'er had the Boers caused England such alarms.
Would Kuropatkin's hosts before Japan
H a d fled had he been guided by thy plan ?
Had the Manchus been aided by thy thought
The rebels ne'er against their king had fought.
And had thy schemes included Persia's life
Notfruitlesshad remained this storm and strife.
"When fortune frowns on man," the proverb goes,
"His wisest act no good resultant shows."
Alas that thou, for ali thy wits, hast wrought
A deed which save regret can yield thee naught!
[Browne 1914, 255-57].
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7.2.6 Irane-Nuw

( N e w Iran) Paper

The biting, satirical emphasis of the Tanz papers was also pervasive in Irane-Nuw
(New Iran), also a major participam in the Constitutional Revolution. This example

depicts 'the disordered dream of Mohammad-Ali-shah on the first night of his arriva
exile at Odessa in Rússia' following his abdication in July 1909 It was printed on
December 16, 1909, in issue 91:
I dream once more I mie o'er Persia's land,
A n d in m y garden scoff at God's command.
Bahadur Jang before me still I see,
W h o cries' O King! M a y I thy ransom be!
Liakhoff too, my Russian colonel true,
Marshals his Cossacks still before m y view.
While old Mushinfs-Saltana, the cow!
Drains, as of yore, the people's life-blood now,
And Sa'du'd-Dawla, egotist unique,
Still loot the town of Tabriz in m y dream.
Still from the Russian Bank my wars to wage.
I beg for cash and offer pledge and gauge.
[Browne 1914, 221].
The Irane-Nuw (New Iran)effectively created a new form of politicai journalism by
composition of popular poems dedicated to politicai issues, intelligible to a wider
audience than literary poetry. The following sample põem entitled Mother's Lullaby
(lay-Lay-i-Madaraneh) shows this exciting function of the paper during the
Revolutionary period. It uses the repetition of popular refrains to drive home the
message of protecting Iran against invasion by foreign powers. It was printed on
February 2, 1910, in No. 123 of the Irane-Nuw paper.
Mom hath come and the time for work, with a lam-lay, lam-lay;
Tis a shame any longer to sleep or to shirk, with a lam-lay,
War's toward, and work for ali; no time to waste, with a lam-lay
"Our country's hope on this work is based, with a lam-lay,
Rise, then, rise, and to college haste, lam-lay, lam-lay!
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From the martyrs' blood and thy forbears' dust, with a lam-lay,
lam-lay,
A rampart rings thee which thou canst trust, with a lam-lay, lam-lay:
Sorrow w e may, but struggle w e must, with a lam-lay, lamlay!
A Persian boy art thou, and Pérsia thy fatherland, with a lam-lay
Well in a faultless body a fearless soul doth stand, with a lamlay!
That soul art thou, and this body of thine is the Persian land, with a Lam Lay.
Rise in arms, and to save the State thy quality show, with a lamlay!
Wherefore, O tender rose-bud, is Pérsia brought so low, with a lam-lay!.
With a garment of glory invest thyself, that it be not so, with a
Lam-lay!
No longer the cot but the saddle now is thy proper place, with a lam-lay!
O lion-cub, 'tis time for the chase, with a lam-lay, lam-lay!
Arise, arise, for a foamed lurks in each sheltering space with a lam-lay!
Suffer not that thy native land be the foemahs share, with a
lam-lay !.
Since it hath like thee a hero bold and a champion rare, with a lam-lay !
Let not its honour decline and its hope be turned to despair,
with a lam-lay!
Lay-lay, bala-lay! Lay-lay, bala-lay-lay!
[Browne 1914, 226]
7.2.7 Ruhul-Ghudus

(The Holy Spirit) Paper

The Ruhul-Ghudus (The Holy Spirit) paper, printed in Tehran in 1907, achieved a
special notoriety by its exceptional courage, publishing in its thirteenth number a
personal attack on Mohammad Ali Shah and his anti-constitutional actions, threatening
him with the fate of Louis XVI, King of France, and recalling the Great French
Revolution:
The editor [Sultanu 1-Ulama Khorasani] of this paper was a man of
extraordinary convictions and zeal, and took a personal share in the
National efforts to defend the Constitution. Thus he participated in the
struggle between the Nationalists and the troops of Mohammad-Ali Shah
on the occasion of the Reactionary Coup d'etat of June 23, 1908, and
fought valorously in defence of the Majlis. Finally, he was taken prisoner,
was confined in chains in the Bagh-i-Shah, and ultimately suffered a
martyr's death, and was thrown into a well. [Browne 1914, 87-88]
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The Ruhul-Ghudus was thoroughly liberal and revolutionary in its politics. Toward the
end of October, 1907 the Shahs' conduct aroused great suspicion, sparking press
attacks and consequent conflicts between editors and the Shah. Sultanul-UlamaKhorasani, also published a criticai article entitled 'A Word from the Unseen, or
Unambiguous Hint,' against Mohammad-Ali-Shah's policy in its issue of November 6,
1907:
We neither dream of authority, nor think of office: we strive with our
whole souls to guard our native land and protect our fellow countrymen,
nor will w e disregard the duty of uttering the truth. There is a difference
between subjects and slaves: to submit to selfish ambitions is incumbent
on slaves, not on subjects, w h o are no slaves but free m e n , even equal to
the king himself. It is for them to reward the king's claims for his
guardianship only when the king fulfils the duties of such guardianship
and shepherd ship. The sheep does not exist for the benefit of the
shepherd, Rather does the shepherd exist for its service. [Browne 1914,
155-7]
H e briefly analysed modern Iranian history, recalling the names and deeds of Iran's
great kings, who despite their wars and conquests had been concerned with securing
the Uves and overcoming the poverty of their subjects. With considerable vimlence, he
castigated the Qajar dynasty;
When the cycle of sovereignty reached Nasser'ud Din-Shah the leaf was
tumed back, and the evil star of the nation was in the ascendant. A gang
of pampered, poor-spirited courtiers, bereft of honour, encouraged the
autocratic tendencies of the King. . .Have ali the kings of the World
neglected their duties and proper functions and tumed their attention to
butchery? Are ali the nations of the World, like the unhappy nation of
Iran, become thralls to the tyranny and selfish ambitions of their rulers?
... Is it not possible, then, that the story of Louis the sixteenth m a y be
repeated in this kingdom?... N o mie can endure to the king in the face of
foreign dominion, under which he will have to exchange the dream of
Empire for the dervish's horn and glory of sovereignty for the misery of
subjection. [Browne, 1914, pp. 157-9]
Figure 7.5 shows thefirstpage of Ruhul-Ghudus

paper N o . 1, 1907.
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7.3 T h e Tanz

P r e s s — a Stimulative Function

The effectiveness of the Tanz press as a means of ridicule and elucidating important
themes in a popular way has already been demonstrated in the previous section. The
virtues of this genre were much intensified in the mobilisation of 1906-7 when Tanz
really came into its own, with humorous newspapers writing in a simple, unadomed
style, and using caricature in a manner intelligible to a mass audience. Popular and
satirical poetry became common literary forms as well. In each of these genres a

poUtical culture of opposition and resistance was elaborated and spread widely, at lea
in urban settings, during the revolutionary movement. [Foran, 1991, 27]

In such a factorable context for politicai satire and caricature, the number of satiri
comic and humorous publications increased. The most amusing of the comic and
satirical papers included the Charand-parand column of the Sure-Israfil (The Angel of
Resurrection), the Sharq (East) and Nasime-Shomal (Northern Breeze), Kashkul (The
Alms-Gourd), Buhlul , Shikhe-Chughoundar (The Reverend Beetroot), MullaNasru'd-Din, Ehtiyaj (Need), and the humorous newspapers Azarbaijan and

Hasharatu'l-Arz (Reptiles of the Earth). Table 7.2 lists (Tanz) papers that were print
during the revolutionary period, preparatory to an examination of their content.
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Table 7.2
Significant Tanz Press of the Revolutionary Period

Name
The Dawn (Tullu)
Admonition (Tanbih)

Frequency

Founded

Location

Weekly

1901

Tehran

1907

Tehran

_

Azarbaijan

Weekly

1907

Tehran

Northern Breeze
(Nasime-Shomal)

Weekly

1907

Rasht

Charivari (Charnd-Parand)

1907

Tehran

Need (Ehtiyaj)

1907

Tabriz

Ay-Mulla-Amu

Weekly

1908

Tabriz

Reptiles of the Earth
(Hasharaf ul-Arz)

Weekly

1908

Tabriz

The Alms-Gourd
(Kashkul)

Weekly

1909

Tehran & Isfahan

1911

Istanbul

Madcap (Sheida)

Tabriz

Mulla-Nasiru' d-Din

Weekly

The Lord's Jungle
(Jangle-Mowla)

Weekly

1910

Tehran

The People's Herald
(Jurchi-ye-Millat)

Weekly

1910

Tehran

The Beggar's Wallet
(Chanta-ye-Pabrehna)

Weekly

1911

Tehran

The Reverend beet Root
(Shikhe-Ghuqundar)

Weekly

1911

Tehran

1911

Tehran

1911

Tehran

The Scale (Mizan)

Buhlul

Weekly
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7.3.1 Nasime-Shomal

(Northern Breeze) Paper

Northern Breeze (Nasime Shomal) was one of the better literary papers, containing
many notable poems, both serious and satirical. The following specimen põem entitled
"Ayway-Vatan-Way" (Thou-Sight Fatherland) by Ashraf of Gilan, illustrates the

ferment of the revolutionary movement and the press participation in it. It was printe
Number 9 of the Nasime-Shomal paper on January 2, 1908 when the revolutionary
movement was at peak momentum. (In February 1908, an assailant threw a bomb at the

Shah's car, killing one of his attendants and wrecking the vehicle.) This politicai põ

excited patriotic feelings among Iranians, stimulating them to join the national protes
against the autocracy of the Qajar Shahs. The use of slang (vernacular) distinguished

the Tanz press of the revolutionary period from the more restrained literary conventio
of traditional poetry. It alludes satirically to intervention of foreign countries in

affairs of Iran (verse 4), corruption of statesmen (verse 7), and social inequality (v
8).
1-Our country is flooded with sorrow and woe, O, for our land woe
Arise, and for coffin and cerements go
O, for our land w o e
2-With the blood of our sons for the fatherland shed. The moon shines red;
Hill, plain and garden blood-red glow:
O , for our land w o e
3-Where are zeal and courage and strife A Nation's life?
The floods of trouble around us flow
O, for our land w o e
4-Foreigners trample on every side On Islam's pride;
O, for our land w o e
O f our Freedom naught but the name they know:
5-Not only our land is lost and misnamed; Our faith 's defamed:
E'en the flowers in the garden stunted grow:
O, for our land w o e
6-The nightingale dares not to sing of the rose: Red the daffodil
grows, A n d red the lily-white flowers blow,
O, for our land w o e
7-Some of our statesmen are brigands sheer; No mystery here
8-For Khalkhafs sake are our hearts in gloom: 'tis the Day of Doom
Not even a shirt hath the peasant to show:
O, for our land w o e
9-To Urmi the Turkish commander, we hear, Swift draws near,
While at Astara Shahsevents strike a blow
O, for our land w o e
[Browne 1914, 184]
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It is not surprising that the best humour, satire and caricature of the revolutionary period
appeared in poems. Poetry was a venerated art in Iran and the Persian language had a
noble traditional literature whose resonances echo even in translation. Love of poetry
was deeply embedded in Iranian society and culture. It w a s not surprising, therefore,
that the press recognised the appeal of poetic forms to the popular audience and used it
with great skill to disseminate revolutionary messages. T h e number of

Tanz

pubUcations, rather more than overtly politicai newspapers, suggests that poetic genres
had more audience impact than direct politicai exhortation, despite the skills of the
poUtical journalists. The press ofthe revolutionary movement was fortunate in attracting
the skills of fine poets such as Ashraf of Gilan w h o used the simple folk language to
depict social problems in his poetry. This specimen of Ashraf s poetry adopts the
satirical device of placing the exhortation in the mouth of an imaginary reactionary
opposed to Ashraf s support for the revolution. Thus, it enables the poet to bring out
the evils of autocratic reaction, social insecurity, and lack of constitutional law without
stating them directly himself:
O Ashraf, be no longer over-bold!
B e not so insistent about the Constitution!
I a m an adversary and enemy to aU the people;
I wiU not unite with any one;
I a m a Reactionary, a Reactionary, a Reactionary!
D o not thou preach Constitutionalism!
O little minstrel, arise, strike the harp and the lute!
O little cup-bearer, give wine quickly!
If the Empire is lost, to H e U with it!
Prate not of the Turk and the Empire!
I drink for wine the blood of the people;
I eat for roast meat the flesh of the people;
I have no fear of torment and retribution;
D o not put m e off with threats of to-morrow's Resurrection!
dPut not thy trust in the words of the Franks;
Talk not ofthe maxims ofthe schools;
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D o not find fault with such as love the ancient ways;
D o not exult in the awakening of the Nation!
What can I do ? the enemy is sharp-witted?
He has broken into this garden and meadow:
A U Sawujbulagh is topsy-turvy.
W e e p not over the people's condition!
If Urumiyya is gone, Khurasan is enough;
If that too goes, Isfahan is enough;
If naught else be left, Tehran itself is enough !
O Ashraf, work no further mischief!
[Browne 1914, 189].
A s well as extensive satirical verse, Nasime-Shomal supported the revolutionary forces

by printing criticai articles against the Shah's policies and those of his reactionary
ministers. Unquestionably, this combination of humour, satire and vigorous, polemicai
prose made it an extremely potent force during the Revolutionary period. Here, Ashraf
Gilan argues that the country is controlled by the despotic regime. [Nasime Shomal,
No. 16, April 14, 1908]
O Ashraf, what is this outcry and lamentation ?
W h a t is this sighing and crying for the people?
Speak out plainly: who and what are you?
Are you [a m a n of] one maund, or ten maunds, or twenty?
Even if the flood carries away this city and land,
K n o w for a surety that sleep overpowers us.
What is the newspaper ? What is this disturbance ?
Think of some action, for there is no dearth of talents.
Rússia and Japan are nothing to us!
W h a t have w e to do with Rússia and Germany?
If the luminary of the Constitution hath shone forth, what is that [to us] ?
If the Sun of Knowledge hath arisen, what is that [to us] ?
[Browne 1914, 193]
This p õ e m makes an interesting, if ambiguous, reference to the role of the press. It

appears to confirm the transforming call of the press by satirising the apathy of publ
opinion in view of the impact of the press. [Nasime Shomal, May 11, 1908.]
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The following põem, containing considerable slang, adopts a cynical approach to the
proposition that Iran has at last attained a free press.
We say that now at last the Press is free,
That Pérsia shall regain prosperity,
That firmly based is now our Liberty,
That colleges abound increasingly.
Bottle and stone best typify our state!
Needs must our caravan be lame and late!
An ass becomes our arbiter supreme,
A dog controls each project and each scheme,
A fox the object of respect doth seem,
Shapshal' a trusty treasurer w e dêem:
What piece can move to save the King from mate?
Needs must our caravan be lame and late.
[Browne, 1914, 196].
Another long p õ e m appeared in the same paper, Number 27, issued on March 5, 1909.
It is supposed to express the despair of the Devil at the downfall of Despotism and,
apart from its satirical power, is not, as Browne observes, lacking in merit and
originaUty.
The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'111 do? O what'111 do?
"For the Constitution has found its feet:
What'111 do ? O what'111 do ?
The Bird of Liberty preens its wings in a rose-girt land,
A n d Tyranny's vein is severed at last by Justice's hand,
A n d the Despot's eyes are blinded by Freedom's gleaming brand,
A n d the autocrats are, it would seem, dead beat,
What'111 do? O what'111 do ?
The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'111 do ? O what'111 do ?
***

M e n of sense I a m mad: Twere best you should let m e alone!
Lest I arise and break your heads with stick or with stone !
For the autocrats aU are uprooted and scattered and over-thrown,
A n d the Flag of Freedom the people greet:
What'111 do ? O what'111 do ?
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The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'111 do? O what'111 do?
***

Deceit is dead, and cruel oppression hath passed away:
Hypocrisy's crushed and godless bribery's lost its sway:
Fallen and dead is the despot, his head with grief grown grey:
His sighs to heavenriseswift and fleet,
What'111 do? O what'U I do ?
The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'111 do? O what'111 do?
***

For seven months this country no Constitution knew:
With our whips and our scourges the backs of the peasants were black and blue.
But n o w from the libertine's tables the chickens and game and stew
Have taken their flight with hurrying feet:
What'111 do? O what'111 do?"
The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'111 do? O what'111 do?
***

Heavens! What hath become of our curses and oaths and blows ?
Our pavilions and pomps, and the thrones and truncheons which w e dispose?
The sticks and scourges and rods that were ready in ranks and rows ?
What hath arrested our nimble feet ?
What'11 1 do? O what'111 do?"
The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'111 do? O what'111 do?
***

What hath become of our slaughter of peasants and torments grim ?
What of our roasted lambs and our goblets filled to the brim ?
What of our sherbets sweet and the succulent capon's limb ?
Whither is gone our delectable meat?
What'111 do? O what'111 do?
The wily old Devil did groan and greet
[Browne 1914, 210-12].
7.3.2 Charand-Parand

Charand-Parand

(Charivari) Paper

was essentially a weekly column which was part of another

newspaper, the Sure Israfel (The Angel of Resurrection). In effect, it was the satiri
portion of that paper. The title of this satirical section clearly acknowledges the

London Punch , the pre-eminent English humorous and satirical joumal of its era, als
known as the London Charivari. Punch was widely imitated; for example, in the
successful Melbourne Punch published for some years in Austrália. It might also be
argued that the drawings in Charand-Parand and other Iranian Tanz papers had a

certain resemblance to Punch caricatures. A principal contributor was the poet Dakha
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or Dih-Khuda of Qazwin, w h o was familiar with the Azarbayjani dialect. Like other
Tanz writers, Dakhaw directly invokes his own person in his appeal to the reader,
personalising the trials and those of the Iranian people by reference to his own
misfortunes.
(1) To-day the appeal of Dakhaw ascends to the Throne of God; with grief for the
Constitution the bonés of D a k h a w are burned.
(2) In this land of Qazvin, through the tyranny of Despotism, the household of
D a k h a w is utterly forgotten.
(3) When the luminary of the Constitution arose from Pérsia the spirit of Dakhaw
was illuminated by its dawning.
4) When the Sun of the Constitution arose talk of it was ever on Dakhaw's tongue.
(5) May my tongue be cut out now that I hear that harm befalls the pillars of the
Parliament!
(6) The ambassador of Autocracy hath set his foot in the Majlis; an autumnal blast
hath blown over Dakhaw's garden.
(7) The foreigner hath stepped into the midst of the Deputies; Dakhaw's gelder-rose
and cypress and Judas-tree are broken !
(8) If (which God forbid!) the Parliament suffers hurt, Dakhaw's enemies will set
fire to his soul.
(9) The Imam-Juma (Chief Priest) of Qazvin hath east the fire of tyranny, malice
and despotism on the family of Dakhaw.
(10) On account of the tyranny and spite of this autocrat in sheep's clothing the
waiUng and lamentations of D a k h a w affect the very stones.
(11) I will become one of the humble servants of Ashrafu'd-Din if this piteous
p õ e m of Dakhaw's should be inserted [in his paper]" [Browne 191].

7.3.3 Azarbaijan

Paper

The Azarbaijan first printed in early 1907 in Tabriz, was notable for its use of colour,
paving the way for the popularity of colour illustration in the Iranian press. Its wit
vivacity made an important contribution to the revolution, Browne describing it as one

of the funniest and most effective of the numerous Tanz papers. Indeed, its genre might

accurately be described as illustrated comic paper. It combined direct politicai analys
with a quirky satirical perception, the quality of its caricature vividly enhanced by
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colour. Azarbaijan was published in Persian and Azari Turkish and its politics were
overwhelmingly Liberal and pro-Constitutional. According to Mowlana:
When the Azarbaijan got the colour process in its printing press, Saffarof
[the editor] had a n e w m é d i u m to exploit His illustration which had
steadily expanded in size, n o w could appear in colour, as could the boldtype headlines. [1963, 345]
This politicai p õ e m was printed in N u m b e r 17 oí Azarbaijan on October 11,1907. The
põem has some interesting aspects, particularly the foreshadowing of Germany as an
intruder into the internai affairs of Iran. Although German was in expansionary mode

at that time, the writer's satire would appear to have been better directed at Rússia a
England, the two colonial powers already dominant in Iran. Perhaps, also, the writer
was subtly using the growing power of Germany and the increasing tensions in Central
Europe to strike indirectly at Rússia and England, also threatened by rising German
power.
(Fortunate is your advent! Greeting and Welcome to thee, O Germany!)
O newly-arrived guest of Pérsia, welcome!
O Germany! Your place is on our eyes: welcome!
Pérsia is like a well-filled table with foreigners for guests;
O guest unbidden to this table, welcome !
Thanks be to God ! The moming of union hath appeared;
The nights of separation have come to an end: welcome !,
Having finished with the affairs of these two, without delay
Thou didst appear in the land of Pérsia: welcome!
To shear the heads of a handful of innocents
Thou bringest in thy hand a sharp razor: welcome!
Wantonly, with pretexts of College and Bank,
Thou hast attained thy secret object: welcome !
Our cry of lamentation still rises to heaven
O n account of the Russian and British Banks: welcome !
In short it seems that we have now no option.
Save to submit to the orders of the Franks: welcome!
Yet the circling heaven remains not in one position;
Say, Despair not of God! Welcome!
[Browne 1914, 258-9].
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Another criticai põem, appearing in Azarbaijan (May-June, 1909) shows the more
directly polemic style of the paper, directly adjuring the autocratic regime of
Mohammad-Ali Shah to avoid despotism and foUow the Constitutional Law of Iran.
O King, at what dost thou aim by thy despotism?
From such deeds naught wiU be witnessed save evil fortune!
Shew generosity in the w a y of the Constitution, that thou may'st be adored:
The honour ofa man is in generosity and his nobility in worship:
Whoever has not these two his non-existence is better than his existence!
W h o , indeed, is the King, with this his pride and egotism,
That his intentions with regard to us should be good?
W e are the worshippers of G o d and His Divinity,
In whose service, from the dust to the Plêiades,
AU are engaged in commemoration, prayers, rising up and bowing down.
The Constellation ofthe Constitution appears from the Firmament of Perfection:
The Night of Parting draws to an end, and the M o m of Union dawns:
Ali will be well through the Glory of G o d Most High.'
O thou w h o art in hardship, poverty and distracted circumstance.
Be patient, for these few brief days will come to an end!'
O n e must not expect from this king but mistakes, for what w e e see in him is
wrong from one end to the other: counsel him not, for vain is counsel to those of
evil nature.
[Browne 1914, 266-69].

At this time, Constitutional forces were mobilising in the provinces and initiating the
march on Tehran which ultimately defeated the Russian forces and led to the abdication
of Shah Muhammad Ali.

7.3.4 Buhlul,

A C o m i c W e e k l y Paper

Buhlul, another weekly illustrated comic paper was lithographed in Tehran, and first

published in the early part of 1911, towards the end of the constitutional revolutionary
period. This paper defended the ideais of the Democratic Party and attacked and

criticised the government, skillfully exploiting the popularity of politicai caricatures
Buhlul was notable for its involvement in the Shuster incident and its criticism of the
consequent Russian ultimatum.
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A n American, W . Morgan Shuster, had been engaged as Treasurer-General of Iran in
May, 1911. Disillusioned with the interference of Rússia and Britain, the Iranian
liberais had tumed to the United States for financier who could put the budgetary
system of the country on a firm basis. When Shuster arrived in Tehran, the Iranian
National Assembly invested him with very extensive powers, and Shuster and his
American advisory group began their work. Rússia strenuously opposed his
involvement, and in November, 1911 presented Iran with an ultimatum demanding that
Shuster be dismissed. Britain quickly joined Rússia in imposing pressure on Iran to
eject the American administrator.

The Majlis rejected the Rússia ultimatum, with the strong support of the press whose

editoriais criticised the spinelessness of the government and the intrigues of Rússi

Britain. The incident inevitably attracted the attention of the satirical poets of t
newspapers. This põem, written by Arif of Qazwin, entitled "On the departure of Mr
Shuster from Iran" was published in 1911. It was written about the time that the
hapless Shuster was forced from Iran, according to the poet as the direct result of
pressure from the semi-colonial powers.

(D
Shame on the host whose guest unfed doth from the table rise!
Rather than this should happen, make thy life his sacrifice!
Should Shuster fare from Pérsia forth, Pérsia is lost in sooth:
O let not Pérsia thus be lost, if ye be m e n in truth!
(2). . .
Our cup is full unto the brim, our measure overflows;
Our homes are meanlyfilchedaway by base and cruel foes!
And if we suffer Shuster now to leave our Persian land
Eternal infamy our name in history shall brand!
(5)
The wolf and shepherd's dog are one like Layla and Majnun;
A cowardly herdsman guards the flock and will betray it soon.
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O what creative energy our Hearts' Exemplar showed!.
Let not our faithful guardian quit our desolate abode!
[Browne, 252]
(Layli and Majnun are the classical lovers of Eastern Romance, like R o m e o and Juliet,
or Heloise and Abelard.)
Figure 7.8 shows the first page of Buhlul Number 34, 1911. It shows a caricature of
W . Morgan Shuster caught between insidious pressures of a guileful England and a
forceful Rússia to frustrate his financial reforms for Iran. Shuster was eventually
dismissed in December 1911.
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7.3.5 Sheida ( M a d c a p ) Paper

Sheida (Madcap), a combination of the exile press and the Tanz genre, was printed in
Istanbul in 1911 under the editorship of Muhammad-Ziya'ul-Din. It was founded by a
committee of Iranian students. According to Browne [1914, 315], not more than four
or five numbers of it were published, and it was a Democrat paper in politics. Sheida
also printed a criticai article against the Rússia ultimatum, an estimated 12,000 Russian
troops having poured into Iran once again demanding Shuster's dismissal. They
advanced as far as Qazvin, some 90 miles south of Tehran, slaughtered m a n y Liberais
at Tabriz in Azarbaijan, and at Mashhad bombarded the shrine of I m a m Reza.
The Iranian press was muzzled by both the Russians, who had complete control over
the northern provinces, and by the Tehran officials, w h o favoured acceptance of the
Russian ultimatum. Despite the strong resistance of the people, on December 23,1911,
the Iranian cabinet accepted and submitted to the Russian ultimatum. Orders were sent
to the people of Tabriz and other northern cities to stop fighting. Politicai meetings were
prohibited in Tehran, and most newspapers were suppressed [Browne 334-35]
Because Sheida was an exile paper, it was able to publish these virulently satirical
responses to the Russian ultimatum. (See Fig 7.9)

231

7.4 Nocturnal Letters (Shabnameh)

— T h e Information

Function

During the Constitutional Revolution period, the number of shabnameh increased
because the bulk of the press w a s still controlled by the government. MehdiMalekzadeh has suggested that the shabnameh or underground papers played a central
role in the Constitutional Revolution, and that these papers had a deep influence in the
politicai awakening and the extension of n e w ideas such as liberty and law in Iranian
society [Malekzadeh 1951, 65]. Shabnameh

were banned by the Shah, but the people

would endure much inconvenience and difficulty to obtain them. Each single copy often
circulated among more than 100 people. W h e n tradesmen and merchants received a
shabnameh, they would hold a small meeting in a remote caravanserai [a resting área]
and debate the politicai issues raised by the papers. Mokhberull-Saltaneh wrote that 'the
number of Iranian papers and Nocturnal Letters increased during the revolutionary
period...and sometimes there were a horrible picture in first page of these papers such
as dagger, gun, knife, and spear'.[1908, 15] Kuel-Kohan, a contemporary researcher,
has stressed the paramount importance of the shabnameh during this period:
A short time after the Bageh-Shah revolt, a group of journalists stayed in
the capital and established a few Secret Societies, because they could not
print official papers. Also, they used the Shabnameh as a strong politicai
instmment to communicate with the people...their purposes reaching to
the national awakening of Iranians. [Cited Qasemi 1993, 31]
A common means of self-expression was the innumerable Shabnameh that were posted
anonymously, their themes caUing resounding clarion calls against foreign intervention
and domestic oppression. During the Qajar's despotic mie, m a n y other

Shabnameh

were published, including Maqaleh-Melli (National Article), Elamiyeh-Vatan-Parastan
(Manifestation of Patriotism), Maktabe-Melli (National School). These papers played a
central role in the awakening of the people during the Qajar dynasty, as M o w l a n a
acknowledges:
In 1892 thefirstrevolutionary underground paper appeared in Tabriz.
This secret publication, Shabnameh (Nocturnal), was the first of its kind
in Iran. It was published by Ali-Gholi-Khan. Turkish is the spoken
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language in Azerbaijan and the Shabnameh printed in Turkish offered a
n e w choice to Azerbijani readers. Because of its contents it had great
popular appeal. In amusing idiomatic language Ali-Gholi-Khan
sarcasticaUy criticised the local authorities. [1963 293]
Thus the titie of the first underground paper gave its name to the subsequent genre.
Browne argued that the impact of the shabnameh was comparable to that of newspapers
such as Akhtar (Star) and Qanun (Law), the eloquent journalism of Prince Malkom
Khan, and the courage and passionate politicai expression of Mirza-Yusuf-KhanMustasharud-Dowleh of Tabriz, martyred in Qazvin. According to Browne, the

nocturnal letters developed from traditional forms of 'jellygraph' printing, essential

reproduced written publications, often with excellent drawings in coloured inks. These
publications were first widely noted at Tabriz and were known as shabnameh, literally
meaning 'night books' but more eloquently described as 'nocturnal letters'. Some

nocturnal letters were issued by newspaper editors such as 'Ali-quli Khan, editor of t
Ihtiyaj (Need).

A notable shabnameh was Talqin-Nameh-Iran , issued in Tabriz during the reign of
Nasseru'd-Din Shah in the form of an admonition addressed to the dying. A garbled
copy was subsequently published in the paper Irsha'd (Guidance) paper at Baku during
the period of liberty Itread:
O servant of God, and son of the servant of God, hear and understand!
W h e n there c o m e to thee the proximate envoys from the Russians, the
English and the House of Ottoman [the Ottoman Turks] and ask thee
concerning thy colleges, thine army, thy roads, thine arts, thy commerce
and thy science...fear not, be not grieved, and say in answer to
them...etc. [Browne 1914, 21]
Another jellygraphed nocturnal letter was printed at Istanbul under the name ShahSavan (King-Lover). This was the name of a well-known group of tribes in North-

West Iran Under the title was written," one number is published every forty years." It

criticised the old methods and principies of administration in what Browne describes a
a very entertaining and laughable manner. Secret Jellygraphed publications resembling
shabameh were produced in Tehran early in the 20th Century under the names Lisanu'1-
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Ghayb (Tongue of the Unseen) and Ghairat (Zeal). Another was the Ruznameh-Ghaybi
(The Unseen Newspaper), which was written in Isfahan and printed in St. Petersburg.
The Ghaybi paper is ascribed to Maliku'1-Mutakallimin, one of the most eminent
victims of the Coup d'etat of June 23,1908. Table 7.3 sets out more information about
significant shabnameh in the preparatory years of the Constitutional Revolution.
Table 7.3
Significant Shabnameh

1900-02

Name
The Tongue of the

Year

Location

Unseen (Lisanul-Ghayb)

1901

Tehran

The Zeal (Ghairat)

1902

Tehran

The Unseen (Ghaibi)

1901

Isfahan

The Genies Bath
(Hammame-Jinniyan)

1901

Tehran

A n underground paper was usually a small quarto sheet without title and generally
lacking date of publication. It carried the editorial statements of the revolutionary
leaders and news of the general uprising. S o m e of these papers even came out daily but
most were weekly, and often irregular in appearance. [Malekzadeh 1951, 102] The skiU
and energy of revolutionary journalists, propagandists, and popular politicai writers
displayed in these underground papers commands respect, not least because of the wide
range of journalistic and illustrative devices used to win public support for the
revolutionary movement. Similar techniques have been used in m a n y subsequent
revolutions. It is not unreasonable, however, to claim that Iranians during the
preparatory period to the Constitutional Revolution and the Constitutional Revolution
itself were among the first to develop and apply this technique.
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7.5 T h e Anjoman

Press

As we have seen, an important phase of the Iranian revolution was the formation of
secret societies (Anjomans) in which the Iranian writers and journalists played a great
part. These groups, which began to meet toward the end of the 19th century, were
essentially discussion groups generally considering liberation from despotism and
benefits of freedom, justice, and education. In the beginning, they did not have any
precise ideology or program of action. Discontent with existing conditions and a belief
in modernisation held their members together. Certainly, they bore little resemblance to
the politicai parties of the West.
Two groups played a more important role in the formation and organisation of the
Anjomans. They were religious leaders and journalists. O f the 54 members of the first
revolutionary committee about 20 were writers and journalists and the remainder
religious leaders and merchants [Malekzadeh 1950, 10] Journalists occupied an
important place in the revolutionary committee because, aside from their literary and
Scholastic background, they could operate secretly or openly by and through the
newspapers. T h e religious leaders were important and respected because they had
virtual monopoly of the dissemination of learning through the religious colleges and
schools, so that the people looked to them for guidance.

The religious societies regarded their task as being merely to awaken the people to the
evils of despotism and the benefits of a constitutional government, and convince them
that the progress was to be achieved by means of the National Assembly (Majlis) where
people could participate in the election of public officials. Again the exile newspapers
were a significant influence:
A n important part in the enlightenment of the members of these societies was
played by the exile press. Copies of the newspapers printed in exile were read
with avidity by the members. [Mowlana, 1963, 316]
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In terms of publication, members of the Secret Centre in Tabriz pubUshed Azad (Free)
and Mujahed (National Volunteer). Nizam-al-Islam Kermani, of the Secret Society in
Tehran, issued the Nedaye-Vatan (Voice of Fatherland) paper. Four members of the
Revolutionary A r m y Committee edited their o w n papers, ali published in Tehran:
Huquq

(Rights), Mosavat (Equality), Ruhal-Ghudus

(The Holy Spirit) , and Sure-

Israfil (The Angel of Resurrection). Thus, the politicai opposition, after years of
enforced silence, rushed to the printing presses to promulgate their new, and old,
politicai ideas. Circles of intellectuals in Tabriz, whose knowledge of Turkish enabled
them to follow cultural trends in the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire, published an
influential Persian language joumal named Ganieh-Funun (Treasury of Knowledge).
These newspapers associated with the secret societies assisted the numerous exile
newspapers in propagating a strong sense of nationalism. [Browne 1914,45]
7.6 Conclusion

In general, the descriptive analysis of samples of the papers and periodic journals
reveal that the politicai press and Tanz papers also played a significant role in the
awakening of Iranian public consciousness in the early 20th century. The ideologies of
the Iranian Constitutional Revolution used the pulpit and the press, poetry and prose to
propagate their ideological perspectives. The volume of politicai literature (leaflets,
pamphlets, shabnameh) distributed in the cities of Iran in this period is said by Rizvani
to 'cause surprise and wonder' to the historians researching the period. [1964, 232]

The social turmoil, and hence the increased receptivity of the masses to politicai and
ideological agitation, facilitated the diffusion of the new ideology. The nomenclature of
the newspapers that sprang up during the revolution reflected these broad ideological
precepts: Tragi (progress), Bidari (Awakening), Adamiyat (Humanity), Azad (Free),
Huquq

(Right), Adalat (Justice), Mosavat

(Equality), Nedaye-Vatan

(Voice of

Fatherland). [Browne 1914, 128] The authority of the ancien regime and its
legitimising devices had already declined by the time the symbols, particularly the
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press, of the n e w order began to emerge. This ideology was responsive to the
economic needs and politicai aspirations of a class whose struggle for politicai power
and recognition had the support of many other strata essentially rejecting Qajar mie.

In the absence of substantial content analysis of the newspapers considered here,
assessment of the virtues of this revolutionary press are largely dependent on scholars
like Browne w h o had consulted a substantial part of the available newspaper stock at
the time of the revolution. Furthermore, Browne also had access to earlier scholarship
into the origins and development of Iranian newspapers, both from Iranian and nonIranian sources. In his judgment, the simplest of the Persian newspapers in style were
the Qanun (Law) of M a l k o m Khan, Al-Jamal, (Beauty), Sharafat, (Nobility) and the
Chanta-pa'-Barahna, (Satchel). Chanta-pa'Baraha was particularly important because
of its successful diffusion of liberal ideas among the villagers and c o m m o n people,
awakening their minds by using language easily intelligible to them. The most firmly
established and prosperous of the Iranian- language newspapers, were the Akhtar and
the Habl-al-Matin, both exile papers in Calcutta. Browne concludes that the services
rendered by these great newspapers were incomparable. Leaving aside the Akhtar
(Star), which was relatively mild—the Qanun (The L a w ) had the strongest impact on
public opinion. The Tarbiyat (Education), Adab (Manner), and Bahar (Spring) must
be reckoned first amongst the Persian literary papers. [Browne 1914, 24]

Inevitably, this account of the revolutionary press had dwelt heavily upon the
newspapers supporting the revolution and opposing the Qajar governments. It is
necessary here to m a k e some brief comment about the press supporting the regime.
Only three newspapers openly championed autocracy, namely the Uqyanus (Ocean),
Ay-Mulla-Amu

and the Fikr (Thought). T h e broadsides published by Shaykh-

Fazlu'llah-Nuri and his followers at Shah-'Abdu'l-'Azim, where they had assembled
and taken sanctuary from the National Assembly in 1907, if these can be considered as
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genuine newspapers, were the most important reactionary media, and have a special
significance in the history ofthe Revolution. [Brown 1914,20]

During the period of the Constitutional Revolution the intellectual awakening spread
rapidly in terms of reach and vigour. The newspapers had a substantial influence in the
renovation of public opinion, especially through the reports of the debates in the
National Assembly, which were published in the eponymous Majlis paper and less
fully in other papers. While the Sure-Israfil (The Angel of Resurrection) and IraneNuw (New Iran) elevated people's politicai outlooks, the Sharafat (Nobility), Al-Jamal
(Beauty), the Chanta-i-Pabrahna,

and others contributed to the rising politicai

consciousness of the working people.
Browne concluded that in point of literary style and expression the best of the older
papers were the Qanun (The L a w ) of Malkom-Khan, and the Sorayya (Plêiades) and
Parwarish (Education) of Mirza-Ali-Muhammad-Khan. A m o n g the later papers the
better were the Sure-Israfil (The Angel of Resurrection), Tamaddon (Civilisation), daily
Habl-al-Matin (Firm Cord) of Tehran, and Irane-Nuw (New Iran). The boldest in their
language were the Ruhu'l-Ghudus, Mosavat, Nuw-Bahar, Sharq, Barq, Sure-Israfil,
and Suhbat. Those most distinguished by moral courage were the Sure-Israfú which
criticised the spiritual authorities, and the Suhbat which condemned prevailing customs.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: INDEX AND AGENT
8.1 Introduction

The fundamental objective of this thesis has been to review the press and traditional
communication channels in Iran, particularly emphasising their participation in the
Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11. There have been few studies of press history
and methodology in Iran either by Iranian or other writers. Ali too often, those that
have been written have comprised lists of newspapers organised in alphabetical order,
and compilations of the names of publications. [See Rabino 1911; Tarbiyat, Browne
1914, Sadre-Hashemi 1953, and Qasemi 1993] Consequently, these works are very
similar because ali the writers have followed the same methodological pattern. T h e
principal exception is Hamid Mowlana's comprehensive review of Iranian journalism in
an historical context.

Printed in 1963, Mowlana's work offered both an historical evolutionary account and
an interpretative analysis of Iranian journalism from its first stirrings in 1837 until the
early 1960's. There have been no other comprehensive studies reviewing the history
and functions of the print media and their effects on the social and politicai awakening
of the Iranian people, particularly during the Constitutional Revolution. Inevitably
M o w l a n a has been a principal source, although this study differs in emphasis and
approach. Informative as w a s Mowlana's text on aspects of traditional
Communications, the press and Iranian journalism were his dominant themes.

Accordingly, the principal advance offered here on Mowlana's classic research is an
attempt to place the development of a mass Communications model of the press in the
context of traditional patterns of Iranian communication, particularly the mosque and
the bazaar. Thus, the thesis has been organised to present a dual Communications
model, incorporating both traditional and mass Communications systems. M u c h of the
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analysis has been directed to identifying the separate elements of the two models, but
with the objective of creating a contextual, rather than an integrated, model. A principal
conclusion here is that an integrated model is neither warranted nor, indeed, feasible.
W h a t is proposed is that the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 brought traditional
and mass Communications together in a loosely-linked dual framework, with the
traditional element unquestionably the most powerful but with a rapidly developing and
potentially potent mass Communications component. This is essentially the model
developed and presented in Chapter 2. (See Table 2-3)
8.2 Revolutionary Tradition and the Constitutional Revolution

In many ways, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 confounds the conventional
historical wisdom of revolutions. Compared with the majority of the world's great
revolutions, it is atypical in several ways, perhaps most importantly in the broad
support given by Iranian middle class elements to the constitutional cause: the religious
leaders, merchants, skilled artisans, intelligentsia, and an emerging bourgeois group
mingling professional and commercial interests. Such a configuration of bourgeois
elements opposed to the established order and prepared to support a revolution has few
parallels. Perhaps the most notable would be the Spanish Civil W a r where the clergy
and the traditional bourgeoisie overwhelmingly supported the revolutionary forces.
There is no analogy in the Spanish Civil W a r , however, with the decisive fusion of
mosque

and bazaar

of religion and commerce, that w a s instrumental in the

revolutionary successes of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The clergy and the
merchants played a predominant role in generating the revolutionary forces through
control of the traditional institutions of mosque and bazaar. In conjunction, the two
institutions with inter-relationships established over more than a thousand years
constituted an extraordinary effective revolutionary instrument. Traditionally, this
relationship of religion and trade, sanctioned by holy text, has been more than a match
for even the most despotic regime. It was, however, a combination that until the early
20th Century at least, could only have been put together in exceptional circumstances.
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Certainly, it would not have been as successful in earlier periods as an ongoing
revolutionary force, and certainly its impact lessened the longer the Constitutional
Revolution lasted.

The contribution of proletariat or working class interests to the decisive early phase
was relatively insignificant. Although it developed s o m e m o m e n t u m after the
Constitutional Revolution began, it was a minor factor in the Revolution's successes. It
m a y even have been a distinct liability because of the propensity of m a n y workers to
give their loyalty to the monarch in return for inducements. The Iranian Constitutional
Revolution, therefore, was untainted by any whiff of Marxism or even significant
working class participation. Nor was it any w a y marked by contending religious
factions, as was the English Civil W a r of the 17th Century.
While nationalism was an important stimulus to the revolution it was nationalism
without a clearly defined focus. It was not comparable, for example, with the European
revolutions of 1848, although both revolutions had a c o m m o n theme in overthrowing
vestiges of feudalism and despotism. A predominant thrust in the 1848 revolutions,
however, was nationalism, the restoration of traditional regional and ethnic identities.
Unquestionably, Iran w a s governed by monarchical despotism with strong feudal
survivals, but it was not an occupied nation. Furthermore, despite its m a n y iniquities
and connivance with imperial powers, particularly Britain and Rússia, the monarchy
was the traditional embodiment of the Iranian state. Although the detested
concessionaires—Britain,

Rússia and, in lesser degree, Belgium— rapaciously

exploited the country, they were at best semi-colonisers. While resentment and
resistance to the colonial exploiters was a principal source of the popular grievances
contributing to the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution, it was not directly the
consequence of full-blooded nationalism. It did not seek to overthrow the monarchy
but at reforming it and curbing its powers to a constitutional monarchy. It must be
concluded, therefore, that the Constitutional Revolution was limited rather than total in
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its objectives, determined to establish a constitutional government and to protect it but
not to destroy and re-build the Iranian state.
8.3 Religion and the Constitutional Revolution

One of the distinguishing features of Iranian politicai history has been the active role
played by the ulama, or religious leaders, in the politicai events of the country. The
Ulama had both ideological and material motivations to support the Constitutional
Revolution of 1906, especially in its early stages. As Algar [1969, 54] has shown, the
ulama had for several generations opposed the state on a variety of popular issues,
particularly, the threats posed by foreign penetration of society. The ulama retained
their spiritual powers though the mosque and minbar, and revived an alliance with the
bazaar merchants to curb and perhaps frustrate the monarchy but certainly not to
overthrow it.

Shi'i Islam is a major but not a predominant branch of Islam, and Iran is the only
nation-state where Shi'i rather than Sunni believers are in the majority. As a religious
world-view, Shi'i Islam arguably has relevant symbolic values which justify resistance
against unjust authority, and legitimates the role of religious leaders as competitors
with leaders of the state. The founding myth is the story of Husssein's (Third Imam)
wilUng martyrdom in the just cause of resisting the usurper caliph, Yazid.1 Legitimate
authority in the Shi'i community has long been shared between politicai and religious
leaders, neither of whom can unambiguously claim to represent fully the will of the
'Hidden Imam', a supreme leader who, according to Islamic tradition, went into transhistorical oscillation in the ninth century. The Shi'i clergy, or ulama, are trained to
interpret Islamic law for believers, and they can assert superior claims to a monarch in
representing authentically the will of the hidden Imam. Nima has argued the crucial
significance of religion in Iranian social consciousness:

l

. The events leading to Imam Hussein's martyrdom began with the division of Islam into Sunni and
Shi'i branches upon the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century (the first century of
the Muslim era).
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It is the most important ideological force for social control; one of the
fundamental bases of religion, and in particular Shi'i Islam, is the
submission to the authority and the acceptance of a goveming elite. Shi'i
c a m e into being as an ideology of protest, and from its birth it acted as a
poUtical force. Shfism, therefore, proclaims the inseparability of politics
and religion. [Nima 1983, 230]

Thus, a revolution with one of its prime objectives the elimination of foreign influences
in Iran could naturally rely upon a native ideology such as Shi'ism. It could not be
relied on, however, to overthrow, or even move decisively away from, a traditional
monarchy. This is a convincing explanation for the gradual drifting away of important

elements of the religious leadership from the Constitutional Revolution after the initial
objectives had been achieved. It is also significant that the ulama decided to exercise

their powers in conjunction with its old ally, the bazaar, in a revival of an historicall
effective conjunction. It is therefore, essential that mosque and bazaar should be

considered as an alliance in the Constitutional Revolution, perhaps a transitory alUance,
but a powerful one nonetheless. They did not participate in the constitutional
Revolution as separate entities both supporting the same cause. Their co-ordinated
participation in the revolution is best illustrated by one of the maxims quoted earlier:
that when the bazaar closed its doors, the mosque opened its doors.

8.4 Class and the Constitutional Revolution
Another factor in the alignment of the ulama and the bazaari leadership with the
bourgeoisie was that both groups were essentially bourgeois because of their
established leadership roles. Although the linkage with more conventional bourgeois
elements was not a typical revolutionary configuration in international perceptions of
revolutionary alignment, it was readily explicable in Iranian history and tradition. The
other principal elements of this bourgeois front against the forces of despotism, were
the intelligentsia, an incipiently revolutionary grouping, the skilled artisans, and a
growing professional and commercial group stimulated by western liberalism and
education, a group mingling both the religious leaders (ulama), merchants, skilled
artisans, intelligentsia, and an emerging professional class mingling professional and
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commercial interests. If bazaar and mosque were reUant on traditional communication
and education, the intelligentsia, and in increasing degree, the nouveau bourgeoisie
looked more to liberal education and propaganda. The intelligentsia particularly
contributed to the development of the press and drew strong sustenance from it

Through the mosque and minbar, the ulama inculcated the revolutionary spirit. The
merchants, together with other increasingly bourgeois groups such as the skilled
artisans and craftsmen, utilised the powerful Communications networks of the bazaar
to bring the bazaari, including workers, into the revolution. The intelligentsia used the
emergent press as the tool for their revolutionary propaganda and organisation.

Thus, the politicai objectives and the politicai communication channels of mosque,
bazaar intelligentsia and professional bourgeoisie were fundamentally different. The
intelligentsia, saw constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism as vital for
establishing a dynamic, modernised Iran. Educated in secular schools, the
contemporary intelligentsia and growing professional classes often lacked a close
relationship with religious scholarly traditions. Furthermore, the commercial element
of the n e w professional classes were also increasingly attuned to westem institutions
such as banks and department stores, lacking the traditional associations with the
bazaar. A U had in c o m m o n , however, the politicai objective of constitutionaUsm. With
the overwhelming support of an emergent press, the constitutional forces were an
inherently incompatible alliance but formidable nonetheless.

8.5 The Press and the Constitutional Revolution

The Iranian press was very much the creation of the Qajar monarchies. Though the
printing press, in theory at least, was available to Iran from the late 15th Century, it did
not appear in Iran in any viable sense until the early 19th Century. (The earlier printing
activities in Iran of missionary groups were very limited, essentially a blind alley.)
First in book publication and then, from 1837, in newspaper and periodical
production, the Qajars sanctioned a very limited newspaper press in Iran. A n y attempt
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at involving the press in modernisation of Iran's society and economy effectively ended
with the removal of A m i r kabir in the early 1850's. F r o m his death until the outbreak
of revolution in 1906 Iran's domestic press was essentially the propaganda instrument
of the Qajars. The consequence was an authoritarian and uncritical press, lacking any
commitment to the independence, technical virtuosity and scrupulous application of
joumaUstic method inherent in the Ubertarian model.

From the early 1880's, this authoritarian press was increasingly challenged by the
development of an exile press with a strong polemicai flavour but also responsible for
disseminating important news, such as the Tobacco Concession arrangements, within
Iran. Towering journalisticfigureslike Sayyed Jamalled Din and M a l k o m K h a n had an
incalculable influence on the nurturing of the Iranian intelligentsia and its native
journalists. In time, these influences filtered through to the development of the
underground press, the publication of the shabnameh,

and the engagement of

increasingly confident Iranian journalists with the revolutionary movement through the
anjomans.

It is difficult to make any convincing assessment of the professional performance of the
press in the Constitutional Revolution in the absence of detailed information about h o w
journalists did their job, and comprehensive analysis of newspaper content. O n e
measure of achievement is the enthusiastic audience response, measured in the surge of
n e w publication and rising circulation figures in the First Constitutional period.
Although these were not sustained, the basis of an assertive, independent and
professional press had been firmly established. Another measure of professionalism is
the innovation and variety the revolutionary press brought to its journalism. Indeed, the
development of a satirical, humorous press, a sophisticated politicai press, and a
superb literary press displaying the traditional Iranian prowess with poetry were
professional achievements that any contemporary westem press might have envied.

An even more significant yardstick of achievement is the response of its opponents
whose o w n meagre press w a s comprehensively routed in the propaganda war. The
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publishers and journalists of the revolutionary press paid a heavy price in terms of lost
employment, harassment, humiliation, denunciation, imprisonment, banishment and
even agonising death. For performance of duty in the creation of an independent press,
the revolutionary press suffered heavily. Their sacrifice was rewarded in the durabihty
of the press traditions they had created in the difficult years that followed the
Constitutional Revolution.

In summary, it must be conceded that the Constitutional Revolution would almost
certainly have achieved the successes it did with little or no press presence. The
traditional Communications mechanisms of the mosque-bazaar alliance were powerful
enough in their o w n right to frustrate the Shah and ensure the granting of the
constitution. Thus, it is possible to assess the Constitutional Revolution as a triumph
for oral and written news utilised through Communications systems which had shed
little of their traditional power. The contribution of the intelligentsia, however, both in
the preparatory period and the revolution itself, must be acknowledged as a n e w factor
in the accustomed patterns of Iranian politicai confrontation. The press was both the
inspiration and the spearhead of the intelligentsia's contribution and also that of the
developing professional and commercial bourgeois elements. Its journalists participated
directly in the revolutionary movement as Iranian patriots, serving also as chroniclers
of a great revolution in the columns of numerous publications. In the vivid phrase of
M o w l a n a , the press had been both index and agent of the Iranian Constitutional
Revolution of 1906-11.
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APPENDIX 1

THE PERSIAN ROYAL PROCLAMATION (FARMAN) OF THE
CONSTITUITONAL REVOLUTION OF 1906

The Persian Royal Proclamation of the Constitutional
Revolution of 1906
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T h e Translation of Royal Proclamation ( F a r m a n ) of August 5, 1906

Whereas God Most High (glorious is His State!) hath entrusted to our hands the direction

of the progress and prosperity of the well-protected realms of Pérsia, and hath constituted
Our Royal Personage the Guardian of the Rights of ali the people of Pérsia and of aU our
loyal subjects. Therefore on this occasion, our Royal and Imperial judgement has
decided, for the peace and tranquillity of ali the people of Pérsia, and for the
strengthening and consolidation of the foundations of the State, that such reforms as are
this day required in the different departments of the State and of the Empire shall be
effected; and we do enact that an Assembly of delegates elected by the Princes, the
Doctors of Divinity (Ulama), the Qajar family, the nobles and notables, the land- owners,
the merchants and the guilds shall be formed and constituted, by election of the classes
above mentioned, in the capital Tehran; which Assembly shall carry out the requisite
deUberations and investigations on ali necessary subjects connected with important affairs
of the State and Empire and the public interests; and shall render the necessary help and
assistance to our Cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as are designed to promote the
happiness and well-being of Pérsia; and shall, with complete confidence and security,

through the instrumentality of the first Lord of the State, submit [their proposals to Us],
so that these, having been duly ratified by Us, may be carried into effect. It is evident
that, in accordance with this August Rescript, you will arrange and prepare a code of
regulations and provisions goveming this Assembly, and likewise the ways and means
necessary to its formation, so that, by the help of God Most High this Assembly may be
inaugurated and may take in hand the necessary reforms. We likewise enact that you
should publish and proclaim the text of tbis August Rescript, so that ali the people of
Pérsia, being duly informed of our good intentions, ali of which regard the progress of
the Government and People of Pérsia, may, with tranquil minds, engage in prayer for
Us. Given [under Our hand] in the Sahib-Qiraniyya Palace on the fourteenth of Jumada
the Second in the eleventh year of Our Reign (August 5,1906).l
*. The Translation of the Royl Proclamation of August 1906 is based on the work of Browne,
353-354
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APPENDIX THREE

THE IRANIAN PRESS—AN OVERVIEW
ANNUAL PUBLICATION—1907—1925

The tables below are designed to provide an annual snapshot of the Iranian press from
the peak of the Constitutional Revolution in 1907 until the accession of the Pahlavi
Dynasty in 1925. Each annual table sets out three things:
• A complete tisting of each news pubUcation pubUshed in the designated year;
• Regularity of publication for each newspaper or journal Usted;
• Designation of genre for each publication.
For selected years, place of pubUcation is also included.

It should be noted that the tables list the gross number of publications each year, not
the net number. In short, publications extending over more than one year will be
counted more than once. This needs to be kept in mind when assessing trends in
publication over 18 years. In broad terms, the tables indicate fluctuations in
newspaper publication which can be attributed to direct consequences of decisive
events in the constitutional Revolution and its aftermath.

Of particular interest to non-Iranian readers are the poetic, evocative titles given to
many of these newspapers, totally different from the cmde labelling mostly applied to
westem newspaper titles.
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Table 1

Newspaper Publication—1907
Frequency

Subject

A'ina-i-Ghayb-Nama (Mirror
Showing the Unseen)

Twice per-week

Political-Economic

Adamiyyat (Humanity)

Twice per-week

Scientific-Economic

Agahi (Information)

Weekly

Al-Jamal (Beauty)

Weekly

Political-Social

Anjwnane-Baladiyyeh (The
Municipal Council)

Weekly-Monthly

News-Historical

Anjumane-Millie Vlayate-Gilan
(The National Provincial Council
of Gilan)

Weekly

News

Name

Daily-WeekJy

Economic-Social

Azarbaijan

Weekly

Critical-Humorous

Baladiyyeh (Municipality)

Weekly

News-Scientific

Baladiyyeh-Isfahan (The
Municipality of Isfahan)

Weekly

Social-News

Bamdad (Morning)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Basirat (Insight)

Weekly

News

Weekly-three times per-week

Political-News

Bistun (Bebistun)

Twice per-week

News-Political

Ekbatan (Ekbatan)

Weekly

News

Farhang (Culture)

Weekly

Politicai

Faryad (The Lament)

Weekly

Political-News

Favayedeh-Ammeh
Benefits)

Weekly

Politicai

—

Politicai

Weekly

Politicai

Anjumane-Asnaf (The Trades
Guide)

Bidari (Wakefulness)

(Public

Ganje-Shayegan (The Royal
Treasure)
Ganjineh-Ansar (The Treasure of
the Helpers)
Ghayb-Nama (Showing the
Unseen)

Gulestan (The Rose-Garden)

Weekly

Gulistan-i-Saadat (The RoseGarden of Happiness)

Twice per-week

Political-Soci/al-Critical

Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord)

Daily

Political-Social

Hamadan

Weekly

News

Haqiqat (The True) in Tehran and
Isfahan

Weekly

Political-Economic

Harfe-Haqq (Right Talk)

Weekly

Politicai

Hawa-va-Hawas (Freak and
Fancy)

Twice per-week

News

Hedayat (Guidance)
Hoda

Weekly
—

Political-Religious

Political-News
Politicai

Huquq (Rights)

Weekly

Political-Historical

Ibrat (Admonition)

Monthly

Politicai

Ilm-Amuz (The Teacher of
Knowledge)

Weekly

Cultural

Ilme-Umur (The Science of
Affairs)

—

Financial

Insqf(Equity)

Weekly

Political-News

Insaniyyat (Humanity)

Weekly

Social

Iraq-Ajam

Weekly

Scientific-Literature

Isfahan
Ittehad (Union)

Weekly-three times per-week

Political-News

T w o weekly

Political-News

Weekly-Monthly

Social-Political

Jahan-Ara (The World Adorning)

Weekly

Political-Social

Jame-Jam (The Goblet of
Jamshid)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Kashgul (The j\lms-gourd)

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Ittihadiyeh-Sa'adat (Happiness of
Union)

Kashife-Haqayeq (The Revealer
of True) in Tehran and Rasht

Twice per-week-weekly

Kukabe-Durri (The Shining Star)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Twice per-week

Political-Humorous

Khayr'ul-Kalam (The Best of

Politicai

Discourses) in Tehran and Rast
Khurram

(Gay)

Weekly

Politicai
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Khurshid (The Sun)

Weekly

Kelide-Siyasi (The Politicai Key)

Weekly

Politicai

Majalleh-Istibdad (The Magazine
of Autocracy)

Weekly

Politicai

Mashruteh-Bi-Qanun (The
lawless Constitution)

Weekly

Political-News

Mashverat (Council)

Weekly

Political-News

Muayyed (i\ided)

Weekly

Political-News

Muhakemat (Judgements)

Daily-twice per-week-

Political-News

News

Weekly-three times per-week

Political-Social

Mosavat (Equality)

Weekly

Political-Social

Namehe-Haqiqat (The Letter of
Truth)

Weekly

News

Naqshe-Jahan (The Picture of the
Wcdd)

Weekly

Social-News

Nasime-Shomal (Northern
Breeze)

Weekly

Political-Humorous-Critical

Nuw-Ruz (New Year's Day)

Weekly

Mujahed (The National
Volunteer) in Tabriz and Rasht

Nayyer-Azam (The Greater
Luminary)

Twice per-week

Political-Scientific

Neday-ye-Islam (The Voice of
Islam)

Weekly

Political-News

Qajariyya

Weekly

Politicai

Qasimu'l-Akhbar (The
Distributor of N e w s )

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Rahnama (The Guide)

Monthly-Weekly

Political-Social

Ruhu'1-Ghudus (The Holy Spirit)

Weekly

Political-Scientific-Critical

Ruznameh-i-Shaykh-Fazlu'llah,

Weekly

Politicai Religious

Sa'adat (Felicity)

Weekly

News

Scfineh-Nejat (The ,\rk of the
Deliverance)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Sahele-Nejat (The Shore of
Safety)

Twice per-week

Scientific-Literature

Salam-Alaykum (Peace be upon
you)
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Weeldy

Shamse-Taleh (The Rising Sun)

Weekly

Soci<al

Shukr (Gratitude)

Weekly

Social-News

Shura-ye-Baladi (The Municipal
Council)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Sehhat (Health)

Weekly

Hygienic

Seratul-Mustaqim (The Straight
W a y ) in Tehran and Tabriz

Weekly

Political-Religious

Daily

Political-Economic

Sure-Israfil (The Trumpet-Call of
Israfil)

Weekly

Political-Social

Surush (Message)

Weekly

Political-News

Tadayyun (Religiousness)

Weekly

Political-Social

Tafakkur (Thought)

Weekly

News

Weekly-once every ten days

Politicai Social

Tariqatu'l-FalahÇThe W a y of
Happiness)

Weekly

Social

Tashviq (Encouragement)

Weekly

Political-Social

Twice per-week

Political-Scientific

Ulfat (Friendship)

Weekly

Political-Social

Uromiya Orthodoxyaita

Weekly

Religious

Urvatu'1-Vosgha (Indissoluble
Link)

Weekly

Politicai

Zabane-Mellat (The Tongue of
the Nation)

Twice per-week

Politicai N e w s

Zesht-va-Ziba (Foul and Fair)

Weekly

Political-Social

Subhe-Sadeq (The True D a w n )

Tanbih (Admonition)

Traqqi (Progress)
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Table 2
Newspaper Publication—1908
Frequency

Subject

(Teacher)

T w o weekly

Cultural-Social

Anadili (The Mother Tongue)

Weekly

Politicai

Ay

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Twice per-week

News-Poli tical

Weekly

Literature

—

—

Twice per-week

Political-News

Haqiqat (True)

Weekly

Politicai

Hashra-Tul-Arz (Reptiles of the
Earth)

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Hedayat (Guidance)

Weekly

News

Ishraq (Dawn)

Weekly

Name
Amuzgar

Molla-Ammu

Barqe-Sabz (The Green Leaf)
Dabiriyyeh (Teacher)
Entesahare-Azadi
(Publication of Freedom)
Gillan

Weekly-Monthly

Political-News

Twice per-week

Political-News

Weekly

News

—

—

Weekly

Political-News

Twice per-week

Cultural

Mare-Fatui-Akhlaq (Knowledge
of Ethics)

Weekly

Ethical-Literature

Muhakemat (Judgement)

Weekly

Politicai

Nahid (Vénus)

Weekly

Political-News

Naleh-MellatÇTh& Nations' Cry)

Weekly

Political-News

Naqure (The Clarion)

Weekly

Political-Critical-Humorous

Nazmiyyeh-Tabriz
of Tabriz)

Weekly

Military

Ittefaq (Concord)
Ittehad (Union)
Jang (War)
Kakhva (The Star)
Khair-Andysh (Well Meaning)
Maarif (Instruction)

(The Police
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Okhvvate-Shiraz (Fraternity of
Shiraz)

Weekly

News

Ruhul-AminÇThe

Weekly

Political-Historical

Sedaghat (Fidelity)

Weekly

Social

Seratul-Sanayyeh (The W a y of
Ait)

Weekly

Economic-Political

Sharqf (Honour)

Weekly

Social

Monthly

Political-Social

Shura-ye-Iran (The Council of
Iran)

Weekly

Political-News

Tebabat (Medicai Profession)

Weekly

Scientific-Medical

Tehran

Twice per-week

Cultural-Political

Tiyater (The Theatre)

Three per-week

Social-Literature

Weekly

Politicai

Trusty Spirit)

Sharcfat (Nobility)

Oghiyanos (The Ocean)

Table 3
News

Publications—1909
Frequency

Subject

Afaq (The Horizon)

Weekly

Literature-Social

Aravot or Sobh (Morning)

Weekly

Political-News

Azad (Free)

Weekly

Political-Scientific

Azarbayjan

Weekly

News

Name

Baladiyyeh (Municipality)
Biza (Clear)
Buqalamun (Turkey)
Daneshvaran (Scholar)
Darul-llm ( H o m e of Learning)

Monthly

Social

—
Weekly

Humorous-Critical

—
Weekly

Political-Scientific

Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord)

Daily

Political-News

Hayat (Life)

Daily

Politicai

Hayate-lmiyyeh (Scientific
Association)
Irane-Nuw ( N e w Iran)

Monthly

Cultural-Scientific

Daily

Political-Social
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Twi.ce per-week

Political-News

Itebar (Validity)

Weekly

Political-News

Ittefaq (Concord)

T w o weekly

Isteqkú (Independence)

—

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Daily

News

Khwasan

Weekly

Political-Social

Kermanshah

Weekly

Politicai

Kashkul (The Alms-Gourd)
Khavarestan (Eastern)

Kesalat (Indisposition)

—

—

Marefat (Knowledge)

Weekly

News

Mofateshe-Iran (Iran's Inspector)

Weekly

Political-Scientific

Mohakemate-Yazd (Judgement
ofYazd)

Weekly

News

Mokafat (Recompense)

Weekly

Political-News

Mosavat (Equality)

Weekly

Politicai

Nejate-Vatan( The Country's
Salvation)

Weekly

News

Daily

Political-Social

Once every fifteen days

Political-Historical

Daily

Political-Social

Daily-Weekly

Political-Humorous

Weekly

Political-News

Police-Iran (The PoUce of Iran)
Safhe-Ruzgar (Age Sheet)
Sharq (East)
Suhbat (Talk)
Tamaddun (Civilisation)
Tanqid (Critic)

—

—

Sorayya (Plêiades)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Tos

Weekly

Political-Economic

Urvatu'l-Vosgha (Indissoluble
Link)

Weekly

Political-Social

Vatan (Fatherland)

Weekly

Political-News

Twice per-week

Politicai

Yadegare-Inqelab (Memorial of
the Revolution) in Tehran and
Qazvin
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Table 4
News Publications—1910
Name

Frequency

Subject

Aflatun (Plato)

Weekly

Humorous

Asr (Age)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Asre-Jadid (New Age)

Weekly

Economic-News

Monthly

Political-Social

Weekly

News

Daily-Twice per-week

Political-Social

Weekly

—

Twice per-week

Political-Literature

Weekly

News-Social

Three times per-week

Political-Economic

Weekly

Political-Social

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Isáqlale-Iran (Independence of
Iran)

Daily

Political-News

Isteqlale-Iran (Independence of
Iran)

Non-PeriodiCdally

News

Weekly

News

T w o weekly

Political-Social

Jarchi-ye-Mellat (The Herald of
Nation)

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Jarchi-ye-Vatan (The Herald of
Country)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Junub (South)

Weekly

Politicai

Khbar (News)

Daily

Political-News

Twice times per-week

Political-News

Weekly

Humorous

Twice times per-week

Political-Literature

Bahar (Spring)
Baladul-Amin (The Secure
Land)
Barq (Lighting)
Danesh (Knowledge)
Dastur (Command)
Diwane-Adalat (The Court of
Justice)
Gillan
Hayat (Life)
Irshad (Direction)

htefaq (Concord)
Ittefaqe-Kargaran (Union of
Workers)

Kankash (The Council)
Mahã-Hammal
Porter)

(Mahdi's the

Nuw-Bahar (Early Spring)
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Monthly

Military

Weekly

Political-Literature

Twice per-week

Political-Ethical

Weekly

Politicai

Daily

Scientific-Literature

—

Politicai

Shqfag (The .Afterglow)

Weekly

Political-News

Siyasi (Politicai)

Weekly

Political-News

Surush (Message)

Weekly

Political-News

Tabriz

Weekly

Political-Social

Tamaddun (Civilisation)

Weekly

Political-News

Okhvvat (Fratemity)

Weekly

Literature-Ethical

Daily

News

Valad 'ul-Amin

Weekly

—

Yadeghar-Junub (Memorial of
the South)

Weekly

Political-News

Zang (Bill)

Weekly

Political-Social

Nazmiyyeh (The Police)
Parwaneh fThe Moth)
Qazvin
Ranjbar (Toiling)
Sahile-Nejat (The Shore of
Safely)
Saslsabill

Vagt (Time)

Table 5

News Publications 1911

Frequency

Subject

Monthly

Scientific-Social

Agahi (Information)

Weekly

Political-Historical

Aineh (Mirror)

Weekly

Political-Social

Name
Aftab (The Sun)

Akbare-Imruz (Today's News)

Daily

News

Amuzghar (Teacher)

Weekly

Scientific-Literature

Anjumane-Velayati-Yazd (The
Provincial Council of Yazd)

Weekly

News

Buhlul

Weekly

Political-Critical-Humorous

Chante-Pa-Berehneh (The
Beggar's Wallet)

Weekly

Political-Humorous-Critical

Dar'ul-Aman (Home of Safery)

Weekly

Political-Religious

Dastore-Okhwat (The
C o m m a n d of Fraternity)

Weekly

Political-Social

—

News

Dehgan (Farmer)

Weekly

Political-News

Farwarán

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Faryad (The Lament)

Weekly

Ethical-Poli tical

Defayyeh (Defence)

Hekayate-Jangudaze-Vaqayi-asYazd-Illa-Shiraz (The SoulMeeting Tale of Events from
Yazd to Shiraz)

News

Idare-Kulle-Poste-Iran (The
State Post Office)

Yearly

Ihyaa (Revivification)

Weekly

Political-News

Daily-Weekly

Political-News

Weekly

Political-Literature

Daily

News

Bi-weekly

Political-Literature

Ittelaat (Information)

Daily

News

Ittelaate-Muhammeh (Import-ant
Information)

Daily

News

Iran-Nuvin (Newest Iran)
Islah (Reform)
Itilaate-Ruzaneh (Daily
Information)
Ittefaq (Concord)

Jangale-Mula (The Loard's
Jungle)

Weekly

Jarche-Asrar (The Herald of
Secrets)

Weekly

Politicai

Jarideh-Kirman (Journal of
Kirman)

Once every ten days

Political-Religious

Kashan

Weekly

News

Merate-Junub (The Mirror of
the South)

Weekly

Political-News

Mizan (The Balance)

Weekly

Political-Ethical

Twice per-week

Political-News

Naw-i-Bashar (The H u m a n
Race)

Political-Humorous-Cri

Nejat (Salvation)

Weekly

Politicai

Neda-ye-Junub (The Voice of
the South)

Weekly

Political-Social

Neda-ye-Rasht (The Voice of
Rasht)

Twice per-week

News

Weekly

Humorous-Political

Payetakht (The Capital)
Paykar (Strife)

—

Rade-Qazvin (Thunder of
Qazvin)
Rahbare-Iran-Nuw (The Leader
of N e w Iran)
Rahe-Khiyal (Fancy's W a y )
Ruznameh-Rasmi-ye-DawlatiIran (Official Newspaper of the
Iran's Government)
Saadat (Felicity)
Seda-ye-Rasht (The Rasht Echo)
Shaykh-Chughandar
Takalife--Umumi (The Public
Tasks)
Tazeh-Bahar (Early Spring)
Ummide-Traqgi
Progress)

(Hopeto

Zamane-Vesal (The Time of
Union )

Weekly

Political-News

Daily-Weekly

News

Weekly

Political-News

Daily-Three times per-week

News

T w o weekly

Scientific-Cultural

Twice per-week

PolitiCdal-News

Weekly

Political-Humorous

—

—

Twice per-week

Political-Literature

Weekly

Artistic

Weekly

Political-Literature
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Table 6
News Publications—1912
Name

Frequency

Subject

Location

Aftab (The Sun)

Three times per-week

Political-News

Tehran

Akhlaqi (Ethical)

—

—

Tehran

Chaman (Grass)

Weekly-Three times perweek

Social-News

Mashhad

Farvardin

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Uromiya

Faryade-Vatan

Weekly

News

Tehran

Fekr (Thought)

Weekly

Political-News

Tabriz

Hafieh (Week)

Weekly

News

Tehran

Iqtesad (Economy)

Weekly

Economic-News

Tehran

Khiyal (Imagination)

Weekly

Political-Social

Rasht

Nejat (Salvation)

Weekly

—

Rasht

Daily

Political-News

Tehran

Shqfaq (The Mterglow)

Weekly

Political-News

Khoy

Shahabe-Saqeb (Metor)

Bi-weekly

Political-Social

Kerman

Shukufeh (Blossom)

Bi-weeldy

Ethical-Literature

Tehran

Once every ten days

Social-News

Tehran

(The Lament of Country

Raad (Thunder)

Talia-ye-Saadat
(Vanguard of Felicity)
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Table 7
News Publication 1913
Name

Frequency

Subject

Location

Agagan or Khros (Rooster)

Monthly

Cultural-Social

Tabriz

Arshalouis or Fajr (Dawn)

Weekly

Political-News

Tehran

Ayeq or Tullu ( D a w n )

Weekly

Political-News

Tabriz

Bitarqf (Impartial)

Weekly

Political-News

Tehran

Fars (Pérsia)

Weekly

Political-Social

Shiraz

Irane-Kununi (Present Iran)

Bi-weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Kashef ul-Asrar (Discovery
of Secrets)

Twice per-week

Political-Critical

Mashhad &Tehran

Kurdestan

Monthly

Politicai

Uromiya

Majalleh-Al-Islam (Islamic
magazine)

Monthly

Religious-Historical

Tehran

Majalleh-Rasmi-Maarif
(Knowledge Official Journal)

—

—

Tabriz

Minak

—

—

Tabriz

Qcradaq

Monthly

Politicai

Tabriz

/?aa<í (Thunder)

Daily

Political-News

Tehran

Tufiq (Success)

Weekly

Politicai

Tehran
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Table 8
News Publication—1914
Name

Frequency

Subject

Location

Weekly Tliree times perweek

Political-Social

Tehran

Weekly

Political-News

Tabriz

Threetimesper-week

Political-News

Tehran

Ittilaat (Information)

Weekly

News-Political

Tehran

Jarideh-Islami (Islamic
Journal)

Weekly

Political-Cultural

Tabriz

Jasus (Spy)

Weekly

Politicai

Tehran

Khavar (East)

Weekly

Literature-Historical

Tehran

Threetimesper-week

Political-News

Tehran

—

—

Tehran

Twice per-week

News

Tehran

Weekly-Three times perweek

Political-Religious

Mashhad

Weekly

Politicai

Tabriz

Three times per-week

Political-News

Tehran

Tabriz

Weekly

Political-Social

Tabriz

Tanbihe-Derakhshan (Light
of Punishment)

Monthly

Political-Humorous

Tehran

—

—

Tehran

Weekly

News

Tehran

Asre-Jadid (New Age)

Idalat (Justice)
Irane-Imroz (Today's Iran)

Kurshied (The Sun)
Kushk (Palace)
Mashverat (Consultation)
Minu (Paradise)

Mitaq
Shura (Council)

Tehran
Utarud (Mercury)
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Table 9
N e w s Publications—1915
Frequency

Subject

Location

Adi (Justice)

Weekly

Political-Ethical

Shiraz

Agahi (Information)

Weekly

Social-News

Mashhad

Twice per-week

Political-News

Tehran

Ahde-Traqi (The A g e of
Progress)

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Tehran

AkhlaqiÇMorzlity)

Weekly

Social

Mashhad

Arin

Monthly

Political-Historical

Shiraz

Three times per-week

Political-News

Tehran

—

—

Tehran

Twice per-week

News

Hamadan

—

Politicai

Tabriz

Twice per-week

News

Hamadan

Daily

News

Mashhad

Jame-Jam (The Goblet of
Jam)

Weekly

Political-Social

Shiraz

Karghar (Worker)

Weekly

Political-Economic

--

Majalleh-Ilmi (Scientific
Magazine)

Monthly

Scientific

Tehran

Mukhbre-Yazd (Repórter of
Yazd)

—

—

Yazd

Musaj-Duliran (A Christian
aPublication)

Weekly

Religious

—

Nasime-Shomal (Northern
Breeze)

Weekly

Political-HumorousCritical

Tehran

Nuw-Bahar (Early Spring)

Daily-Weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Nedaye-Haq (The Country's
True)

Weekly

Social-Ethical

Khoy

Bi-weekly

Scientific-Literature

Tehran

Weekly

Political-Ethical

Qazvin

Name

Ahde-Inqelab (The A g e of
Revolution)

Bamdade-Rushan
Morning)

(Light of

Chaman (Grass)
Ekbatan-Nameh-Ishqi
Insaf(Eqmty)
Ittehad (Union)
Ittelaat (Information)

Parvin (Plêiades)
Qazvin
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Sa'lem (Health)
Setare-Iran (Staroflran)
Shahabe-Saqib (Meteor)
Taziyaneh-Ghairat (Zealof
Scourge)
Traqi-Iran (Progress oflran)

Weekly

News-Social

Tehran

Daily

Political-News

Tehran

Bi- weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Shiraz

Weekly

—

Tehran

Table 10
N e w s Publications—1916
Frequency

Subject

Location

Weekly

Politicai

Tehran

Twice per-week

Political-News

Bakhtaran

Daily

Economic-News

Bakhtaran

Bi- weekly

Hygienic-Agricultural

Tehran

Weekly

Political-News

Shiraz

Three times per-week

News

Tehran

Weekly

Social-Political

Shiraz

Twice per-week

Political-News

Shiraz

Daily

News-Political

Tehran

Bi- weekly

Political-Literature

Tehran

Rahe-Nejat (The W a y of
Salvation)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Isfahan

Talia-ye-Subh (Vanguard of
Morning)

Weekly

Social-News

Uromiya

Tazehe-Iran (New Iran)

Weekly

Scientific-Ethical

Hamadan

Name
Ahde-Jadid (New Age)
Akbar (News)
Bistun (Bebistun)
Bitary (Veteriíidary)
Hafeze-Isteqlal (Keeper of
Independence)
Iran
Inteqam (Vengeance)
Ittehade-Islam (Unity of
Islam)
Kankash (The Council)
Parsi (Persian)
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Table 11
N e w s Publications—1917
Frequency

Subject

Location

Amuzghar (Teacher)

Weekly

News-Social

Rasht

Asre-Saadat

Weekly

Political-News

Rasht

Weekly

—

Mashhad

Buhlull

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Rasht

Fars (Persian)

Weekly

Political-Social

Shiraz

Monthly

Social

Tehran

Weekly

News

Bakhtaran

Three times per-week

Political-News

Tehran

Weekly

Political-Religious

Foman

—

—

Tehran

Kliede-Nejat (The Key of
Salvation)

Weekly

Political-News

Tabriz

Kucabe-Iran (The Star of
Iran)

Three times per-week

Political-News

Tehran

Lawa-ye-Islam (The Banner
of Islam)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Isfahan

Mashreq (The East)

Weekly

News

Tabriz

Navid (GladTidings)

Weekly

—

Tehran

Name

(TheAgeofFelicity)
Bahare-Khorasan
(The Spring of Khorasan)

Ferdus (Paradise)
Garbe-Iran
(The West oflran)
Gulshan (Flower of Garden)
Jangal (Forest)
Khurshid (The Sun)

Parvin (Plêiades)

Three times per-week

Politicai

Tehran

Seda-ye-Iran (The Voice of
Iran)

Three times per-week

Political-News

Tehran

Daily

News

Tehran

Weekly

Literature

Tehran

Weekly

Politicai

Tabriz

Setare-Iran (The Star of Iran)
Surushe-Iran
(The Message of Iran)
Tajaddud (^evivaí)
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Weekly

Politicai

Tabriz

Monthly

Hygienic-Medicine

Tehran

Vatan (Fatherland)

Threetimesper-week

Political-News

Tehran

Zabane-Azad

Threetimesper-week

PoUtical-Literature

Tehran

Taltia-ye-Saadat
(Vanguard of Felicity)
Tebbe-Musawwar
(The Dlustrated Medicine)

(Free Language)

News

Table 12
Publications —1918

Frequency

Subject

Location

Monthly

Cultural-Social

Tehran

Daily

Social-News

Mashhad

Monthly

Literature-Social

Tehran

T w o weekly

Literature-Humorous

Tehran

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Shiraz

Istakhr (Pool)

Weekly

Political-Social

Shiraz

Kashefe-Asrar (Discovery of
Secrets)

Weekly

Political-News

Isfahan

Khulde-Bairn (Eternal Heaven)

Weekly

News

Tabriz

Kuhak (An d^rmenian Journal)

-

-

Tabriz

Majalleh Adabi (The Literature
Magazine)

Bi- weekly

Literature-Scientific

Tehran

Once every two
month

Scientific-Literature

Tehran

Three times per-week

News-Political

Tehran

Weekly

--

Tehran

Twice per-week

News

Tabriz

Subhe-Saadat (The Felicity of
Morning)

Weekly

Social

Rasht

Talia-Saadat (The Vanguard of
Felicity)

Daily-Weekly

Social-News

Bakhtaran

Weekly

Social

Shiraz

Name
Amuzghar (Teacher)
Bahar (Spring)
Daneshkadeh (Faculty)
Gule-Zard (Yellow Flower)
Gulistan (Rose Garden)

Majalleh-Al-Adab (The
Literature Magazine)
Qiyame-Sharq (The Rising of
East)
Rastiy (True)
Sharq (The East)

Zendegani (Life)
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Table 13
News Publications—1919
Name

Frequency

Subject

Location

Monthly-Irregular

Scientific-Social

Kerman

Monthly

Literature-Scientific

Tehran

-

-

Anzali

Weekly

—

Tehran

Monthly

Social-Literature

Isfahan

Weekly

Political-News

Shiraz

Monthly

Social

Rasht

Twice weeklyMonthly

Economic-Scientific

Tehran

Monthly

Scientific-Technical

Tehran

Weekly

Political-Literature

Tehran

Marifat (Knowledge)

Bi- weekly

Cultural-Social

Isfahan

Mihan (Motherland)

Twice per-week

Political-Cultural

Isfahan

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Tehran

Bi- weekly

News

Tehran

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Tehran

-

-

-

Salamat (Health)

Twice per-week

Political-News

Mashhad

Sharqe-Iran (The E ^ t of Iran)

Twice per-week

Political-Religious

Mashhad

Weekly

News

Tabriz

Once every fifteen
days

Political-Social

Isfahan

Adab (Manner)
Akhtare-Danesh (The Star of
Knowledge)
Al Badr'ul-Munir
Aravad or Sobh (Morning)
Armaqan (Present)
Baharestan
Baladiyyeh (Municipality)
Falahat-va-Tejarat (Trade and
Agricultura!)
Fanni (Technical)
Hayate-Javid (Immortal Life)

Nameh Musawar-Iqbal
(IqbaTs Illustrated Letter)
Paykar (Strife)
Rahnama (Guide)
Ruitry

Shomale-Gharb (The Eastern
of North)
Zabane-Zanan ( W o m e h s
Language)
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Table 14
N e w s Publications—1920
Frequency

Subject

Location

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Tabriz

—

—

Tehran

Weekly

Scientific-Literature

Isfahan

Al-Kamal (Perfection)

—

—

Tehran

Aliyans-Faransses

—

—

Tehran

Once every two
months

Ethical-Cultural

Tehran

Monthly

Literature-Social

Tehran

Bi- weekly

News

Tehran

Weekly

Political-Social

.Anzali

Bi- weekly

Humorous

Tabriz

Weekly

Humorous

Tehran

Twice per-week

Politicai

Rasht

Danesh (Knowledge)

Monthly

Seientific-Social

Mashhad

Dunya ye-Iran (The World of
Iran)

Monthly

Literature-Scientific

Shiraz

Farhang (Culture)

Monthly

Cultural

Rasht & Tehran

Fekre-Azad (Free Thought)

Monthly

Literature-Cultural

Shiraz

Garne-Bistum (The Twenty
Century)

Weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Twice per-week

Political-News

Rasht

Hallaj (Beater)

Weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Inqelabe-Sorkh (The Red
Revolution)

Weekly

Political-News

Rasht

Iqtesade-Iran (The Economy of
Iran)

Weekly

Economic-News

Tehran

Iran-Javan (Young Iran)

—

Social-News

Tehran

Irane-Surkh (Red Iran)

—

Politicai

Rasht

Irane-Tazeh (New Iran)

Twice per-week

News

Hamadan

Name
Adab (Manner)
Ahan (Iron)
Akhtare-Massud

Alame-Nasavan (The World of
Women)
Armaqan (Present)
Asayesh (Rest)
Badre-Munir (Moon Shining)
Berjis (Guipure)
BubukhorLolo

(Bugbe«ar)

Communist

Gilan

298

Jangal (Forest)

-

-

Rasht

Once every three
months

Literature-Social

Tabriz

Monthly

Scientific-Historical

Shiraz

-

—

--

Manarat

Weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Mulla-Nasr'udin

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Tabriz

Rahnama (Guide)

Threetimesper-week

Social-News

Tehran

Ruznameh-i-Divar-Kobe-Rusta
(The wall Paper of Village)

Irregular

Political-News

Rasht

Sa'adat (Felicity)

Weekly

Politicai

Tehran

Salah (Advisability)

Weekly

News

Tehran

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Tehran

Tebbi (Medicine)

Monthly

Medicai

Tehran

Tahzib (Refining)

Weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Urizan (.An Armenian Journal)

—

—

Tabriz

Usule-Talimat (The Principies
of Education)

Monthly

Scientific-Cultural

Tehran

Kaqasar or Dostare-Hunar
(Lover to M)
Khawar (East)
Ma'd

Seda-ye-Tehran (The Voice of
Tehran)

Table 15
N e w s Publications — 1 9 2 1
Frequency

Subject

Location

Weekly

Cultural

Mashhad

Threetimesper-week

Economic-Social

Isfahan

Al-Nejat (Salvation)

...

—

Tehran

Amuzesh (Education)

Weekly

News

Rasht

Ankar

-

--

—

Ásia

Monthly

Social

Tehran

Asrare-Jalali

Weekly

News

Hamaddan

Name
Akhlaq (Ethic)
Akhghar (Ember)

Asraru'l-Ansar (The Secrets
ofFriend)
Asre-Azaã (The Age of
Freedom)
Azadistan
Bidari (Awakening)

Chaman (Grass)
Donya-ye-Iran (The World
oflran)

Monthly

Ethical-Literature

Isfahan

Daily-Weekly

Political-Social

Shiraz

Bi-weekly

Cultural-Literature

Tabriz

Weekly-Once every ten
days

News

Rasht

Threetimesper-week

Social-News

Mashhad

Monthly

—

Mashhad

Ghurresh (Thunder)

Weekly

News

Isfahan

Gholle-Atashi (Fiery
Flower)

Weekly

Political-News

Shiraz

Once everyfifteendays

Humorous-Literature

Shiraz

—

-

—

Gulush

Weekly

—

Shiraz

Harzan or Ofoq (Horizon)

Weekly

Political-Social

Tehran

Hegola orNejat (Salvation)

Weekly

News

Tehran

—

—

—

Monthly

Ethical-Scientific

Tehran

Weekly

Social

Shiraz

Bi-weekly

Political-News

Tehran

Three times per-week

News-Political

Tehran

Bi- weekly

-

Mashhad

Weekly

Political-Economic

Tehran

Three times per-week

—

Mashhad

Jarideh-Sabah (Journal of
Morning)

Monthly

Social

Bakhtaran

Kargar (Worker)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Khoy

Monthly

Social

Burujird

Gholle-Surkh (Red flower)
Gholle-Zendegi (Flower of
Life)

Huquq (Law)
Ilm-va-Akhlaq (Science and
Ethic)
Ilm-va-Tarbiyat (Science and
Education)
Irane-Askhadavur or
Karegare-Irani (Iraniaan
Worker)
Islah (Reform)
Jahane-Zanan (The World of
Women)
Jannat (Paradise)
Jarideh-Khurasan (Journal of
Khorasan)

Marifat (Knowledge)
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Mehre-Munir (Shining of
Effeeting)

Weeldy

Economic-News

Mashhad

Twice per week

Political-Cultural

Tehran

Mellat (Nation)

Weekly

Political-Social

Shiraz

Nameh-Melli (National
Letter)

Weekly

—

Tehran

Bi-weekly

—

Tehran

Weekly

Political-News

Tehran

Weekly-once every
fifteen days

Literature-Ethical

Isfahan

Weekly

News

Shiraz

Daily

News

Tehran

Weekly

Political-Social

Isfahan

Sohail (Canopus)

Weekly

Political-News

Malayer

Takamul (Evolution)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Tabriz

Tebbe-Konuni (The Present
Medicai Professional)

Monthly

S cientific-Medicine

Mashhad

Tehrani Ayag or SobheTehran (Morning of Tehran)

—

Political-News

Tehran

Usulle-Talim (The Principie
of Education)

Monthly

Literature-Cultural

Tehran

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Tehran

Weekly

Social

Tehran

Mihan-Yomiyeh
of Daily)

(Country

Namehe-Banuwan
Letter)

(Ladies's

Ranjbare-Irani (Iranian's
Toiling)
Seda-ye-Isfahan (The Voice
of Isfahan)
Seda-ye-Junub (The Voice
of South)
Sharqe-Vosta (Middle East)
Subhe-Ummid
Hope)

(Morning of

Zabane-Iran
(language oflran)
Zanane-Iran (Iran's W o m e n )
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Table 16
N e w s Publications—1922
Name
Afkar (Thought)

Frequency

Subject

Daily-weekly

Political-Social

Ahshuyrush

Weekly

News

Akhbare-Amri (Directive News)

Monthly

Politicai

Asre-Jadid (New .Age)

Weekly

Political-Social

AzadiTreé)

Weekly

News-Cultural

Badr (Full Moon)

Weekly

Political-Historical

Baharestan

Three times per-week-weekly

Political-News

Baide-Shomal

Weekly

News

Baladiyyeh (Municipality)

Bi-weekly-monthly

Social-News

Dasture-Okhwat (Command of
Brotherhood)

Weekly

Political-Humorous

Edalat (Justice)

Weekly

Political-Historical

Eqdam (Action)

Daily

Political-News

Farda (Tomorrow)

Weekly

Social

Faryad (Shout)

Twice per-week

Political-News

Ferdowsi

Once every two months

Literature-Scientific

Furoqe-Tarbiyat (Brightness of
Education))

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Ghararne-Bistom (The twenty
Century)

Three times per-week

Political-Humorous-Critical

Haqiqat (True)

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Irane-Azad (Free Iran)

Daily

Political-News

Isteqamat (Perseverance)

Twice per-week

News

Ittehad (Union)

Daily

News-Political

Ittelaate-Uromiya (Daily
Information)

Daily-weekly

News

Jahan-Zanan (The World of
Women)

Monthly

Khalq (Mass)

Weekly

Political-News

Khorasan

Weekly

News

Kord

Weekly

Political-News

Twice per-week

News-Political

Weekly

Political-Religious

Monthly

Political-Social-Military

Monthly

—

Twice per week

Political-Humorous

Nejate-Iran (Salvation oflran)

Weekly

-

Neda-yi-Dehqan (The Voice of
Peasant)

Weekly

News

Nehzate-Sharq (Movement of the
East)

Twice per-week

Political-Religious

Nure Kianak or Zendegi Nuw
(New Life)

Twice per-week

Political-News

Nuroz (New Day)

Weekly

Social-Literature

Qanun (The L a w )

Daily-Weekly

Political-Social

Weekly-Monthly

Scientific-Technical

Raporte-Amaliyat (Report of
Operation)

Yearly

Medicine-News

Rustaie (Peasant)

Weekly

Cultural-Social

Sadeh (Decade)

Monthly

Literature-Historical

Saeqeh (Thunder)

Weekly

News-Socidal

Sahiyeh-va Omure-Khiriyeh

Monthly

Scientific-Hygienic

Sayhe-Asemani (Heavenly
Thunder)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Three per-week

Politicai

Shqfaqe-Sorkh (Red Aurora)

Three times per-week-Daily

Political-News

Shire-Koh (Lion of Mount)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Siyasat (Politic)

Twice times per-week

Political-Critical

Tabiyat (Nature)

Monthly

Humorous-Literature

—

—

Tofan (Deluge)

Three per-week

Political-News

Yqanegi (Unity)

Monthly

Social

Kerdar (Behaviour)
Mahe-Naw

(New M o o n )

Mahnamehe-Artesh
Journal)

(The Army

Mahtaban
Nahid (Vénus)

Qoshon (Military Forces)

Setare-Sharq (Stdar of the East)

Talieh-Afkar (Vanguard of
Thought)
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Zabane-Zanan (The Language of
Women)

Monthly

Educational-Literature

Zanbor (Bee)

Weekly

Political-Social

Zareh (Farmer)

Weekly

Social

Table

News
Name

17

Publications—1923
Frequency

Subject

Weekly

News-Social

—

—

Twice per-week

Social-News

Weekly

Social-Economic

Asia-Markazi (Central .Ásia)

Daily

Social-News

Asia-Vosta (Medial Ásia)

Daily

Political-News

Twice per-week

News

Ofuqe-Roshan (The Light of
Horizon)

Weekly

Political-News

Enteqad (Criticism)

Weekly

Social

Inekas (Reflection)

Twice per-week

News

Daily

News-Political

Irane-Kohan (Old Iran)

Weekly

Socidal

Irane-Mostaqel (Independent of
Iran)

Weekly

—

Bi- weekly

Social

Weekly

News

—

—

Bidar (Awake)

Daily

Political-News

Partow (Ray)

Threetimesper-week

Literature

Parvaneh (Butterfly)

Weekly

News

Paykan (.Arrow-Head)

Twice per-week

Political-News

Azar
Majalleh-Azar (Azar Magazine)
Astaneh-Razavi
Ásia

Islami (Islamic)

Irane-Imruz (Today's Iran)

Baran (Rain)
Bahre-Khazar (Caspian Sea)
Buhlull -be-Jayeh- Azadi

Pajuhesh (Research)

Daily-weekly

News

Paikar (Battle)

Three times per-week

Taziyaneh-Ibrat (Scourge
Warning

Weekly

Toh-Fatul-Odaba (Present of
Literary M a n )

Monthly-once every three months

Taqdire-Akhlaq (Moral of
Destine)

Weekly

Social

Jamea-Islami (The Islamic
Society)

Weekly

Islamic

Hesare-Addl (Limitation of
justice)

Daily-weekly

Social-Humorous

Hayat (Life)

Three times per-week

Political-News

Khandeh (Laugh)

Weekly

Humorous

Ha'yate-Iran (Life oflran)

Twice times per-week

Political-News

Khorsid (The Sun)

Monthly

Social-Literature

Dabestan (Primary School)

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Donya-ye-Imroz (Today's World)

Weekly

Scientific-Social

Donya-ye-Iran (World of Iran)

Weekly

Political-News

Ruznameh-ye-Islami (Islamic
Paper)

Daily

News

Sepahyan (dArmy)

Once every twenty days

Historical-Literature

Junub (South)

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Sehate-Iran (Honesty of Iran)

Weekly

News

Sepidehdam (Dawn)

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Shams (Sun)

Weekly

Economic-News

Saadate-Junub (Prosperity of the Weekly
South)
Shahab (Meteor)

Three times per-week

Political-Literature

Scientific-Literature

Politicai

News-Political

Sedaye-Islam (The Vice of Islam) Twice per-week

Political-Social

Sedaye-Asia (The Voice of Ásia) Weekly

News

Saihe(Shout)

Weekly

Political-News

Teb (Medicine)

Monthly

Hygienic-Medicine

Tobiat (Nature)

Weekly-Monthly

Literature-Humorous

Asre-Nuw (New Age)

Weekly

News

Amai (Action)

Weekly

—

Fruqe-Khavar (Brightness of
East)

Weekly

News

Frah-va-har (d\n Zoroastrian
Journ«al)

Weekly

News

Twice per-week

Political-Critical

Flaq (Twilight)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Qalame-Pak (The Right Pen)

Weekly

Politicai

Daily

News

Qiyam (Rising)

Three times per-week

News-Political

Kar (Working)

Three times per-week

Political-Social

Qiyam be-Haq (Raising to Right)

Weekly

Political-Social

Karegar (Worker)

Weekly

Keshavarz (Farmer)

Weekly

Agricultural

Goftare-Rast (True Speech)

Weekly

Political-Social

Golle Atashi

Weekly

Political-News

Golzar (Rose Garden)

Monthly

Literature

Mah (Moon)

Weekly

Social

Ganjineh-Ma'arefÇTTeaswe of
Knowledge)

Monthly

Scientific-Literature

Majalleh-Tazkkur (Reminding
Journal)

Bi-weekly

Religious-Social

—

—

Fekre-Azad (Free Thought)

Qiyamat (Resurrection)

Majalleh-Huquq (Law Magazine)

—

Majalleh-Homi (Journal of the
Osprey)

Monthly

Merat'ul-Al-Melleh (Mirror of
Nation)

Weekly

—

Meraat (Mirror)

Weekly

Social

Makhzane-Danesh (Tr-easure of
Knowledge)

Weekly

Social

Mardane-Kar (Workmen)

Twice per-week

Social-Political

Marde-Azad (Free M e n )

Daily

Social-News

—

_

MarghiTAed)

Social-Literature
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Mesbah (Light)

Monthly

Social

Mamat-va-Hayat (life and Died)

Monthly

Technical

Nameh-Amal (Letter of Actions)

Twice per-week

News

Nameh-Farhang (Letter of
Culture)

Twice per-week

Social-News

Nejate-Iran (Salvation oflran)

Twice per-week

Social-News

Neda-ye-Asemani (Heavenly
Voice)

Weekly

News

Neda-ye-Iran (Voice oflran)

Three times per-week

Political-News

Nur (Light)

Weekly

—

Nahzate-Islami (The Isl«amic
Movement)

Weekly

Social-Religious

Hayyem

Weekly

News

Yaghma (Plunder)

Monthly

Literature

Table

News

Name
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Publications—1924
Frequency

Subject

Addl (The Justice)

Weekly

News

Aflak (Firmament)

Weekly

Politicai

Ahang (Music)

Weekly

Political-Social

Bi-weekly

Political-News

Daily

News

Aieneh-Afkar (The Mirror of
Thought)

Weekly

News

Aiena-Khlqat (The Custom of
Creation)

Daily

News

—

—

Three per-week

Political-News

Ahde-Inqlab (The Age of
Revolution)
Ahde-Tajaddud (The Age of
Modernisation)

Al-Haq (Justify)
Asman (Sky)
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Asre-Nahzat (The A g e of
Movement)

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Weekly

Political-News

Azadi (Freedom)

Weekly

Political-Economic-Humorous

Azadi-ye-Sharq (Freedom of the
East)

Monthly

News

Twice per-week

Political-Social

j\zemate-Islam (The Greatness of
Islam)

Weekly

Political-Religious

Bahare-Delkash (Nice Spring)

Weekly

Literature-News

Banuvar or Karegar (Worker)

Daily-Weekly

News-Economic

Bidari (Awaking)

Daily-Weekly

Political-Social

Binul-Nahrain

Weekly

News

Danesh-Pajuhan (Researchers)

Weekly

News-Cultural

Four times per-week

Political-News

Monthly

Social

Daily

News

Ganjineh-Danish (The Treasury
of Knowledge)

Weekly

Cultural-Social

Gharbe-Iran (The East of Iran)

Twice per week

News

Weekly

Politicai

Haeyona

Daily

Political-News

Hay'ate-Addl (Justice of Life)

Daily

News

Weekly

Economic-News

Once every three months

Scientific-Literature

Daily

News

Weekly

News-Social

Daily

News-Political

Jangale-Muwla (The Lord's
Jungle)

Weekly

Humorous-Cri tical

Jaredeh Tehran (Magazine of
Tehran)

Weekly

Social

Asre-Tammaddun
Civilisation)

(The A g e of

Azar

Democracy
Farrukhi (Auspicious)
Fekre-Iran (The Thought of Iran)

Gharne-Chardahum (The
Fourteen Century)

Iqtesad (Economy)
Iran
Iran-Nuwin (New Iran)
Irteqa (Progress)
Jannate-Adan (Paradise)
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/ovierf (Eternal)

Weekly

—

Jnub (The South)

Weekly

Political-Religious

Karun (River Karun)

Weekly

Political-News

Khurshid (The Sun)

Weekly

Political-News

Khurshid-i-Iran (The Sun oflran)

Weekly

Political-Social

Korna (Trumpet)

Weekly

Scientific-Literature-Humorous

Once every three months

Economic

Lavai-Bainul Nahrain

Weekly

Scientific-Literature

Mahshar (Gathering Place of
Manlrind on the day of
Judgement)

Weekly

Political-Social

Bi- monthly

Religious-Ethical

Marde-Kar (Workmen)

Weekly

Political-Religious

Nahzate-Iran (The Movement of
Iran)

Weekly

Social-Economic

Naleh-Iran (The Cry oflran)

Weekly

Nameh-Javanan (Youth Letters)

Weekly

Political-Social

Nameh-Kherad-Pajuhan

Monthly

Literature

Weekly-monthly

Social-Scientific

Naseru-Malleh

Weekly

Political-Economic

Nasihat (Admonition)

Weekly

Economic-News

Nasime-Sabah (The Breeze of the
Zephyr)

Weekly

Social-Literature

Nehzate-Islam (Islamic
Movement)

Weekly

Social-Religious

Nejate Vatan (The Country's
Salvation)

Weekly

News

Neda-ye-Gilan (The Voice of
Gilan)

Daily

Political-News

Nure-Bakalam orPayame-Nur
(Message of the Light)

Weekly

Social-Cultural

Padash (Reward)

Monthly

Gozareshe-Rayese-Kole-Maliyeh
Iran (Iran's Official Financial
Report)

Majallehe-Al-Islam (The Islamic
Journal)

Nasavane-Vatankhah (The Patriot

Women)

raniavi
Parvaresh (Education) in Rdasht
and Qazvin

Weekly-Monthly

Military-Scientific

Daily-Weekly

Political-Social-Critical

Payam (Message)

Weekly

_

Payame-Jadid (New Message)

Monthly

Social

Qalame-Azad (The Free Pen)

Bi-weekly

Political-Literature

Monthly

Agricultural

Ranjbar (Toiling)

Weekly

Political-News

Rastakhiz (Resurrection)

Weekly

Sa'adate-Vatan (Felicity of
Fatherland)

Weekly

—

Sa'adate Iran (Felicity oflran)

Weekly

Political-Social

Sabi-Al-Reshad (Direction of

Weekly

Religious-Social

Rahnam-ye-Dehghan
Farmer Guide)

(The

Way)
Saha

.—

Seda-ye-Sharq (The Voice of
East)

Weekly

News

Shai (Ray)

Weekly

News

Shoaleh (Fl.ame)

Weekly

Political-Social

Bi-weekly

Political-Religious

Weekly

Social

Bi- weekly

Political-News

Weekly

Social-News

Twice per-week

Scientific -Politicai

Tanbih ul-Ghafelin (Admonition
Unaware)

Monthly

Social

Tawfiq (Success)

Weekly

Humorous-Critical

Tebbe-Jadid (New Medicai
Professional)

Monthly

Medicine

Tejarat (Trade)

Monthly

Economic

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Siyasate-Islam (Policy of Islam)
Sohail (Canopus)
Surushe-Iran (Message oflran)
Taliahe-Qoads (The Holiness
Vanguard)
Tamaddun (Civilisation)

Tulu (The D a w n )
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Ulume-Maliyh va Iqtissad
(Commence and Economic
Sciences)

Once every three months

Ummid (Hope)

Twice per-week

Political-News

Vcfa (Fidelity)

Monthly

Literature-Social

Vaqt (Time) Printed in Mashhad
and Rasht

Twice per-week

News

Economic

Table 19
News Publications—1925
Frequency

Subject

Daily

News

Aftabe-Sharq (The Sun of East)

Three times per-week

Political-Social

Akhtare-Sharq (St-ar of the East)

Weekly

Asare-Jam (The Traces of
Goblet)

Weekly

Asayesh (Rest)

Twice per-week

News

Three times per-week

News

Atashfeshan (Volcano)

Weekly

Political-Literature

Azad (Free)

Weekly

Political-Economic

Azar

Weekly

News

Azar-Abadgan

Weekly

News-Social

Name

Afkare-Sutodeh
(Worthy Thought)

Social-Religious

Asre-Nuw (The New Age)

Atash (Fire)

Azemate-Iran (Greatness oflran)

Twice per-week

News

Weekly

Socidal-News

Badre-Munir (Shining Fullmoon)

Daily

Political-Social

Bahare- Sharq (Spring o the Edast)

Weekly

News

Bani Hashimi

Weekly

Politica]

Three times per-week

News-Political

Weekly

Ethical-Historical

Daneshkadeh (Faculty)

Monthly

Literature-Scientific

Daste-Intiqam

Weekly

Political-News

Erfan (Knowledge)

Weekly

Social-Scientific

Fallah (Happiness)

Weekly

News

Farhang (Culture)

Weekly

Farsnameh (Persian's letter)

Weekly

News

Twice per-week

Political-Literature

Fekre-Javan (Young Thought)

Weekly

Political-Critical

Gharbal (Riddle)

Weekly

Political-News

Iblagh (Conveyance) in Shiraz
and Tehran

Twice per-week

News-Political

Isteqamat (Persevere)

Twice per-week

Political-Literature

Azemate-Sharq
(Greatness of the East)

Bayane-Haqiqat (Expression of
True)

Bustan (Garden)

Fekre-Azad (Free Thought)

Ittellate-Bisim-va -Seta

Ittihade-Islam (Unity of Iskirn)

Twice per-week

Political-News

Three times per-week

News

Ittehade-Sharq (Unity of the East)

Jahannama (Cosmorama)

Weekly

Political-Social

Kaqapar orArman (Ideas)

Weekly

Soci^-News

Kukabe-Deakhshan

Bi- weekly

News

(Bright ofthe Star)

Mashreq (The East)

Bi-weekly

Mihyman & Ranjbar (Toiling)

Weekly

Merrikh (Mars)

Weekly

Nameh-Azad (Free Letter)

Weekly

Nameh-Tajaddud

Three times per-week

News

Social-Cultural

Scientific-News

Political-Literature

(Modernisation Letter)

Nurqfkan (Search Light)

Weekly

Paik (Courier)

Twice per-week

News-Social

News

Parsad

Parwaneh (The Moth)

Weekly

Pulad (Steel)

Three times per-week

Qazai (Judicial)

Bi-weekly

Political-Literature

Social-Scientific

Judicial

Salahe-Bashar

Twice per-week

Political-Social

Weekly

News

S/wr? (The East)

Monthly

Literature-Historical

Sehat (Health)

Monthly

Medicine-Hygienic

Subhe-Sadeq ( True Dawn)

Weekly

News

Swat (Face)

Weekly

Humorous

Takhte-Jamshid (Persepolis)

Weekly

News

Monthly

Social

Daily

News

Weekly

Social

(Godness of H u m a n )

Sarfarf (Frontier)

Shahpur

Tanha (Alone)

Targhib (Persu»asion)

Tariqe- Nejat
(The W a y of Salvation)
Tarjumane-Haqiqat (Expression

Monthly

ofthe Right)

Traqi (Progress)

Three times per-week

Ufoqe-Iran (Horizon of Iran)

Weekly

Political-News

Urdibehesht

Weekly

News

Waqt (Time)

Monthly

Ziya-ye-Sharq (Light of the East)

Three times per-week

News

Social-News
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APPENDIX FOUR

IRANIAN PRESS—1837-1925
NEWS PUBLICATION TABULATIONS
Table 1
Types of Publications.. 1837-1925
Type of publication

Number

Percent

Periodic Journals

983

81.7

Shabnameh
(Nocturnal Letters)

90

7.4

Exile Papers

130

Total

1203

10.8
100

Table 2
Distribution of Newspapers Before the Revolution
Percent
During years
During years
The place of
1900-1906
1837-1900
pubUcation
67.4
16
29
Tehran
17

Percent
40
42.5

Tabriz

9

20.9

Rezayieh

3

6.9

—

—

Shiraz

1

2.3

—

—

Isfahan

1

2.3

2

5

Mashhad

—

—

2

5

Hamadan

—

—

1

2.5

Bushir

—

—

2

5

Total

43

100

40

100

316

Figure 1
Types of Publications 1837-1925
Number (X)

1000

983

900

500

130
90

100

0
Periodic Journals
|_

Nocturnal Letters
(Shabnameh)

Exile Papers
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Table 3
Subject of Publications—1837-1925
Subject

Number

Percent

Agricultural

8

0.41

Artistic

2

0.10

Criticai

28

1.44

Cultural

69

3.56

Economic

66

3.4

Ethical

77

3.98

Historical

60

3.1

Humorous & Jokes

57

2.94

Hygienic

12

0.62

Judicial & Legal

11

0.56

Literature

152

7.86

Medicai Professional

15

0.77

News

508

26.2

PoUtical

457

23.6

Religious

41

2.12

Scientific & Technical

105

5.43

Social

265

13.7

Total

1933

100
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Figure 2
Subject of
Number (X)

Publications—1837-1925
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Table 4
Frequency of
According to: Frequency

Publications—1837-1925
Number

Percent

Four times per-week

5

0.9

Daily

84

7.2

Threetimesper-week

65

5.5

Twice per-week

104

8.9

Weekly

592

50.5

Once every ten days

6

0.51

Bi-weekly

33

2.8

Once every fifteen days

15

1.23

Once every twenty days

1
129

11.

Bi-monthly

4

0.3

Once every three month

9

0.76%

Yearly

7

0.59%

Occasionally

118

10.

Total

1172

100

Monthly

320

Table 5
Langua ?e of Publications—1837-1925
According to: language

Number

Percent

Armenian

32

41.5

French

5

6.5

Hebrew

1

1.3

Kaldani

6

7.8

Persian & Arabic

3

3.9

Persian 8c Arabic & French

1

1.3

1

1.3

Persian & Hebrew

2

2.6

Persian 8c Russian

3

3.9

Persian & Turkish

6

7.8

Persian & French

10

12.9

Turkish

7

9.1

Total

77

100

Persian & Gilak (A Local
language)

321

Table 6
Place of Publication—1837-1925
According to:
Number
The place of pubUcation
Ahvaz
1

Percent

AnzaU

4

0.5

dArak

2

0.2

dArdebil

1

Bakhtaran (Kermanshah)

11

1.1

Bmjird

2

0.2

Bushir

2

0.2

Foman

1

Hamadan

14

1.4

Isfahan

55

5.6

Kashan

2

0.2

Khoy

8

0.8

Khoramshahr

1

Kerman

14

1.4

Laliiyjan

2

0.2

Malayyar

1

Mashhad

52

5.3

Qazvin

11

1.1

Qum

1
64

6.6

1

0.1

Shiraz

59

6.

Tabriz

101

10.4

Tehran

543

55.7

Rasht
Ray

Turbate-Hydariyya

1

Uromiya

13

1.3

Yazd

8

0.8

Total

975

100

